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The National Planning Policy Framework was adopted in March 
2012, promoting sustainable development as a 'golden thread' 
running through the whole document. Since then, the concept of 
sustainable development has been a key or sole consideration 
in the determination of applications for planning permission.  
This research is a detailed consideration of that concept within 
and without the Framework. 
 
The research begins by identifying the traditional 
understandings of the term from its use in international and 
national policy documents since 1972.   It continues with an 
examination of sustainable development in the Framework to 
see if a meaning can be derived from analysing its language or 
from a detailed review of decisions taken where it is applied as 
a criterion.  The research includes a comparative analysis of 
relevant planning appeal decisions and court judgments in the 
twenty months from formal adoption of the Framework. 
 
Neither the appeal decisions nor the court rulings enable any 
reliable conclusions to be drawn on what sustainable 
development means within the Framework. They do show that 
the Secretary of State has an almost unfettered discretion to 
decide the meaning of sustainable development on a case by 
case basis without regard to its interpretation and definitions 
outside the Framework.   
 
Sustainable development has no formally agreed or legally 
enforceable definition.  Unless and until such a definition is 
secured, the Secretary of State and the courts will assign 
mutating meanings to the term on a case by case basis.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Context 
 
“'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means  
Just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'”1 
 
In 2012 the Supreme Court considered the exercise by Dundee Council of its decision-
making powers in the context of an application for planning permission for a superstore.  The 
Council’s approach to the interpretation of its policies came in for particular criticism from 
Lord Reed.  Drawing on Alice’s further adventures in Wonderland he remarked that 
“planning authorities do not live in the world of Humpty Dumpty: they cannot make the 
development plan mean whatever they would like it to mean”.2   
 
While Carroll’s Wonderland is an unlikely legal source, words and their meaning are as 
important for the English planning system in 2017 as they were for Alice and Humpty 
Dumpty in their exchange some 140 years earlier.   
 
This research focusses on two words - sustainable development – and a presumption in its 
favour in the particular context of the National Planning Policy Framework 2012 (‘the 
Framework’). It is an investigation of the use of those words in a specific context at a specific 
time, asking the following questions: 
 What sustainable development is generally understood to mean outside the 
Framework; 
 How sustainable development is defined and interpreted within the Framework; 
 How sustainable development has been defined and interpreted in the practical 
application of the Framework; 
 The role of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (‘the 
Secretary of State’), and the courts in refining that meaning; 
 The consequences for the English planning system in 2017; 
 
The research is based on the following hypotheses: 
 That the legal mechanisms related to the determination of planning permission, are  
constructed so that the meaning of sustainable development in the Framework is 
derived on a retrospective, case-by-case basis in actual decisions made; 
                                                          
1 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (Collins Classics 2010) 83 
2 Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 13  
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 That Development approved as sustainable development within the terms of the 
Framework is not consistent with traditional or established understandings of the 
term; 
 That this derived meaning is inherently unstable, and  determined primarily by 
whatever the decision maker wants it to mean. 
 
In a recent meeting of the Public Bill Committee for the Neighbourhood Planning Bill a new 
clause 9 was proposed. The purpose of the clause was to confirm that achieving long term 
sustainable development was the purpose of planning was.  The clause included an 
explanation – including objectives - of what sustainable development meant in practice.3 The 
proposal was resisted by Gavin Barwell, the Minister for Housing and Planning, on the basis 
that it was not necessary to “write these things into legislation” because the goal was already 
met in both legislation and policy.  He also stated that the Government wished to preserve 
the ability to amend ‘the NPPF definition’ in the future through policy.   
 
The problem with this approach is that the Framework does not define sustainable 
development.  Instead, paragraph 6 states that “The policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken 
as a whole, constitute the Government’s view of what sustainable development in England 
means in practice for the planning system.”4  When sustainable development is ‘defined’ in 
this way, the outcome is that lawyers, not local authorities decide what it means in practice.  
The outcome is that simple policy terms such as ‘policies for the supply of housing’, become 
issues debated by the courts – in this case the Supreme Court in the ‘Hopkins Homes’ case 
due to be considered in February.5   
 
The research argues that a legal, or at least measurable, definition of sustainable 
development is needed so such outcomes can be avoided. 
 
This chapter sets the overall context and structure of the research. It outlines the origins of 
the English planning system and its interrelationship with planning law, introduces the key 
concerns of the research, reviews the literature relevant to those concerns, sets out the 
structure and scope of the work as a whole and summarises the methodological approaches 
employed. 
 
1.1 Origins of Planning and Planning Law 
                                                          
3 Neighbourhood Planning Bill Public Committee (eighth sitting) 27 October 2016 col 284 
4 Department for Communities and Local Government ‘National Planning Policy Framework’ (2012)  
5 Suffolk Coastal District Council v Hopkins Homes Ltd & Anor [2016] EWCA Civ 168 due to be 
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If the primary concerns of planning are a conscious engagement with the environment and a 
desire to shape it in a way that benefits society as a whole; then they can, as Rydin 
proposes, be aligned with the origins of western civilisation as a whole6.  However the birth 
of the modern English planning system is generally accepted as originating with Ebeneezer 
Howard and his concept of the garden city in his seminal work Garden Cities of Tomorrow,7 
while the first legislation giving conscious consideration to planning law is the 1909 Housing, 
Town Planning Act.   
 
The 1909 Act introduced concepts that at the time were unprecedented in terms of public 
interference with the use of private land.  It introduced the notion that a scheme for the 
development of private land might be legitimately prepared and approved by a public local 
authority whether or not that authority owned the land.   The local population as a whole, as 
well as the individual land owner, could seek to control and direct the use and development 
of land applying commonly agreed design principles.  All land could be considered a public 
as well as a private asset, and a vessel within which intangible rights such as ‘amenity’ were 
held for the benefit of the population as a whole.   Local authorities were given regulatory 
powers, so that landowners’ development ambitions could be restricted through the use of 
public powers.  Such public intervention was intended to ensure that new developments 
were not only safe and healthy but also had some consistency with aesthetic aspirations for 
the area as a whole, by being anticipated in a larger scheme or plan for that area.   
 
Between 1909 and the second world war, public powers to  created such plans extended in 
their scope as their relevance to the countryside as well as the town was recognised, but the 
foundations of the modern planning system were established with the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947. The 1947 Act established principles of development control that are 
familiar today. It assigned a statutory definition to the term ‘development’ encompassing both 
physical works in the form of building, mining, engineering or other physical operations, and 
changes of the use of buildings or other land so long as that change was material.  The Act 
went on to require that where any works or uses fell within this definition, the development 
could not take place, or be allowed to continue, unless a formal consent  - a planning 
permission - had been obtained for it.  The consent process involved the submission and 
publication of a formal application, and formal consideration of whether or not that 
application should be approved. As Booth recognises, introduction of the need for planning 
                                                          
6 Yvonne Rydin, The Purpose of Planning (Policy Press 2011) 
7 Ebeneezer Howard, Garden Cities of Tomorrow (2nd Edition Dodo Press 2009) 
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permission created a form of public ownership in the development of land, and made the 
local authority the curator of that interest8.  The decision was made by an officer of that 
authority or a committee made up of its members, and the person or body tasked with 
deciding whether or not to approve a planning application was required by law to apply a 
particular legal test.   
 
If, as McAuslen proposes, planning law is an arena where ideologies of public interest, 
private property and the right to participation intersect9, the intersection is shown most 
starkly in the determination of planning applications where individual property owners are 
required to offer their development aspirations up to public scrutiny and debate, and have 
those aspirations approved and regulated by local or national government bodies.   Section 
numbers have changed since 1947 but the principles have endured and still underpin the 
determination of all applications for planning permission on land in England.   
 
1.2 The legal test 
The current test for determining planning applications (‘the legal test’) is an amalgamation of 
sections from two different pieces of legislation. Section 70(2) of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990 requires the authority considering whether or not to grant planning 
permission should ‘have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so far as material’ 
while section 38(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 2004 requires that these 
determinations should be made ‘in accordance with the plan unless material considerations 
indicate otherwise’.  As Booth recently noted, the legal test “of profound significance for the 
way in which spatial planning operates within the UK… inviting the decision-maker to 
determine what regard must be paid to those things that she or he does deem to be 
material”10  
 
The words of the legal test have barely changed since 1947 but its operation always was, 
and remains, complex. The text operates as the locus for an intimate interaction of planning 
policy and law; a procedural scaffold enclosing a wide discretionary space within which a 
particular proposal is evaluated.  It requires the decision maker to consider the application  
against a specific policy context comprising  both the development plan policies relevant to 
the land and a wide range of relevant planning issues, where they are ‘material’ to the 
particular application.    
 
                                                          
8 Philip Booth  Planning by Consent (Routledge 2003) 6 
9 Patrick McAuslen The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press Ltd,1980)  
10 Philip Booth, ‘Planning and the Rule of Law’ (2016) Vol 17 Planning Theory & Practice, 344  
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The legal test does not, and cannot define which policies apply in each case.  It does not 
and cannot proscribe what weight is to be given by the decision make to each policy or 
material consideration. It does not and cannot state where the merits of a particular 
application lie.  Rather, the legal test enables a wide range of potential approaches to be 
taken to each application.  The decision maker has a broad range of potential choices: which 
development plan policies to choose; which considerations are more or less material than 
the others, and how they should be weighed against each other in deciding whether or not to 
grant permission.   In this process of balancing and assessment the weight given to policies, 
their impact in relation to particular applications is not fixed but can instead fluctuate 
depending on the writer, the reader and the physical and political context within which they 
are read and understood.   
 
This interaction of policy considerations mutates according to the development proposed, 
the site it is proposed for and the particular policy context. This context can be altered by the 
introduction of new local and national policies, the publication of new planning guidance or a 
government statement to parliament.  The focus and balance of this decision-making 
process can be fundamentally shifted through the introduction by government of overarching 
policy presumptions.  These presumptions are highly significant for their impact on the legal 
test. They are required to be taken into account so that a lack of proper regard to them will 
invalidate the decision as a whole.  They effectively require the decision-maker to adopt a 
particular bias in relation to the proposal even before the normal weighing process begins.   
 
1.3 Sustainable Development  
Sustainable development was first used as a term to describe a particular policy position in 
the report presented by Gro Harlem Brundtland to the UN General Assembly in 1987 (‘the 
Brundtland definition’).11  In that context it was used to describe an approach to development 
where first world nations placed conscious limits on their growth so as not to compromise the 
growth potential of other societies and future generations.   Since then the term has been 
widely used in international, national, regional and local policy contexts but has not acquired 
a legal or even formally recognised definition.  The Brundtland definition is often referred to 
but thirty years after it was used for the first time me there is still no generally agreed 
definition of what it is and no legal or enforceable standard.   
 
                                                          
11 World Commission on Environment and Development ‘Our Common Future’ (OUP 1987) 
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In 2012 the National Planning Policy Framework was adopted as the central national 
planning policy document12 introducing the concept of sustainable development into the 
heart of the planning process, as a ‘golden thread’ through the document and, in a 
metaphorical sense, the planning system itself.  From March 2012 the question of whether a 
particular proposal represented sustainable development would always be a material 
consideration in the determination of planning applications.  Moreover, where the existing 
development plan was ‘absent, silent or out of date’ then a presumption in favour of 
sustainable development had to be applied.     
 
The creation and adoption of the Framework represented a prime opportunity to adopt one 
of the many definitions of sustainable development available and impose it as a standard, 
but the opportunity was lost. The Framework includes the text of the Brundtland definition, 
and imports key components of the most recent UK Strategy on Sustainable Development, 
but there is no single definition of the sustainable development for Framework purposes 
except for paragraph 6 where it is contrived to mean development that is consistent with the 
aims of the Framework itself.   
 
Within the Framework, therefore, sustainable development is not so much a defined term but 
rather an evaluative touchstone. The question of whether or not a development is 
sustainable depends primarily on whether or not the development conforms to the 
Framework.   However, the Framework itself is nearly 60 pages long containing a large 
number of policies and covering a very wide range of policy considerations. Conformity with 
the whole of the document is in most cases, impossible while the evaluation of such 
conformity is still a subjective concern, an evaluation of competing claims that is very much 
for the decision maker alone.  The sustainability or otherwise of a proposal is thus decided 
on a case-by-case basis by each decision maker, depending on what part of the Framework 
the decision maker decides to refer to and the meaning and weight attributed to it.   
 
1.4 Politics and Planning 
Because the sustainability of a proposal depends largely on the discretion of the decision 
maker, the status of that person or organisation in the decision-making hierarchy is also 
significant.    Most planning decisions are made by a local authority planning officer or 
committee - or where that decision is contested, on appeal by a planning inspector – but it is 
the Secretary of State who is has the position of greatest significance as he is both the most 
significant actor in terms of policy setting and decision taking.   
                                                          
12 Department for Communities and Local Government ‘National Planning Policy Framework’ (2012)  
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The determination of planning decisions is not only more complex than appears from the 
words of the legal text, it is also highly sensitive to the particular socio-political context within 
which it is produced and adopted.   The Secretary of State’s functions are driven primarily 
towards the promotion of a particular political agenda.  He has the power to alter the policy 
context for determining an application without needing to enact any legislation through: 
 The imposition of new planning policies through issuing new guidance such as the 
Framework or through informal, immediate alterations to online National Planning 
Policy Guidance, or simply by statements to parliament.  New policies imposed by 
government in this way automatically become material considerations that must be 
taken into account in the planning process; 
 The introduction of new policy presumptions such as the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development which are immediate material considerations requiring a 
particular bias to be adopted by the decision-making individual or body that operates 
in parallel with the legal test. 
 
The Secretary of State is also the decision-maker on planning applications either through 
use of powers of ‘call in’ prior to the initial decision being taken or by ‘recovering jurisdiction’ 
of planning appeals from planning inspectors.  In any of these cases the legal test is applied 
de novo, and there is a reconsideration of the merits of the application against both the 
development plan and material considerations, including the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development. For cases of any scale or significance it is the Secretary of State – 
the same entity responsible for production and adoption of the Framework – who makes that 
key evaluation. 
  
Within the current decision-making hierarchy the Secretary of State is both a dominant actor 
in the making of planning policy and also the final arbiter of its meaning within the context of 
determining planning applications.   Decisions made by the Secretary of State can be 
challenged only on the basis of legal or procedural defect, not on issues of planning 
judgment.  So long as the legal test itself is observed, the courts will not intervene in the way 
in which sustainable development was defined, nor step in to impose their own 
understanding of the term.   
 
1.5 Literature review  
There is a wide range of material available on planning policy and planning law but little or 
nothing on this crucial intersection of the two disciplines. The field of planning is not short of 
critical, engaged self-reflection on what planning is and should be.  There is a substantial 
amount of literature on what planning is about, and for, the legitimate scope of planning 
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policy – what it is, how it should be formed, developed and applied, and on planning theory - 
traditional and new definitions, and the link between planning theory and practice and other 
social policies.    
 
Key texts from authors such as Healey13  Allmendinger 14 and Rydin15 consider in breadth 
and depth the conceptual origins and range of scope of planning, ranging from its role in 
economics and politics, its connections to social theory and its influence over physical 
development. These authors consider the role of the planner: as a social and political agent, 
interpreter of issues, promoter of communicative processes, policy analyst, and advocate for 
a particular perspective on and reaction to proposals for development planning and control.  
They also consider the role of the planning system and produce a variety of theories about 
what that system is for and how it functions, including the the complexity of power relations 
in the context of policy formulation and the ideologies underlying the system as a whole. 
 
Planning law is a parallel discipline that operates as a constant regulatory framework and 
constraint for planning theory and practice.  However, there is little or nothing in planning 
theory on the ideological foundations of planning law and no critical consideration of the 
intersection of law and policy in the determination of planning applications.   As Philip Booth 
recently remarked: “the importance of law in the day-to-day exercise of planning powers is 
acknowledged, the extent to which law and legal process has shaped the objects and 
practice of planning is much less well understood.16  In contrast to planning theory and 
policy, planning law is viewed as a value-neutral regulatory canon that cannot be questioned 
and is more often excluded from critical consideration.  The nature and purpose of town 
planning can be defined from a variety of perspectives; planning law seems to exist in an 
abstract, unquestioned, parallel universe.    
 
Rydin’s recent work: ‘the Purpose of Planning’ suggests that planning is a profession 
enduringly concerned and engaged with defining its role.17   Rydin proposes a range of ways 
of understanding the planning system: a form of collusive decision making (page 12); an 
interaction of governance networks (page 20); a space where conflict occurs (page 126).   
She does not mention the potential relevance of the legal test as the essential regulatory 
superstructure framing all decisions on planning proposals.  She does not consider the role 
                                                          
13 Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Palgrave Macmillan 2006);  
14 Philip Allmendinger, Planning Theory (Palgrave Press 2002) 
15 Yvonne Rydin, Y (2013) The Future of Planning: Beyond Growth Dependence  (Policy Press 2013) 
16 Philip Booth, ‘Planning and the Rule of Law’ (2016) Vol 17 Planning Theory & Practice, 344  
17 Yvonne Rydin, The Purpose of Planning (Policy Press 2011) 
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of the planning lawyer as a participant in regulating this system in day to day decision 
making, as the advocate when issues are re-determined by government, or the courts as 
significant actors in confirming the scope of administrative authority or the weight and 
significance of planning policies.  Allmendinger’s most recent work includes a detailed 
account of the development of a neoliberal agenda from the 1980s onwards but does not 
factor in the role of presumptions in the legal test as points where the balance of power 
shifted strongly towards development and growth, thus promoting that very 
agenda18.    
 
McAuslen suggests that the legal test for the determination of planning applications is 
viewed by planners as a covert weapon used by lawyers to insert themselves as unwanted 
visitors to the planning system.19   Whatever the reasons, there is relatively little 
consideration by planning academics on the operation of the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development in the Framework.    For example, there is an entire journal 
dedicated to the topic of sustainable development yet between January 2012 and 
September 2016 not one article was written looking at the way in which that term was used 
in the Framework20.   
 
 A comprehensive examination by the University of Cambridge Centre for Housing and 
Planning Research took the Framework into account but only in terms of its function as one 
of a range of potential planning constraints rather than questioning its validity as an 
evaluative criterion in the development consent process21.  A number of technical reports on 
the Framework have been produced by planning practitioners.  In March 2013 Savills 
produced a report assessing the impact of the Framework in terms of planning permissions 
issued22, and in 2014 three more reports came out – one from CPRE looking at the impact of 
the Framework on the countryside23, another from Glenigan detailing the effect of the 
Framework on the residential market24, and a third from Turley Associates looking at appeal 
statistics and how they were affected by the introduction of the Framework25.   These reports 
address the NPPF directly are useful in that they identify trends based on statistical analysis 
of the outcomes of applications and appeal decisions with some reference to particular 
                                                          
18 Philip Allmendinger  Neoliberal Spatial Governance (Routledge 2016) 
19 Patrick McAuslen The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press Ltd 1980) 
20 Sustainable Development edited by Prof Richard Welford, University of Technology, Sydney 
21 Gemma Burgess, Sarah Monk, Michael Jones, Professor Tony Crook, ‘Research on the nature of planning 
constraints (Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research 2014) 
22 Savills, ‘National Planning Policy Framework one year on’ (2013)  
23 CPRE ‘Community Control or Countryside Chaos? (2014)  
24 Glenigan ‘Residential Planning and the NPPF’ (2014)  
25 Chris Pickup, ‘The Impact of the National Planning Policy Framework on Decision Making’ (Turley 2014)  
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judgments.  However they produce data rather than argument and focus on outcomes rather 
than the processes behind them. They reveal the empirical impact of the Framework on 
decision making as a whole but never question its fundamental terms or ideological 
justification. There is no substantive critical analysis of the decisions themselves.  
 
Legal practitioners have a different, but equivalently limited focus on planning issues, 
concentrating on the operation of the legal test in terms of how it is considered in case law 
but rarely considering or questioning the role or meaning of policy. Planning lawyers produce 
copious amounts of material in the form of reviews of individual cases or analysis of 
emerging legislation but tend to avoid reflection on the significance of their own role as 
advocate, interpreter, or arbiter.  They focus on the legal substance of cases, summarising 
the key elements of significant judgments and occasionally question their future impact and 
rarely question its fundamental legitimacy by asking whether the law ought to be worded as 
it is or function as it does.    
 
This is epitomised in the approach of the legal profession to the legal test, which has since 
its introduction generated a significant amount of case law, and associated comment from 
practitioners.  The commentary is generally limited to summarising the treatment of the test 
in specific key cases and the way in which changes have been recognised, explained and 
reinforced in the associated case law rather than its evolution over the years.  The 
perspective adopted tends to be analytical rather than critical, accepting the new 
presumption as a fait accompli, without detailed consideration of the ideological foundations 
or merits of the term or its potential effect on the planning system.  The legitimacy of the 
legal test, and its effectiveness in actually delivering sustainable development, are rarely, if 
considered.  McAuslen is the only author to engage extensively and exclusively with 
planning ideologies, his main work on this issue was nearly 40 years ago and has not been 
updated26.  Booth presents a considered summary of the history of the decision making 
process and a range of relevant issues such as the competing concerns of private and public 
interest, and the difficulty of interpreting policy terms such as amenity but this work again 
predates the framework and, indeed, the new Coalition government27.  
 
The meaning of the new presumption did attract some critical attention when the draft 
Framework was published. Howell was bullishly optimistic about the potential impact of the 
presumption28 while Ellis was equivalently cautious and the only practitioner to question the 
                                                          
26 Patrick McAuslen The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press Ltd 1980) 
27 Philip Booth  Planning by Consent (Routledge 2003)  
28 John Howell,  ‘Keynote Address Planning Conference’ (2011) Volume 13 Journal of Planning & 
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merits of placing a mutable concept such as sustainable development as the driving principle 
behind planning decisions29.  However neither Ellis nor Howell have revisited their 
predictions following actual adoption of the document.   
 
The operation of the legal test as modified by the Framework was the central theme at the 
national planning law conference in 2013 which took "Untangling the Golden Thread", as its 
theme, but as McAuslen’s paper for that conference pointed out, none of the contributors 
engaged with the question of whether the Framework was ‘just’30.  Contributors 
acknowledged the potential of the NPPF to effect radical change in what could be permitted, 
but no one questioned whether the government ought to be able to make such radical 
changes simply by inserting a introducing a new planning policy document into a sixty year 
old legal test. Hardly any of the materials available considered in any detail the 
interrelationship between planning law and policy.  In particular there appeared to be no 
consideration of the extent to which policy aspirations, though secured through adopted 
plans, and supplementary planning documents, could be frustrated by the political nature of 
the development control process.   Since that Conference Weeks has published one article 
noting that  the presumption in favour of sustainable development has operated as a means 
for developers to bring forward unwanted development, contributed to the incidence of 
‘planning by appeal’ and likely to promote growth rather than sustainable development.  
These points are though made within the context of an article on localism rather than as a 
critique on the Framework itself31.  
 
There is a body of environmental law concerned with the definition and regulation of 
sustainable development in both the national and international arena, considering 
sustainable development as a legally-enforceable concept and as a criterion for the 
evaluation of developments.   Authors such as Ross help to provide a context for the 
Framework by tracing the evolution of the concept of sustainable development into 
mainstream UK law and policy32.  Segger and Khalfan   consider sustainability in relation to 
international economic environmental and social law33. Richardson and Wood engage with 
complex intersection of legal and policy issues relevant to sustainability34.  This should in 
                                                          
Environment Law  OP4-8 
29 Morag Ellis, ‘Green growth: do blue and yellow really make green?’ (2011) Volume 11  Journal of Planning 
and Environment Law 1433-1446 
30 Patrick McAuslen, ‘Towards a just planning system: the contribution of law’ (2013) Journal of Planning and 
Environmental Law Volume 2 145-157 
31 Paul Weeks, ‘NPPF: two years in’ (2014) May Property Law Journal 23-25 
32 Andrea Ross, Sustainable Development Law in the UK from rhetoric to reality? (Earthscan 2012)  
33 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaz Khalfan Sustainable Development Law Principles, Practices and 
Prospects (OUP 2004) 
34 Benjamin J Richardson and Stephan Wood Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart 2006) 
 
 
12 
 
theory be directly relevant to the consideration of the same term in the Framework but none 
of them consider the concept of sustainable development within planning or examine the 
definition within the particular context of the Framework.  
 
The only substantial body of work engaging with the concept of sustainable development in 
the specific context of the Framework has been generated by parliamentary committees and 
they have proved to be a useful ongoing source of literature on its evolution and impact. In 
2011 both the Environmental Audit Committee and the Select Committee for Communities 
and Local Government carried out an inquiries and published two reports on the 
Framework35 36. In April 2014 the Select Committee on Communities and Local Government 
set up an inquiry into the operation of the Framework in its first two years and published its 
report at the end of that year37.    These are more discursive in their approach than lawyers 
and actively and critically consider the function of the term sustainable development within 
the legal test, but are not, and are not intended to be a critical, detailed analysis of its effect. 
 
1.6 The need for this research 
In Chapter 6 of the 2014 report by the Select Committee on Communities and Local 
Government on the operation of the Framework concern was expressed at the lack of up-to-
date data.  In spite of the broad scope of potentially relevant materials the Committee was 
concerned that there were still some key areas, particularly in relation to the intersection of 
law and policy that remained under- or unexplored.  The Committee was clear that national 
statistics on the provision of housing, while welcome, would be insufficient for this purpose 
and emphasised the importance of data collection  in order to avoid making future policy 
decisions ‘in the dark’.38  The Framework has generated a significant amount of attention 
from parliamentary committees.  However no professionals or academics within the fields 
either of planning or environmental law have, as yet, carried out a detailed critical 
investigation into what the term sustainable development means as defined by the 
Framework or as applied to the determination of planning decisions.  
 
This research aims to fill some of the space between between planning theory and legal 
analysis and is situated in the discursive lacuna between two professions: the planners who 
do not interrogate the operation of the legal test because they regard it as outside their 
                                                          
35 Environmental Audit Committee, ‘Sustainable Development in the National Planning Policy Framework’ 
(HC 1480 2011)  
36 Communities and Local Government Committee, The National Planning Policy Framework (HC 1526 2011) 
37 Communities and Local Government Committee, Operation of the National Planning Policy Framework (HC 
190 2014)  
38 Ibid, 54 
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legitimate scope of scrutiny and the lawyers whose scrutiny of the same test is limited to 
whether the procedural and legal requirements have been properly observed rather than the 
merits of the policies applied. It also aims to meet some of the need identified by the 
Committee by examining in detail the way in which the legal decision making process in 
planning introduction has been affected by the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development.   The research is original because it focuses on the intersection of the legal 
test with its policy context and unique because it includes a linguistic deconstruction of the 
framework combined with a detailed examination of actual decisions taken over a substantial 
period of time.   
 
1.7 Methodology 
The research investigates the meaning and interpretation of sustainable development in the 
Framework through a variety of approaches: 
 An examination of what the term sustainable development has traditionally been 
understood to mean by examining the words in their wider policy context from their 
‘Brundtland’ origins and subsequent integration into international and national policy 
– in particular the 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy; 
 An examination of the term sustainable development in the Framework itself; 
focusing on the syntactical use and linguistic positioning of the term in the first draft, 
consultation document and adopted policy;  
 An empirical analysis of the way in which the term was considered within a defined 
range of individual planning appeal decisions made by the Secretary of State; 
 A parallel assessment of the way in which the term was considered by the judiciary in 
the context of statutory appeals and judicial reviews of planning decisions.   
 
The research is inherently inter-subjective, as it is concerned with the interpretation of a key 
term in a national policy document that is applied as part of a statutorily required legal test.  
At its heart this research is also a search for meaning and an exploration of how meaning is 
assigned and acquired; raising issues of syntax and the interrelationship of language and 
the power of those who use that language. As a result a mix of methodologies is employed: 
doctrinal research, socio-legal approaches, and analysis that is as empirical as possible 
given the data available.   
 
Chapters 2, 6 and 7 involve a ‘black letter’ examination of relevant case law for the way in 
which specific topics are considered.  Chapter 2 looks in detail at the cases associated with 
the operation of the legal test since its inception since 1947. Chapter 6 also examines case 
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law but is more forensic in its approach, focussing on a specific 20 month period to look at 
the treatment by the courts of the concept of sustainable development as defined and 
applied by the Framework.  Chapter 7 also examines court judgments issued within a 
specific period, this time looking at each decision in turn for the way that the concepts of 
meaning and interpretation of language itself are treated. 
 
Doctrinal research has its limits as a research method and this is particularly the case in 
relation to planning law where legal theory operates alongside a wide and constantly 
changing canon of local and national policy and politics.  For this reason a broader socio-
legal approach is employed in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7.   The relevance of this wider context is 
primarily to enable a more detailed examination of the policy context within which the legal 
principles are applied.  In chapter 2, this comprises the planning policies created and 
adopted by government in the form of circulars, planning policy guidance, and statements to 
parliament, as well as the local policies adopted by councils in the form of local plans, and 
supplementary planning documents.   In chapter 3 there is a detailed examination of the 
chronology of international and UK policies which have over time, defined sustainable 
development. These chapters also expand to the scope of the research to its wider socio-
political context, drawing on a range of materials to propose that the concept of sustainable 
development is being remoulded in the context of planning decisions to create and promote 
a  pro-growth, neo-liberal approach to the development of land.  This socio-legal approach 
enables the Framework itself to be investigated as a piece of discourse as well as an 
emanation of policy and facilitates a light-touch process of textual deconstruction to show 
how the meaning of sustainable development is obscured rather than clarified through being 
included in that document. 
 
Socio-legal approaches have been criticised by authors such as Hutchinson for their lack of 
rigour and empiricism.39  Doctrinal research based on case law is also problematic in terms 
of empirical analysis because it is difficult to carry out a like-for-like assessment of judicial 
decisions: each case is different and each judge has his or her own way of addressing it.  A 
more analytic approach is possible in appeal decisions made by the Secretary of State 
because these are highly formulaic, adopting an identical structure and often using identical 
language, to consider and decide on the planning appeals that come within his frame of 
reference.  Chapter 5 takes advantage of this standardised, template-based decision-making 
                                                          
39 Terry Hutchinson ‘Doctrinal Research’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds),  Research Methods in Law 
(Routledge 2013) 16 
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tabulating, comparing and analysing the Secretary of State’s decisions on a relatively like-
for-like basis. 
 
Both Oscola and Harvard were considered as referencing styles and in the first drafts of the 
research Harvard was used because of the amount of policy documents considered.  Given 
the amount of judicial decisions, and their impact on the research as a whole, the Oscola 
referencing was the style finally chosen and applied. 
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis  
Chapter 2 is an in-depth analysis of the legal test itself.  It begins with a review of its 
procedural and legal context before going on to a dissection of the legal test into its 
constituent elements, and looking in detail at each.   This chapter focusses in particular on 
the significance of planning policy considerations in the exercise of the legal test and shows 
how, from time-to-time, policy presumptions are inserted and applied as an essential 
element of the legal test as it is applied by decision makers.  It considers how presumptions 
in favour either of the plan or development have altered the way in which the test has been 
applied over the years and looks at the effect of those presumptions on the decisions made.  
It introduces and explores the historical tension associated with the dual functions of the 
Secretary of State as the Minister of State with responsibility both for making planning policy 
and for deciding how it should be applied in the determination of individual applications.   
 
Chapter 3 explores the question of whether or not sustainable development has an ‘ordinary 
and natural’ meaning that is commonly accepted and if so what it is.  Beginning with the use 
of the term in documents such as Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’40 this chapter shows how the term 
sustainable development entered international policy vocabulary, identifies its origins in and 
evolution through English environmental law and policy and highlights the historic and 
enduring difficulties with achieving a widely accepted or applied interpretation.  The chapter 
proposes that although there is evidence for a common understanding of what sustainable 
development means, the term is not formally defined and can easily be appropriated for 
particular purposes and used to support specific agendas.  The chapter explores the extent 
to which this happened after the election of the Coalition government in 2011 showing how 
the concept of sustainable development was increasingly equated with economic growth 
rather than environmental protection while environmental impacts were presented as an 
exclusively financial development cost to be measured and offset.  
 
                                                          
40 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Penguin 1962) 
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Chapter 4 looks at the use of sustainable development within the Framework itself and asks 
whether ‘sustainable development’ as contained within and defined by the specific context of 
the Framework, has any connections with established understandings of the term.  This 
chapter analyses the Framework syntactically as a piece of text, looking at the key changes 
in structure and content that occurred between publication of the initial draft, the consultation 
draft and the adopted document.  It focusses on the new presumption, beginning with a 
comparison of the way in which the term ‘sustainable development’ appeared and was 
defined in the initial version, subsequent consultation drafts and the adopted document. It 
dissects the text to show how the concept of sustainable development, and its derivatives 
(‘development that is sustainable’, ‘sustainably’, ‘sustainable use’ and ‘unsustainable’) are 
used within the current text, with the effect of draining meaning from rather than contributing 
meaning to the term.   
 
This examination of the Framework shows how the way the term is used tends to obscure 
rather than clarify meaning, so that there is no definition of sustainable development within 
the Framework that can be objectively or rigorously applied to development proposals.  It 
proposes that the Framework seems instead designed to produce a concept of sustainable 
development that is both mutable and malleable, that can be used to approve or refuse a 
wide range of development proposals depending primarily on the interpretative stance of the 
decision maker, and achieve different planning outcomes depending on the location, type 
and scale of development, and their context in terms of the local, or national bodies or 
individuals making the decision.     
 
Chapter 4 explores the political concerns and power relations behind and operating through 
the evolution of the Framework.   It assesses the Framework as a piece of discourse, a text 
that has emerged from and is defined and best understood with reference to, a particular 
political and economic context.   The Framework is presented as the production of a 
particular political ideology created and interpreted by particular actors in a particular time, 
where land is seen primarily as a source of economic growth and its intrinsic, invaluable 
environmental role needs to be hidden or at least reduced in significance.  The Framework is 
shown as operating both as a policy document and as a key element in a pro-growth political 
agenda where the concept of sustainable development has meaning imposed on it to serve 
in the promotion that agenda.  
 
Chapter 5 is the first part of the analytical heart of the research.  It involves an empirical 
analysis of planning decisions made by the Secretary of State over a specific period, looking 
on a case-by-case basis at decisions made by him on planning appeals where the legal test 
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was exercised ‘de novo’ and with reference to the new presumption in favour of sustainable 
development.  
 
In each case the type of development, and the outcome of the decision making process was 
recorded, and then the decision were analysed for: 
 How, if at all they defined sustainable development; 
 Whether or not they referred to the three social, environmental and economic ‘pillars’ 
and the relative weight given to each one; 
 The extent to which the Secretary of State intervened to override either the views of 
the local authority or the inspector. 
These decisions represented a small proportion numerically of all of the decisions taken in 
relation to planning applications but were considered to be the most relevant for 
consideration because powers of call in and recovery apply only to developments that are of 
the greatest significance in terms either of scale, scope or impact and because of the 
dominant position of the Secretary of State in the planning system.    
 
The temporal scope of the analysis of recovered and called in decisions was the twenty 
month period from the date when the new presumption came into full effect – ie 28th March 
2013 to 31st October 2014. This was selected because it enabled the examination of 
significant number of planning decisions and case law while limiting the risk that the 
Government might remove the presumption in favour of sustainable development from 
consideration in planning applications.   Because significant numbers of the decisions 
considered related to traveller developments and renewable energy the decisions were 
subdivided and analysed accordingly. 
 
Chapter 6 is the next element of substantive analysis and examines decisions of the High 
Court (including the new specialist planning court), the Court of Appeal or the House of 
Lords involved in reviewing decisions made on planning applications by local authorities, the 
planning inspectorate or the Secretary of State. There was much greater diversity of style 
and structure in these judgments compared with the appeal decisions; the range of 
considerations was different in each case and both the style and content of each decision 
varied depending on the individual judge.   
 
The purpose of this exercise was to analyse the rulings that considered its application by the 
Secretary of State for:  
 Consideration of the meaning of sustainable development within the Framework; 
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 Comments on interpretation of the Framework generally; 
 The extent to which the decision maker is considered to have misunderstood or 
misapplied the Framework. 
The exercise began with a review of every case within the 20 month period reported in 
Bailii41 .  From these cases were selected those where the concept of sustainable 
development as defined and applied by the Framework were identified as of primary 
relevance.  Each decision was then analysed for the extent to which the term was 
reconsidered, applied or interpreted to see if, from the range of cases considered, it was 
possible to reveal a coherent approach to the way in which the term should and should not 
be considered and applied.  
 
Chapter 7   This chapter is primarily a summary of the research and a review of the original 
hypotheses in the light of the findings.  It revisits the original hypotheses and draws together 
the findings in chapters 5 and 6, proposing conclusions in relation to: 
 Whether the Secretary of State, through his decisions, clarified or confounded the 
meaning of sustainable development within the Framework;  
 The extent to which this was investigated or challenged in judicial decisions;   
 The extent to which the presumption in favour of sustainable development is 
operating as it was original claimed it would 
This chapter also investigates the way in which the courts consider the meaning and 
interpretation of language in relation to the review of planning decisions.  
 
The research concludes with reflections on the implications of the new presumption for the 
planning system as a whole, with specific reference to the recent East Staffordshire 
decision.42 
  
                                                          
41 British and Irish Legal Information Institute 
42 East Staffordshire Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor 
[2016] EWHC 2973  
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Chapter 2: The legal test – Principles, Presumptions and Politics 
 
Introduction 
 
This research is concerned with the meaning of sustainable development within the specific 
context of the Framework, and focusses on the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development contained within that Framework as it is applied in the determination of 
development proposals.   
 
This chapter is a detailed examination of the legal test which regulates those determinations. 
It begins with its historical origins and then sets out the current version in full. It examines 
each element of the legal test in turn, showing how an understanding of specific terms such 
as ‘development plan’, and ‘material considerations’ have evolved through consideration in 
the courts and how the operation of the test is influenced by  changes to the governing 
legislation  or through the introduction of new planning policy presumptions.  It explores the 
historical tension associated with the interaction of legislation and policy with particular 
reference to the 2001 ‘Alconbury’ and the 2015 ‘West Berkshire’ cases.  It concludes with a 
summary of the impact of the introduction of the Framework and its presumption in favour of 
sustainable development – a presumption which must as a result of the Framework either be 
taken into account as a material consideration or applied in favour of the development 
proposed.     
 
2.1 Origins and context  
 
Allmendinger proposes that there are three kinds of space within the planning system – 
territorial, relational and soft43. This chapter proposes that there is a fourth space – 
discretionary, highly disputed, and boundaried by the words of the legal test.  The planning 
decision-making process has always included the exercise of such a test.   The legal test 
has legislative origins but has always had the effect of yoking law and policy together in a 
complex interactive process, noted by Booth as being “of profound significance for the way 
in which spatial planning operates within the UK”.44    
 
Section 14 of the 1947 Act required the local authority considering an application for 
permission for development to “have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so far 
                                                          
43 Philip Allmendinger, Neoliberal Spatial Governance (Routledge 2016) p 164  
44 Philip Booth, ‘Planning and the Rule of Law’ (2016) Vol 17 Planning Theory & Practice, 344  
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as material thereto, and to any other material considerations.”45  The current version of the 
legal test contains echoes of its 1947 origins but is an awkward conflation – well described 
as ‘cumbersome and clumsy’46 - of two separate pieces of legislation:  
 Section 70(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (‘the 1990 Act’) requires 
the local authority to ‘have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so far as 
material to the application, and to any other material considerations’47;   
 Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’) 
informs and modifies this by adding the additional requirement that: ‘if regard is to be 
had to the development plan…the determination must be made in accordance with 
the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise.’ 48    
 
As Moys recently commented “whatever the 1990 Act has to say about the law on plan-
making, this is only ever part of the picture. This is because of the vital role that planning 
policy, the software of the system, plays".49  The complexity of the test, the extent to which it 
involves the exercise of relatively subjective judgments by local authorities and the 
significance in both financial and community terms of the decisions taken in terms of their 
economic and social consequences have conspired to make this an enduringly dynamic, 
complex and controversial area of planning law.  There is a substantial body of case law on 
every element of the test including the definition of the development plan; the meaning of 
material considerations and the relative weight to be given to each in the determination of 
individual applications.    
 
Although the legal test itself has retained its essential content and structure since 1947, 
planning decisions do not occur in a legal vacuum.  Planning decision-making is one of the 
key regulatory functions carried out by public bodies in England and has significant 
consequences both for the community and the land affected. As a result there are 
overarching requirements imposed by international and national law which must be observed 
if the decision is to survive judicial scrutiny.  This wider procedural context has changed 
significantly in the last sixty years.  The principal international change since 1947 is the 
European Communities Act of 1972 and the creation of a regulatory environmental 
superstructure over the planning process with the 1985 Environmental Impact Directive and 
                                                          
45 Town and Country Planning Act 1947 (TCPA 1947) s14 
46 Sweet and Maxwell Encyclopaedia of Planning Law and Practice, vol 2, para 54.04 
47 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s70(2) 
48 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 s38(6) 
49 Clive Moys ‘Has the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 stood the test of time’ (2016) 5 JPL 447 
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its subsequent replacement Directives50.  This imposes a requirement on all applications for 
development consent to have their potential environmental impacts assessed and where 
possible mitigated before any such consent is granted. This assessment exercise is 
intimately connected with the decision to grant a planning application and occurs in parallel 
with it but remains a separate legal requirement which, as Chapter 3 will show, both decision 
makers and the English courts have been reluctant to recognise.    
 
In terms of national law, two pieces of legislation have had a significant, and relatively 
unanticipated impact on planning: the Human Rights Act 199851 and the Equality Act 201052.   
The 2001 Alconbury case established that the system of planning appeals as a whole was 
compliant with Article 653, while cases such as Buckley54 Varey55  and Chapman56 
established that human rights considerations such as Article 1 of the First Protocol (the 
protection of property) and Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) must be 
taken into account in planning decisions involving members of this community and that the 
grant of planning permission would be invalidated if their rights were not taken into account.     
 
The Public Sector Equality Duty was brought in by section 149 of the 2010 Equality Act and 
required public bodies to have due regard to the needs of members of the population who 
shared protected status when exercising any public function – for example, the duty is 
relevant to members of the gipsy and traveller community because they share the protected 
characteristic of race.   Its relevance to planning case was established in Harris57 and 
explored and confirmed in Coleman58 where claims established that a lack of proper regard 
to the particular needs of specific communities in the determination of planning applications, 
resulted in a breach of the Equality Act and led to the permissions being quashed. 
 
There are additional overarching procedural requirements relating specifically to the planning 
process but separate to the legal test:  
 Planning applications must be processed, consulted on and publicised in accordance 
with the requirements of the General Development Procedure Order;59   
                                                          
50 Council Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment  [2014] OJ L 124  
51 Human Rights Act 1998 
52 Equality Act 2010 
53 Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23, [2001] 2 All ER 929  
54 Buckley v United Kingdom app  no 20348/92 [1996] ECHR 39  
55 Varey v United Kingdom app no 26662/95 [2000] ECHR 692 
56 Chapman v United Kingdom app no  27238/95 [2001] ECHR 43 
57 Harris, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Haringey [2010] EWCA Civ 703 
58 Coleman, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Barnet Council & Ors [2012] EWHC 3725  
59 The Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015  SI 2015/595 
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 Decisions made by planning committees must comply with the Local Government Act 
1972 in terms of publication of minutes and committee documents; 
 Committee members themselves need both to observe common law principle relating 
to bias as well as any specific requirements in the local authority’s own constitution, 
as shown in the recent Kelton case.60 
 
Finally, there are additional requirements specific to any application that involves listed 
buildings or land within a conservation area.  The Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas 
Act 1990 requires that, in addition to the legal test, where listed buildings are involved the 
decision maker must have “special regard” to the desirability of preserving the building or its 
setting or any features of special architectural or historic interest and in the case of buildings 
in conservation areas pay “special attention” to the “desirability of preserving or enhancing 
its character or appearance”.61  This was recently considered in North Norfolk where Mr 
Justice Purchase referred to the “presumptive desirability” of preserving the setting of a 
listed building, and made it clear that consideration of historical merits of “should not be 
addressed as a simple balancing exercise but whether there is justification for overriding the 
presumption in favour of preservation.” 62 
 
2.2 The planning balance 
 
The legal test includes a specific requirement to have regard to the development plan, but 
leaves the weight of that plans policies to be determined by the decision maker. That 
decision maker has a wide discretionary scope to balance the policies of the current 
development plan and other considerations specific to the particular application in question 
against each other to reach a decision that will either unlock or freeze the development 
potential - and financial value - of land.     
 
The operation of the legal test has been legitimately described as ‘a complicated juggling act 
performed on a unicycle balanced on a tightrope’63.  It is a complex decision making process 
where the decision maker has to carry out a delicate balancing exercise between formal 
policy requirements and the considerations unique to that application. The task of the body 
                                                          
60 Kelton v Wiltshire Council [2015] EWHC 2853 (Admin) 
61 The Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, ss 66, 67, 72, 73 
62 North Norfolk District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 279 (Admin) [66] 
63 Graham Warren, ‘Housing – is it Sustainable’ [1996] JPL Occ. Pap 24, 76 
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entrusted with applying the legal test was comprehensively summarised by Lord Clyde in the 
leading City of Edinburgh case64: 
 
“it will obviously be necessary for the decision-maker to consider the development plan, identify 
any provisions in it which are relevant to the question before him and make a proper interpretation 
of them. .. He will also have to consider whether the development proposed in the application 
before him does or does not accord with the development plan. There may be some points in the 
plan which support the proposal but there may be some considerations pointing in the opposite 
direction. He will require to assess all of these and then decide whether, in light of the whole plan, 
the proposal does or does not accord with it. He will also have to identify all the other material 
considerations which are relevant to the application and to which he should have regard. He will 
then have to note which of them support the application and which of them do not, and he will 
have to assess the weight to be given to all of these considerations. He will have to decide 
whether there are considerations of such weight as to indicate that the development plan should 
not be accorded the priority which the statute has given to it. And having weighed these 
considerations and determined these matters he will require to form his opinion on the disposal of 
the application.” 
 
Given the scope of the required decision-making exercise, and its complexity, it is hardly 
surprising that each one of the steps identified has proved problematic for decision makers 
and fertile ground for the courts, and the main areas of contention are summarised below.  
 
2.3 The development plan and material considerations 
 
The development plan is identified as the primary consideration in both elements of the 
current legal test and is the first issue for consideration under the steps identified by Lord 
Clyde in City of Edinburgh.  The Housing, Town Planning Act of 1909 established the 
founding principles while the 1947 Act enabled each of the newly formed local planning 
authorities to survey its area and submit that survey to the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning with a “development plan”, indicating the manner in which they proposed that land 
in their area should be used.65  Development plans are still formulated, assessed and 
adopted at a local level setting broad development aspirations and constraints against which 
new development is to be assessed, having regard to established design principles and 
matters of wider public interest such as health, amenity and infrastructure provision and 
without regard to individual land ownership ambitions. 
 
It is clearly essential that the individual or body making the planning decision should be able 
to identify the relevant Development Plan for a particular application but the legal definition 
                                                          
64 City of Edinburgh Council v. Secretary of State for Scotland and Others [1997] UKHL 38  
65 Town and Country Planning Act 1947, s5 
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of the Development Plan is contained in a mixture of statute and regulations66 67  and  
practice it has proved difficult for decision makers to distinguish development plan 
documents from the range of other planning policy documents available, with the process 
involved described by Justice Howell in RWE Npower as ‘an exploration of some of more 
obscure parts of the labyrinthine scheme governing planning in England’.68   
 
Once identified, the decision maker is required to ‘have regard’ to the provisions of the 
relevant development plan where they are material to the application in hand.  Development 
plans are substantial documents setting out a broad range of formal policies is supported by 
extensive supporting and explanatory text on issues ranging from sites for new settlements 
to the quality and design of window frames.  Plans are so broad in scope so that it is almost 
always possible to use their content to create and present legitimate arguments both in 
favour of, and against, the proposal at hand based.  The decision maker must consider this 
wide and sometimes conflicting range of policy aims and ambitions, and decide whether or 
not a particular application is ‘in accordance with’ the plan. However there is no legal 
direction or government guidance on what ‘in accordance’ means.   
 
The difficulty of the exercise was recently summarised in the 2012 Tesco Stores case where 
Lord Reed commented that “development plans are full of broad statements of policy, many 
of which may be mutually irreconcilable”. 69    Nevertheless, the decision maker is required to 
consider each application for its compliance with the plan ‘as a whole’, deciding which 
policies are relevant and taking into account the extent to which a particular proposal 
accords with them or not.   
 
The process is neither simple nor static, and may be made more complex where the 
‘development plan’ comprises more than one document. For example, development 
proposals in London must also take into account the strategic ambitions of the London Plan 
as well as the plan for the individual Borough.  Nationally the situation has been made more 
complicated with the introduction of neighbourhood plans (NDP), which, when adopted, also 
qualify as the development plan for the area70. Criticised as creating “an uneven geography 
of representation in favour of the better educated, well-off and more vocal social groups”71, 
                                                          
66 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (PCPA) 2004 s38 
67  The Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012/767, r5 
68 RWE Npower Renewables Ltd, R (on the application of) v Ecotricity (Next Generation) Ltd [2013] EWHC 
751 
69 Tesco Stores Limited (Appellants) v Dundee City Council (Respondents) (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 13 [19] 
70 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 Act, s38(3) 
71 Simin Davoudi & Paul Cowie ‘Are English Neighbourhood forums democratically legitimate?’ Planning 
Theory and Practice Vol 1 No. 4 562 
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they are drafted and produced by local communities and cover relatively small areas of land, 
but the scope of geographic coverage belies their overall influence and is increasing.  
 
NDPs are technically required to be consistent with the local authority development plan for 
the area, but where that plan is under review, strategic policies in neighbourhood plans can 
be effective in preventing development as was established in BDW Trading.72This position 
has been confirmed in a number of judgments since.  In Gladman Developments Mr Justice 
Lewis confirmed that a neighbourhood plan could include strategic housing policies in the 
absence of such policies in an up to date local authority plan73.  This reasoning was followed 
in DLA Delivery where Mr Justice Foskett  recognised that where a site’s development 
potential was stagnating in the absence of a local authority development plan, the 
neighbourhood plan could help in ‘unlocking’ the site’s potential74.  The Court of Appeal has 
not addressed the question of whether or not neighbourhood plan policies can prevail in the 
absence of a local authority development plan but it has confirmed that NDPs may contain 
strategic site allocations.75 
 
The 2014 Report of the Communities and Local Government Committee on the operation of 
the Framework noted this potential conflict and the resulting confusion, recommending that 
the Government carry out an immediate consultation on it76.  No such consultation has 
occurred.   In the meantime the 2016 Neighbourhood Planning Bill will introduce further 
changes to the development plan process potentially including: 
 Powers for the Secretary of State to direct two or more local planning authorities to 
prepare a joint plan and to invite a County Council to prepare a plan on behalf of a 
district authority; 
 A new requirement for regular forma review of plans; 
 Greater prescription on the content of local development documents. 
 
Having identified the development plan, the relevant development plan policies, and 
considered whether or not the current application is in accordance with them, the next task 
facing the decision maker is to identify the full range of other considerations material to that 
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application, and then decide whether the initial decision-making inclination is either 
confirmed or confounded by them.   
 
The concept of material considerations has been in place as a key element of the legal test 
since 1947.   The leading case is still Stringer77 which established that any consideration 
relating to the use or development of land could be ‘capable’ of being a material 
consideration in the assessment of an application for planning permission, though whether it 
was or not would depend on the particular proposal and its circumstances.  This broad range 
of potential material considerations was, if anything, widened with the 1995 Tesco decision 
that established that regard must be paid by the decision maker to any consideration with 
‘some connection with the proposed development which is not de minimis’.78   
 
The understanding of what is or is not material can evolve over time and be modified so that 
considerations previously considered irrelevant become issues that ought to be taken into 
account.  To this extent material considerations function as a social and political barometer 
reflecting both societal concerns and changes in political perspective.  For example public 
health concerns previously seen as irrelevant have, with concerns about obesity and public 
health, gained status as material planning considerations, so that in Copeland the grant of 
permission for a change of use from grocery shop to fast food takeaway was invalidated 
because the council did not consider the proximity of the takeaway to a local school as a 
material consideration79.   
 
While the range and impact of what is material will not only differ from one case to another 
but may also evolve over time, some considerations will always be material and should 
never be ignored by the decision maker.   The Habitats Directive establishes a European 
network of areas where the land in question is recognised as ecologically valuable and is 
safeguarded against potentially damaging developments80.  The Birds Directive establishes 
a similar European network of Special Protection Areas to guard against habitat loss and 
degradation that could threaten the conservation of wild birds81.  Land that has particular 
ecological value may also be designated as a Site of Special Scientific Interest82. Aesthetic 
as well as environmental qualities are similarly protected.  Land within National Parks is 
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heavily constrained by its two statutory purposes: to conserve and enhance natural beauty, 
wildlife and cultural heritage and to promote opportunities for the understanding and 
enjoyment of their special qualities by the public83 and land designated as an Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty is held for the primary purpose of the conservation and 
enhancement of the appearance of the land84.  Finally where land is designated as Green 
Belt by a local authority it is unlikely that any development will be allowed unless ‘very 
special circumstances’ can be shown.85     
 
All of these policy constraints are clearly material considerations where they apply in the 
determination of a planning application. Failure to take them into account, or to apply them 
incorrectly, in the decision making process will usually be sufficient to invalidate the decision.   
 
The age and relevance of the development plan will always be a material consideration. 
Even though technically the development plan is the primary consideration, plan policies 
formulated under a different national or local context or an altered economic environment 
can quickly become out of date when the in the face of changing national policies such as 
the Framework.  In such circumstances the principle established in Simpson Corporation 
applies; the local authority need not ‘slavishly adhere’ to the plan policies but may instead 
allow material considerations to weigh more heavily in the planning balance86. The local 
authority whose adopted plan is out of date and/or inconsistent with emerging national 
policies, or its own local plan, must recognise and take that age and inconsistency into 
account, and where necessary give increased weight to more up-to-date policies, whether 
emerging nationally or through the development and adoption of a replacement plan.  
Paragraph 216 of the Framework confirms the principle previously established in guidance 
and case law: the nearer an emerging policy is to adoption, and the fewer unresolved 
objections remain, the greater weight it will have in the decision-making process.     
 
Government policy, whether contained in the Framework, the online National Planning Policy 
Guidance, or and parliamentary white papers and ministerial statements, will always be 
material to a planning decision.  Indeed the recent Frack Free Balcombe case confirmed that 
“national Planning Policy is par excellence a material consideration.” 87   Other issues that 
are routinely considered to be material considerations when relevant to any application 
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include: alternative potential uses for the land; the planning history of the site; the potential 
for creating a precedent for similar developments in the area; the availability of alternative 
sites for the use; relevant appeal decisions; and parallel statutory codes such as licensing of 
premises health and safety, and building control.  
 
2.4 Presumptions  
 
Allmendinger comments that “there has been an “off and on” presumption in favour of 
development within planning policy for many decades”.88  Presumptions are an element of 
the legal test that both distinguish it from decision-making requirements in many other areas 
of law and add to the complexity of the process as a whole.    
 
They can be applied either through changes in government policy or through alterations to 
legislation.  When applied through statute – as with the presumption in favour of the 
development plan imposed through the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 they change 
the legal test itself. When applied through government policy they leave the words of the 
legal test untouched but influence its application in a fundamental way, by requiring a 
particular orientation to be applied by the decision maker.  Generally, they make the delicate 
task of juggling development plan policies against material considerations even more 
complex and potentially hazardous for the decision maker. 
 
The most common use of presumptions in the planning system is through changes in 
national policy to promote an orientation in favour of development.  One of the earliest 
planning policy circulars published in 1922 stated that ‘The Minister considers that the 
presumption should always be in favour of the person who wishes to undertake 
development’. 89  There were subsequent iterations in Government Circulars of 1949, 1951, 
and in 1984 a new presumption was introduced by a Conservative government requiring 
decision makers to make decisions on planning permissions within an overarching bias in 
favour of approval90, resulting in what Harrison has described as ‘a development spree 
which is now largely discredited.’91    
 
The balance of presumptive power changed significantly in 1991 when a late amendment 
was proposed by the then Conservative government to the Planning and Compensation Bill, 
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adding a statutory presumption in favour of the development plan. The relevant planning 
policy guidance note was also revised, producing an updated version of PPG1 in 199292.  
The 1992 PPG confirmed that the change in the law introduced a presumption in favour of 
proposals consistent with the development plan. However it also retained the statement that 
the planning system “should operate on the basis that applications for development should 
be allowed.”  
 
The resulting confusion was aptly described by Purdue as “The battle of the presumptions”.93  
The battle ended with the landmark City of Edinburgh case in 1997 and Lord Clyde’s ruling 
that: “…the development plan is no longer simply one of the material considerations…there 
is now a presumption that the development plan is to govern the decision on an application 
for planning permission.”94   This judgment was reinforced with a revision of the relevant 
Planning Policy Guidance note (1997) confirming that “The Government is committed to a 
plan-led system of development control’ 95 and given statutory force by the enactment of 
section 38(6) of the 2004 Act and the adoption of Planning Policy Statement 1 (2005).96   
 
The Coalition government of 2010 inherited a plan-led planning system and initially retained 
the presumption in favour of the development plan. They have made few changes to the 
legal test but the introduction of the Framework combined with the subsequent cancellation 
of Planning Policy Statement 1 and its replacement with online National Planning Policy 
Guidance (NPPG) has nevertheless fundamentally altered the planning balance, and 
arguably begun a new battle of the presumptions.   
 
On one hand the Framework explicitly restated and reinforced the status quo of the legal 
test.  Paragraph 11 states that applications should be decided in accordance with the 
development plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise.  Paragraphs 12, 32 and 
50 reinforce this position so that the development plan is preserved as the ‘starting point’ for 
decision making with the Framework as no more than a new material consideration.  This 
has been supported in subsequent case law such as Scrivens where Mr Justice Collins 
explicitly confirmed that the Framework was a material consideration in planning terms but 
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excluded it from having a status equivalent to development plans or even a National Policy 
Statement97.     
 
Even as a material consideration, the Framework is still a significant new factor. In Solihull 
Metropolitan Borough Council v Gallagher Estates the requirement in para 47 of the 
Framework that local plans must meet objectively assessed housing needs was described 
as a "radical change" from the preceding national policy in PPS3 so that the council’s failure 
to acknowledge this change and give appropriate weight to the new policy invalidated the 
permission98.      
 
The most significant change to the planning system resulting from the introduction of the 
Framework is the new presumption in favour of sustainable development introduced through 
paragraph 14.  Paragraph 14 creates a requirement that where the development plan is 
“absent, silent or relevant policies are out-of-date” then the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development will apply and will have greater weight than those poslicies. 
 
In Bloor Homes Mr Justice Lindblom comprehensively explored and defined the 
circumstances in which the presumption might apply, ruling that: 
 A development plan will be "absent" if none has been adopted for the relevant area; 
 …it may be "silent" because it lacks policy relevant to the project under 
consideration; 
 …relevant policies…may have been overtaken by things that have happened since it 
was adopted…  
Labelling them as the ‘three possible shortcomings’ of a development plan, he was equally 
clear that any of them, if present, would impose a requirement, in the form of the 
presumption, that planning permission be granted99.   This echoes paragraph 14 itself which 
requires that when the presumption applies development plan policies and permission 
should be granted unless “any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and 
demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework 
taken as a whole; or – specific policies in this Framework indicate development should be 
restricted.”    
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For the local authority who wants to retain strategic control over new development by 
retaining its own development plan rather than sustainable development as the primary 
consideration it is essential to have a new plan in place, that is compliant in all respects with 
the Framework – but this is difficult to achieve.  
 
The adoption of a new development plan has always been a complex and lengthy process 
due to the extensive regulatory requirements that apply and the range of views that have to 
be taken into account. The adoption of a development plan that is compliant with the 
Framework is more difficult still, particularly in terms of meeting the requirement for an 
evidence-based 5 year assessment of housing needs.   In addition, in order for a 
Framework-compliant development plan to be approved and adopted the local authority 
must show that: 1) the statutory duty to cooperate contained in section 110 of the Localism 
Act 2011 and section 33A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 has been 
taken into account and complied with and 2) that the plan meets the criteria set out in the 
NPPG to show that it is ‘sound’100.   
 
The difficulty of getting plans adopted was considered in the 2014 report of the House of 
Commons Communities and Local Government Committee101.  It noted that nearly three 
years after the introduction of the Framework, 40% of planning authorities did not have an 
adopted plan and only 21% of the plans adopted were made after the Framework came into 
place, and referred specifically to the District Councils Network and their reference to plan 
production as a game of ‘snakes and ladders’ where years of progress could be negated in 
the final stages of plan production with the publication of an unfavourable inspector’s report. 
Among the reasons proposed for this deficit were a lack of resources, the difficulty of 
meeting the duty to co-operate and compliance with the Framework requirements in terms of 
viability and maintaining a five year supply of housing land.   
 
As a result although the legal test, including the presumption in favour of the development 
plan remains intact for many local authorities, the lack of a Framework-compliant plan 
renders their own development plan impotent and makes the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development the dominant – sometimes the only – policy consideration. 
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Allmendinger has proposed that the presumption simply echoed the “Thatcherite 
presumption in favour of development’102 but that presumption was one in favour of the 
particular development proposed at a particular time.  This presumption is different, as it is in 
favour of a concept rather than a particular development.  It is not in favour of the particular 
development proposed but in favour of all development that can be brought under the 
linguistic umbrella of sustainable development. It therefore allows much more freedom to the 
decision maker who can consider any development either sustainable or non-sustainable 
depending on the individual analysis of its benefits and impacts.  
 
2.5 Politics 
 
The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government is the primary – some might 
say the most dominant – actor in the planning system both in terms of making policy and 
determining planning decisions.   He is accountable to Parliament for his own acts and 
decisions and those of the civil servants in his department. He is entrusted with a wide range 
of executive functions, but the range and limits of his powers are fundamentally fluid and 
open to interpretation, restrained only by the terms of his appointment, the legislation 
relevant to the exercise of his powers, the law and custom of Parliament, and the willingness 
of the courts to enforce them.  
 
The Secretary of State is empowered by statute to exercise a range of functions which are 
strictly legislative in terms of their formal content but encompass a wide discretionary scope 
in terms of actual decision making.  This includes a range of executive functions in relation to 
planning, a number of which are directly relevant to this research.   
 The Secretary of State is responsible for the formulation and application of national 
planning policy.  He may call for new planning policy on any relevant topic and has 
the final say on its content.  New policy guidance can also be introduced immediately 
through written statements to Parliament accompanied by amendments to the NPPG 
 The Secretary of State also has significant powers of intervention in relation to 
individual development plans under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
2004. He may direct the LPA to modify the plan and the authority must comply with 
any such direction unless they withdraw the plan103. He can direct an authority to 
prepare a revision of its plan in accordance with a timetable set by him and has a 
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wide default power if he considers that an LPA is failing to do anything necessary in 
connection with the preparation or adoption of a local plan104.  
 The Productivity Plan issued in July 2015 indicated the possibility of government 
intervention where plans were delayed with the Secretary of State stepping in to 
arrange “for local plans to be written, in consultation with local people.”105  This 
proposal is now enshrined in the Neighbourhood Planning Bill and could easily be a 
legislative reality by early 2017. 
 The Secretary of State is also the ultimate decision maker whenever he chooses to 
exercise that function in relation to any planning application.  He  may intervene 
directly in the planning decision-making process by inserting himself as the decision-
maker in the following situations where the scope of this decision making power is  
his alone fettered only by judicial intervention (if it is sought).   
o He has the power to ‘call in’ an application for determination before a decision 
has been made106.  In these circumstances there will be a public inquiry 
chaired by a planning inspector who prepares a report on the case, including 
recommendations in relation to the decision to be made. The Secretary of 
State publishes that report along with his decision and reasons for agreeing 
or disagreeing with the recommendations. Call-in powers tend to change 
depending on the political context and where the government perceives that 
intervention is most needed; 
o The Secretary of State has a parallel power to step in as the decision maker 
during a planning appeal107.   Using these powers the Secretary of State can 
step into a planning inquiry at any point before a decision is issued as the 
decision maker in the place of the usual planning inspector.  As with called-in 
applications, the planning inspector writes a report with recommendations for 
consideration by the Secretary of State but the Secretary of State makes the 
actual decision. 
 
The Secretary of State is therefore the individual charged both with determining the content 
of planning policy, and then in deciding how it should be interpreted and applied to particular 
development proposals.  A number of authors have expressed disquiet that the individual 
who determines the content of national planning policy should also be ultimately responsible 
for its interpretation and application.  Graham notes that policy presumptions have the 
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capacity to operate as ‘a device to ensure that weight was given’ to a particular policy 
objective108.   Healey acknowledges the value of the discretionary of this space but at the 
same time recognises that it depends on the skill of the decision maker and is vulnerable to 
being misused109.  Allmendinger recognises, that the way in which the planning system 
operates enables those placed highest in the underlying power structures of decision making 
to have the greatest power110.     
 
The potential impact of the Secretary of State’s powers are increased by the new 
presumption. As seen above, the legal test already encloses a wide discretionary space.  
Where a development plan is ‘absent, silent or out of date’ the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development replaces consideration of development plan policies as the key 
concern for the decision maker.  Although ‘development’ is extensively and rigorously 
defined in the planning law context111, sustainable development has no equivalent definition 
in law or even policy.  The presumption in favour of sustainable development creates a 
generalised bias in favour of any development that is considered sustainable and against 
any development that is not.  The Secretary of State therefore has a much wider scope of 
decision making within the context of this presumption than he did previously 
 
2.6 The role of the courts 
 
The scope of the Secretary of State’s powers has been the subject of two landmark 
judgments: Alconbury Developments in 2001,112 and the 2015 West Berkshire113 decision. 
 
Alconbury centred on an application for a freight terminal and the central issue was whether 
the Secretary of State’s ability to step into and take over the planning decision making 
process constituted a ‘fair and public hearing’ compatible with Article 6(1) of the 1953 
Human Rights Convention.   The case raised the issue of whether the political nature of the 
appointment and its policy-making function meant that the Secretary of State lacked 
sufficient independence to make planning decisions at all, with the High Court initially ruling 
that he could not.   
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This judgment was overturned when the case reached the House of Lords. Their Lordships 
accepted that Article 6(1) applied to planning decisions and acknowledged that neither 
planning inspectors nor the Secretary of State were impartial or independent arbiters, but 
both were confirmed as appropriate decision makers in this context and the appeal process 
as a whole was confirmed as compatible with Article 6. The primary reasons for this were: 1) 
the decisions themselves were administrative in nature, involved the exercise of delegated 
power and not a judicial act; 2) the decisions were taken on grounds of policy and 
expediency, and so were for an executive rather than a judicial function of the government; 
3) the courts in any case retained sufficient oversight with their capacity to intervene when 
required through the process of judicial review.   
 
The decision to a certain extent clarified the extent to which the courts might interfere with 
planning judgment, and confirmed that it was limited to responsibility for oversight of the 
procedural aspects of the decision. So long as the courts retained this oversight function 
planning decisions, including those determined on appeal, would remain in compliance with 
Article 6(1), leaving the Secretary of State free to assess the planning merits, applying his 
particular policy considerations and preferences, whether or not motivated by the politics of 
the day. As Lord Clyde commented: “Planning matters are essentially matters of policy and 
expediency, not of law”114.  If anything, Lord Clyde saw it as beneficial that there should be a 
‘central supervision’ of the application of planning policy and identified the benefit, for the 
planning system as a whole, in having a politician with the ultimate responsibility for 
determining, as a matter of planning judgement, because this would achieve ‘some overall 
coherence and uniformity in national planning’.115  This view was broadly welcomed by 
practitioners such as Robert McCracken 2001116 and Simon Bird117, and has not been 
challenged since.    
 
Although the ‘Alconbury’ ruling remains unchallenged, the 2015 ‘West Berkshire’ case re-
addressed the issue of the Secretary of State’s discretionary powers118.    
 
On 28th November 2014 the Secretary of State made an alteration to the NPPG policy in 
relation to affordable housing through a Written Ministerial Statement in the House of 
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Commons so as to exclude smaller developments from their existing liability for making 
payments towards the provision of such housing119.  The effect on local authorities, including 
those bringing the challenge, was to make related policies in their adopted development 
plans automatically ‘out of date’ for the purposes of paragraph 14 of the NPPF, even where, 
as in the case of the claimant Council, the plan was adopted in January 2015, after the date 
of the policy change.  The decision to adopt the new policy was challenged on a number of 
grounds including unfair consultation, the failure to take material considerations into account, 
non-compliance with duties under the Equality Act 2010 and irrationality.   
 
In the High Court the challenge was successful on all of the grounds including Ground 2: that 
the new policy was inconsistent with the statutory scheme of planning law and its purposes.   
Mr Justice Holgate began his consideration of this issue by reprising the ‘Alconbury’ 
decision, confirming that it was for the Secretary of State to determine planning policy 
objectives, that policy formulation was a matter for the Executive and that the merits of policy 
formulation were not for the courts to consider, but also stressing Lord Clyde’s recognition of 
the value of the Secretary of State in maintaining a coherent policy framework.  Mr Justice 
Holgate went on to highlight the impact of the new policy, noting (para 98) that it “effectively 
negates or ‘trumps’ local plan policies which do not accord with these new national policies” 
and that (para 80) the new exemption would reduce affordable housing provision with 
‘profound consequences’ nationwide.  
 
Mr Justice Holgate considered the nature of the Secretary of State’s common law 
prerogative power to promulgate policy and noted that it must be exercised within ‘the 
statutory framework for the planning and control of the use of land’ including section 70(2) of 
the 1990 Act, and could not be used to frustrate that statutory scheme  (para 115,117).  
Within this context, national policies should not be used to override local ones and there was 
no power to ‘make policies outside the statutory local plan process (para 122, 123).   Mr 
Justice Holgate also noted that the new policy would displace or override adopted policies 
and was not designed to work with them in any way (para p126, 133,134).  He concluded 
that the proposed policy ‘ignores or circumvents the presumption in favour of the 
development plan policies in section 38(6)’  by replacing the usual process of weighing 
policies against each other with an overriding policy direction’, was incompatible with the 
purpose of planning legislation and could compromise decisions made under it (para 134, 
139, 140).  This decision was overturned in the Court of Appeal but, as will be shown in 
chapter 7, the issue has not gone away. 
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Conclusion 
 
The legal test for the determination of planning applications is far more complex in nature 
than is apparent from the bare text. The balancing process is unique to each proposal, and 
is technically for the decision-maker alone. The development plan is legally defined but can 
still be difficult to identify. Concepts such as ‘material considerations’ are not defined and 
mutate according to circumstance, including through alterations to legislation or by new 
central government policy, or through ministerial statements.  The development plan must be 
identified and taken into account as a primary consideration, but it must also be weighed 
against the other considerations material to that decision. The weighing of the relative weight 
of development plan policies against material considerations is a concealed, complex, 
protean process that adapts to fit an ever-changing socio-political context and serve a 
variety of political ideologies, with politicians rather than planners or planning lawyers as the 
final arbiters in any such decision.  
 
The scales of the planning balance are notionally tipped in favour of the plan but can easily 
be outweighed by material considerations depending on the particular proposal and its 
particular context.   The legal test is currently required to be exercised in parallel with, and 
often in the shadow of the Framework presumption in favour of sustainable development.  
This presumption is always a significant material consideration in the determination of all 
planning applications, and in the case of those without a Framework-compliant development 
plan, the key determining consideration by which the application will stand or fall.  As a 
result, the wording of paragraph 14 means that in many development proposals the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development is dominant over many, and sometimes 
all, development plan policies.    
 
 The Secretary of State is responsible for the creation, and adoption of the new presumption 
and has the legal capacity and the political will to intervene in the application of the new 
presumption in the determination of any planning application, either during the application 
process or within the context of an appeal against an initial refusal.   
 
There is capacity for any person ‘aggrieved’ by that decision to apply to the court to have 
that decision reviewed or quashed, but this power of review is limited. Although as seen in 
‘West Berkshire’ the courts are willing to intervene in specific circumstances, their powers of 
intervention are limited to investigating and regulating errors of law, and does not involve the 
exercise of planning judgment.  The discretionary function remains the property of the 
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decision maker and, unless he acts perversely, the Secretary of State’s decision making 
powers in terms of assessing planning merits, and assigning sustainability, are largely 
unconstrained. 
 
The 1985 Gransden case established the principle that without a proper understanding of 
policy, decisions may lack legal validity: “if the body making the decision failed properly to 
understand the policy, then the decision would be as defective as it would be if no regard 
had been paid to the policy” 120.   Lord Clyde recognised in the Alconbury decision that “The 
Secretary of State is not entirely free to make his own decision… He cannot act in an 
arbitrary way”121.  Given the centrality of the concept of sustainable development within both 
the Framework and the legal process relating to planning decisions it is of primary 
importance to establish what sustainable development means in the context of the 
Framework and how it should be applied. 
  
                                                          
120 Gransden & Co Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1985) 54 P & CR 86, p519 
121 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23 p170 
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Chapter 3 
Sustainable Development: evolution, regulation, definition 
 
Introduction 
 
As seen in the previous chapter,  ‘Gransden’ established the importance of decision makers 
understanding the policies they were applying and Mr Justice Lindblom subsequently 
confirmed in his ‘Bloor Homes’ judgment that ‘statements of policy are to be interpreted 
objectively by the court in accordance with the language used and in its proper context’.122    
Sustainable development became a key criterion for planning decisions in 2012 but was 
already in use as a familiar descriptive term in a range of international and national policies.  
This chapter examines the use of the term prior to and outside the context of the Framework 
to see whether it has a reliable, commonly understood, definition that can be taken as a 
starting point for an understanding the term as defined within it. 
 
This chapter examines the linguistic evolution of sustainable development from its global 
origins in the 1960s through its use in European and national policy documents and its 
recent interpretation since the election of the Coalition and subsequent Conservative 
Governments.  It reviews of the difficulties of enforcing environmental standards in planning 
law through regulation and concludes with a critical consideration of the current definitions 
proposed in English law and policy. 
 
3.1 International Context  
While it can be argued that the tension between the need to respect the environment while 
allowing for human growth and development is as old as society itself the publication of 
‘Silent Spring’ by Rachel Carson arguably marks the point when environmental issues 
entered modern global consciousness as a problematic aspect of development.123  This 
seminal work identified and exposed the causal relationship between human activities such 
as the widespread use of pesticides and the unintended and unforeseen changes in the 
natural environment such as the loss of bird populations. It brought the environmental 
agenda into global consciousness; and introduced an understanding of sustainable 
development as inherently concerned with anticipating and preventing environmental 
damage.   
 
                                                          
122 Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 754 (Admin) [19] 
123 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Penguin 1962)  
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The next decade brought the issue into the forefront in a more direct way with environmental 
disasters such as the Santa Barbara oil spill, the creation of protest organisations such as 
Greenpeace and publication of qualitative forecasts of environmental harm such as ‘Limits 
to Growth’.124  The 1972 Stockholm Declaration was the first international policy document 
that recognised the need to consider the environmental impact of development, balancing 
the benefits of development against its effects on the natural world125.  
 
The term sustainable development was used for the first time in the 1980 World 
Conservation Strategy126, but was not defined. The first definition of sustainable 
development was that used by Gro Harlem Brundtland in the report ‘Our Common Future’ 
presented to the World Commission on Environment and Development to the UN General 
Assembly in 1987 (‘the Brundtland definition’).   The extract most often quoted is her 
statement that “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs”127.   This extract presents sustainable development as little more 
than a simple balancing of current and future needs, but the speech as a whole proposed 
that wealthier nations had a general responsibility to curb all forms of growth so that the less 
economically advanced populations would have more freedom to develop and acquire a 
more equitable share in world resources.  In this context, sustainable development meant a 
fundamental international re-balancing of power between rich and poor.    
 
As Christe and Schmidt recognize, the definition of sustainable development in the 
Brundtland report did not lay clear linguistic foundations for its future understanding “some 
definitions are too vague to allow clear instructions, e.g. the Brundtland definition”128.  
Although the term has been used widely since, often using the Brundtland definition explicitly 
or implicitly, policies rarely acknowledge the full whole meaning and full implications of the 
term in its original context, and either offer no definition at all or propose a wide range of 
alternative definitions and goals instead. 
 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
                                                          
124 William W Behrens III, Jergen Randers, Dennis Meadows, Donella Meadows, The Limits to Growth 
(Universe Books 1972) 
125 United Nations Environment Programme Declaration of United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNEP 1972) 
126 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources World Conservation Strategy (IUCN 
1980) 
127 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 
128 Stephan Schmidt and Marius Christe “A Formal Framework for Conceptions of Sustainability – a Theoretical 
Contribution to the Discourse in Sustainable Development’(2012) Volume 20  Sustainable Development p 212    
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introduced Agenda 21 as a world action programme requiring integration of environmental 
social and economic factors and resources in development planning129.  Sustainable 
development is referred to frequently in the document and Principle 3 clearly owes its 
origins to the Brundtland definition with its statement that current rights of development 
should meet the needs of the future, but the term is not defined either in the main body of 
the report or in its Annex - the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development130.  The 
subsequent UN Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted Principle 4 ‘promoting 
sustainable development’ but did not define it.131   A 1998 Report a committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly noted that “we have been particularly concerned during our 
enquiry to find the term sustainable used in a blanket way to refer to just about anything 
which the witness supports” but this did not result in a definition.132   The 2002 UN Summit 
on Sustainable Development (UN 2002) made the first reference to the three ‘pillars’ of 
sustainable development: social economic and environmental133 and the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 - 'Rio+20' included a commitment 
to meet internationally agreed goals – but as before, no definition.134   
 
During the same period, the term sustainable development was increasingly used in 
European as well as global policy documents but without developing or adopting a specific 
definition.  The term was used in the 1994 Aalborg Charter as an aspirational concept on 
which to base living standards rather than a principle underpinning development 
proposals135.  The 2001 European Sustainable Development Strategy also referred to the 
term, this time explicitly relying on the Brundtland definition136.  The ‘renewed’ version of this 
document in 2009 again incorporated the Brundtland definition but also incorporated 
additional principles and objectives: “economic prosperity, social equity, environment 
protection and international responsibilities” while the supporting text for the document 
referred to four ‘pillars’: economic, social, environmental and global governance137.  
 
3.2 National Context 
                                                          
129 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) ‘Earth Summit Agenda 21’ UN 
(1992) 
130 UNCED, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ UN (1992)  
131 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UN (1992)  
132 United Nations Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs ‘10th Report Housing’ 
UN (1998) 
133 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development ‘Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development’ UN (2002)  
134  United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development ‘The Future We Want’ UN (2012)  
135 European Commission ‘Charter of European Sustainable Cities and Towns towards Sustainability’ EC 
(1994)   
136 European Commission ‘European Strategy for Sustainable Development’ EU (2001) 
137 European Commission ‘Review of the European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ EU (2009)  
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Sustainable development was no more coherently developed in English policy documents 
than its international counterparts.  Indeed there appears to have been some resistance to 
integrating planning and environmental issues at all.   The speaker at the keynote address 
at the 1990 planning law conference referred to environmental considerations as ‘the 
“green” questions’138, an editorial in the Journal of Planning and Environmental Law (‘JPL’) 
in 1992 cast doubt on whether sustainability would ‘play any real part in development 
decisions’139 while a contemporaneous article by the Minister for Housing and Planning 
stated that that the government would resist examination of individual decisions for their 
sustainability140.     The position changed quickly: in 1993 the Under Secretary of State for 
the Environment gave a speech noting with concern the lack of a satisfactory definition of 
sustainable development and proposing that it should incorporate two dimensions – 
domestic and international.141    
 
The 1994 Sustainable Development Strategy alluded to environmental issues with a 
foreword stressing the need to be ‘sensitive to the intangibles’ and an introduction that 
recognised the national need to make ‘radical changes necessary to protect the world’142.    
This Strategy did not adopt a formal definition of sustainable development but did 
incorporate themes central to the Brundtland definition, noting the competing need to build 
prosperity through development in the present without compromising the needs of the 
future.   It also identified four principles: 1) that decisions should be based on the best 
possible scientific information and analysis of risks; 2) that where there is uncertainty and 
potentially serious risks exist, precautionary action may be necessary; 3) that ecological 
impacts must be considered, particularly where resources are non-renewable or effects 
irreversible; 4) that cost implications should be “brought home directly to the people 
responsible”.  In the same year, sustainable development was recognised by practitioners 
as a potential material consideration in planning decision-making143. 
 
                                                          
138 Baroness Blatch, ‘UK Planning Law Conference Keynote Address’ [1990] Journal of Planning & 
Environment Law, Occasional Paper 17 
139 Robert McCracken, The development plan – master or servant?  (1992) Journal of Planning & Environment 
Law Occasional Paper 19, 90 
140 George Young The development plan – master or servant?  (1992) Journal of Planning & Environment Law 
Occasional Paper 19 ,3 
141 Tony Baldry Sustainable development (1993) Journal of Planning and Environment Law November B 122  
142 UK Government  ‘Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy’ HMSO (1994) 
143 Paul Winter ‘Planning and Sustainability: an examination of the role of the planning system as an instrument 
for the delivery of sustainable development’ Journal of Planning & Environment Law [1992] Oct 883 
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Following the election of the Labour government in 1997, the sustainability agenda grew in 
significance through new policies, legislative references and the emergence of bodies 
specifically concerned with its delivery.   
 
A sustainable development strategy was issued in 1999 which began by defining 
sustainable development as a ‘simple idea of ensuring a better quality of life for everyone, 
now and for generations to come’144.  This implicit incorporation of the Brundtland definition 
was combined with the four objectives from the 1994 predecessor document, and 
recognised the need to include economic, social and environmental capital within its 
considerations.  It also required application of the precautionary principle and updated the 
existing Sustainable Development Indicators (‘SDIs’) including social benchmarks such as 
educational qualifications and expected years of healthy life alongside environmental 
indicators such as air, noise and water quality.  In the same year the final report of the 
Urban Task Force inserted its own criteria for defining a sustainable city and its own 
meaning for sustainable development in a planning context145.    
 
The 2003 paper “Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future” did not define 
sustainable development but instead included a specific list of factors that could be relied on 
in terms of bringing forward proposals that promoted sustainability within communities. This 
document came closer than any predecessors in terms of defining and recording what 
sustainability meant in practice146.  2005 saw publication of a new Sustainable Development 
Strategy which referred to the Brundtland definition and added a new set of indicators, four 
new priorities and five new principles147.     
 
Planning policy documents were comparatively slow either to embed the concept of 
sustainable development, or include empirical environmental markers. Planning Policy 
Statement 23 presented environmental regulation and planning law as separate but 
complementary regimes148 while Planning Policy Statement 1 referred to the Brundtland 
definition but recommended pursuing the four aims set out in the 1999 Strategy instead149.    
                                                          
144 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ‘Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable 
Development for the United Kingdom’ HMSO (1999) 
145 Department of Environment Transport and the Regions ‘Towards an Urban Renaissance’ Final Report of the 
Urban Task Force HMSO (1999)  
146 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister ‘Sustainable communities, building for the future’ ODPM (2003) 
147 Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs ‘Securing the Future UK Government Sustainable 
Development Strategy’ CM 6467 (2005) 
148 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister ‘Planning Policy Statement 23: Planning and Pollution Control’ HMSO 
(2004)  
149 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister ‘Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable Development” 
HMSO (2005)  
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The decade following the 1997 election also saw the establishment of a number of 
organisations directly concerned with securing sustainable development. The Environmental 
Audit Committee was established in 1997 to examine government policies and programs in 
relation to sustainable development, without any definition of what that meant. The 
Sustainable Development Commission was established in 2000, basing its definition of the 
term on the Brundtland definition and recognising that the achievement of Sustainable 
Development required balancing environmental social and economic limits. This was 
followed in 2006 with the creation of the Sustainable Development Unit, basing its definition 
on the five principles in the 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy.    
 
The integration of sustainable development into English policy between 1993 and 2005 
seems to show a general will to engage with the concept but little or no ambition to produce 
a coherent, commonly used definition.  If anything, the increasing use of the term was 
accompanied by a sustained diversification and increasing breadth in the scope of matters 
used to explain and define it, with additional principles and pillars emerging on an apparently 
ad-hoc basis.  While the Labour government of 1997 did make sustainable development a 
key policy issue, it did not create any a stable notion of what the term meant.  As 
Allmendinger notes “The government set out four aims for sustainable development in its 
1999 strategy...it was unclear what such entreaties actually meant...If a proposal met some 
of these objectives and not others then was it sustainable development?”150   
 
The enduring absence of an agreed definition and the tendency for the term sustainable 
development to acquire multiple meanings meant that between 1962 and 2005 the impact of 
the concept of sustainable development diminished in terms of impact even as its use 
increased.  As a result, although the term itself became increasingly familiar as something to 
aspire to, it was of little use as a benchmark against which developments could be tested.  
 
Nevertheless, although no commonly agreed definition emerged, some key principles were 
established that contributed towards an emerging and generally accepted understanding of 
what sustainable development means.   The Brundtland definition was often used as a 
starting point for defining the concept, with sustainable development generally understood 
as growth that met the needs of the present population without compromising the needs of 
future communities.   Sustainable development was frequently associated with a general 
                                                          
150 Philip Allmendinger ‘Neoliberal Spatial Governance’ Routledge 2016 p142 
 
 
 
47 
 
leaning towards an equitable, distribution or redistribution of resources – again remaining 
true to its Brundtland origins if not linguistically consistent with them.  Although the principles 
and pillars were used to supplement the understanding of this key context differed according 
to context they consistently included references to social, economic and environmental 
elements, so that they can be included in the general conception of what sustainable 
development means.  
 
3.3 Definitions after 2010  
The Coalition government of 2010 inherited a concept of sustainable development that was 
loosely tethered to environmental issues but capable of taking on many other meanings.  
The Government had an ideal opportunity to clarify what it understood by the term, to include 
empirical and measurable benchmarks within it and to incorporate that understanding into 
new planning policies. The government certainly sustained a rhetoric of sustainable 
development but did not exploit the opportunity for new policies that included consistent and 
measurable definitions of the term.   Instead, sustainable development was re-presented as 
associated primarily with the promotion of economic growth, while the environmental impacts 
of development were increasingly re-framed as exclusively financial costs that could be 
assessed and offset through financial contributions.  
 
Within a year of the election sustainable development was already being defined in a way 
that was quite different from its policy origins and traditional understandings: a concept 
associated with economic growth – particularly in terms of planning.  “Mainstreaming 
Sustainable Development” was published in 2011.   This document proposed that 
development would be seen as sustainable if it contributed to growth and described 
sustainable development as: “making the necessary decisions now to realise our vision of 
stimulating economic growth and tackling the deficit”.151  The 2011 budget confirmed the 
government’s intention to create a national planning policy document that would include  a 
presumption in favour of sustainable development ‘where the default answer to development 
is ‘yes’.152  The 2011 Natural Environment White Paper emphasizing that preserving 
designated nature improvement areas should not have the effect of ‘deterring’ sustainable 
development, introduction the notion that protecting the environment was a problematic 
issue in terms of development that could legitimately be outweighed by the need for 
development.153       
                                                          
151 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ‘Mainstreaming Sustainable Development – The 
Government’s Vision and what this means in practice’ DEFRA (2011) 
152 H M Treasury ‘Budget 2011’ TSO (2011) para 1.82 
153 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ‘The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature’ CM 
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This repositioning of sustainable development as a driver for growth and environmental 
concerns as expensive impediments to that growth continued through the term of the 
Coalition government. In 2013 DEFRA announced a new centralised approach to 
sustainable development within all government policies and activities.  This statement 
acknowledged the Brundtland definition to the extent that it mentioned the needs of future 
generations, but also stated that economic growth was the priority of sustainable 
development.154  Two months later the government began a consultation on biodiversity 
offsetting that presented environmental issues as financial burdens and proposed ways that 
they might be offset rather than avoided, moving away from traditional representations of 
ecology as a special, non-renewable resource.155   This process of offsetting was described 
by Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in his speech to the Policy 
Exchange as a ‘trade-off between economic and social benefits and the natural environment, 
again reinforcing the notion of a market-based approach to environmental impacts  156   
 
The Coalition government also reduced the ways in which environmental benefits and 
detrimental impacts could be measured and recorded. As part of the pre-legislative scrutiny 
for the new Water Bill the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA) select committee 
issued a report recommending that the existing obligation to contribute to the achievement of 
sustainable development be replaced with a positive duty to secure it157.  The Water Bill was 
published in June 2013 with all references to sustainability replaced with a resilience duty 
concerned with guarding against flood risk rather than promoting environmental concerns.158  
In July 2013 the government published a new set of Sustainability Development Indicators, 
proposing that the existing 68 indicators be replaced with 12 ‘headline indicators’ and 25 
‘supplementary indicators’.159   
In terms of assessing performance against specific benchmarks, it was clear that the 
Government’s claim to be the “greenest ever” was not supported. In September 2014 the 
Environmental Audit Committee (‘EAC’) issued its fifth environmental scorecard for the UK 
Government, including empirical progress markers.  Biodiversity, air pollution and flooding 
were all marked as ‘red risks’, all of the others were amber and not one was considered 
                                                          
154 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs  ‘Making sustainable development a part of all 
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155 UK Government ‘Biodiversity offsetting in England’ DEFRA (2013) para 40   
156 Owen Paterson ‘Speech to Policy Exchange’ (DEFRA 2013) 
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satisfactory.  The EAC also noted that the number of environmental taxes had dropped by 
8.3% and commented that “there is still more to do to embed sustainable development 
across Government”.160  
 
In December 2014 the EAC issued its final report of that parliament, noting with concern that 
the Government was proposing to replace the 17 Sustainable Development Goals proposed 
with 6 ‘essential elements’.  They called this shift a mistake that would exclude key aspects 
of the sustainable development framework - and included a recommendation that the 
government phase out subsidies for carbon intensive energy sources ‘rapidly’161. The 
Government’s response issued in February 2015 rejected the proposal of a new Framework 
in favour of a ‘green thread’ through all policies and stated that the best way of dealing with 
inequality was promoting a data revolution162. 
 
The Coalition Government also abolished significant independent environmental reporting 
bodies.  In July 2010 the Government announced its intention to withdraw funding from the 
Sustainable Development Commission and abolish the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution163. This was followed in August with the announcement of the abolition of the Audit 
Commission164.   In terms of maintaining an oversight and scrutiny function on environmental 
policy, only the Environmental Audit Committee survived, voicing its concern about the 
government’s approach to sustainable development in a number of different reports: 
 In March 2011 the EAC issued its report on sustainability and the Localism Bill, 
expressing concern at the lack of a statutory definition of sustainable development 
and that in the absence of such a statutory definition, its core principles would not be 
represented.165   
 In June 2013 the report “Embedding sustainable development: an update’ noted the 
dissonance between the government’s environmental intentions and the lack of any 
specific criteria for assessing the sustainability or otherwise of development – 
referred to as ‘a pressing cause for concern’.166   
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 In the same month the EAC issued its report on ‘Outcomes of the UN Rio+20 Earth 
Summit’ criticising the absence of the Prime Minister from that summit, the lack of his 
presence at the committee hearings and highlighting the divergence between 
environmental aspirations and economic realities by noting that: ‘the Treasury 
appears to view the environment as a block to economic development.’ 167 
 In November 2013, the EAC reported on sustainability  and the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills noted the absence of consideration of environmental 
impacts in key policy documents such as the Regional Growth Fund and 
recommended the development of sustainability strategies and effective sustainability 
reporting.168  
 In the same month the EAC reported on the proposals for biodiversity offsetting 
noting that ‘the current system is not doing enough to promote and enhance 
biodiversity’.169 
 In September 2014, in its environmental scorecard report, the EAC specifically 
recommended more regulatory systems embedding sustainable development, a new 
environment strategy and an independent body – an ‘office for environmental 
responsibility’.170 However, this was emphatically rejected by the Government on the 
basis that sufficient external scrutiny was provided by the Committee itself171.    
 
None of these reports appear to have made any difference to the Government’s approach to 
sustainable development as a way to enable growth. The current Cabinet Office 
environmental policy document states that sustainable development ‘means making the 
necessary decisions now to realise our vision of stimulating economic growth and tackling 
the deficit’172.  A similarly pro-growth stance is demonstrated in the definition of sustainable 
development promoted in the licence for the new Strategic Highway Company which states 
that sustainable development ‘means encouraging economic growth while protecting the 
environment’173.   At the same time environmental measures that might inhibit growth are 
eroded or removed. in March 2015, the Government removed the Code for Sustainable 
Homes which allowed councils to adopt their own sustainability standards as a planning 
requirement, as a planning requirement and instead transferred some of those standards 
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into Building Regulations as “new national technical standards”174  In July 2015 the 
Government withdrew from previous proposals to require all new homes to be carbon neutral 
from 2016175 
   
As well as continuing to reduce the scope of any empirical controls, the Government has 
continued to treat environmental impacts as financial costs to be reduced or offset, 
promoting what Barkemeyer et al have described as a ‘business interpretation’ of 
sustainable development that excludes consideration of equity “to focus instead on market 
mechanisms and technological change”.176  The 2015 Infrastructure Act removed previous 
policy standards for provision of zero-carbon homes, replacing them with a general on-site 
carbon dioxide emission standard, and permitting the remainder of the zero carbon target to 
be achieved through off-site measures including payments into a fund investing in carbon-
saving generally177.    The continued dominance of the Government’s approach is clearly 
visible in the evidence given by Rory Stewart to the Environment Audit Committee where he 
stressed the overall importance of “making sure that our money is spent as efficiently as 
possible” and promoted environmental improvements on the basis of the money they could 
generate: “if you look at investment in water quality, you put in £1 of investment, you would 
probably at the moment expect about £1.70 worth of benefit”178    
 
3.4 Environmental regulation 
 
The government may be free to use the term sustainable development in a range of policy 
contexts and to ascribe different meanings to it but its actions are not entirely unfettered in 
terms of environmental controls on planning decisions. The European Communities Act 
1972 provides that EU law will prevail over 'any enactment passed or to be passed' by the 
United Kingdom Parliament.  European Directives give rights that can be asserted by 
individuals and that must be safeguarded by the courts.   English courts must decide 
questions on the meaning and effect of any EU instruments in accordance with the principles 
laid down by the European Court of Justice and rulings of the ECJ must be given direct 
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effect even if incompatible with UK law.  European environmental assessment processes in 
particular introduce and enforce rigorous empirical standards on the development consent 
process in England through Directives aimed at identifying, assessing and mitigating their 
environmental impacts.   
 
EU requirements in terms of environmental assessment of decision-taking and plan-making 
are therefore of primary significance in both decision-taking and plan-making.  Although they 
neither define nor enforce the concept of sustainable development, they are the only controls 
that require the formal recognition and mitigation of environmental damage and enable 
individuals to enforce those requirements where they are not complied with by government 
bodies.   
 
The Environmental Impacts Assessment (‘EIA’) Directive was made in 1985 and required 
that when considering whether or not to grant a ‘development consent’ any decision-making 
body should first consider the scale of its environmental impact, require that impact to be 
assessed if significant, and consider ways to mitigate that impact before granting consent for 
the development in question.179  In 1988, in a keynote address to the Planning and 
Environment Law Conference, the Under Secretary of State for the Environment said that 
“environmental concerns are not going to go away. A developer who promotes a major 
project without seriously addressing those concerns is simply asking for trouble”. 180   In 
practice, not only developers but also local and central government bodies and the English 
courts were slow to recognise the scope and reach of the Directives or to integrate them 
properly into the existing processes.   A raft of cases demonstrated that local authorities 
were failing to meet the Directive in almost every aspect: information supplied was 
insufficient for full environmental assessment181; the interpretation of thresholds was 
inaccurate182; Directive requirements were wrongly applied in relation to phased 
developments183; and the relationship between prior assessment and mitigation through 
planning conditions was misunderstood184.   
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One case in particular - Barker v London Borough of Bromley185 – stands out, not only 
because it involved a direct conflict between the EIA Directive and planning legislation in 
terms of the definition of a ‘development consent’ but also because it demonstrated the 
persistence with which the English courts resisted the importation of European concepts 
within the English system.  
 
In 1997 an application was submitted for the redevelopment of Crystal Palace Park and 
permission was issued in March 1998, with certain issues ‘reserved’ for subsequent 
approval.  No assessment of its environment affects was required by the Council or carried 
out by the developer.  The subsequent reserved matters application revealed specific 
aspects of the development previously undisclosed including a multiplex cinema and large 
car park. Again, no environmental assessment was required or carried out. The grant of full 
permission was then challenged on the basis of non-compliance with the EIA requirements. 
The key area of dispute was the assertion that the reserved matters approval, though not 
defined as a planning permission in UK law at that time, did constitute a development 
consent for EIA purposes and therefore required a second formal assessment separate from 
any work done – or not done - on the initial consent.  Both the High Court and Appeal Court 
disagreed with this assertion, and dismissed the challenges, but on appeal to the House of 
Lords it was decided to seek a ruling from the European Court of Justice.  
 
The ECJ adopted the opposite approach to the English courts.  It ruled that interpretation of 
the EIA Directive must be consistent with the originating principles of the EIA itself, even 
where this was in conflict with the enacting regulations.  The need for assessment would be 
determined not by whether English law required it but whether or not the empirical scale and 
scope of the development brought it within the remit of the Directive, requiring its effects to 
be examined for their impact. Although in terms of the national planning regulations in effect 
at the time a ‘reserved matters’ application was not a planning permission, it was still a 
development consent for the purposes of the EIA Directive186.  The House of Lords ruled 
accordingly, noting (para 33) that the Government’s interpretation of the requirements was 
flawed: ‘the Secretary of State must accept responsibility for the defect.’   Changes in 
legislation followed, but not until 2008, nearly 10 years after the original claim.   
 
The Strategic Environmental Affects Directive (‘the SEA Directive’), requires a similar 
assessment process to the previous EIA but in relation to ‘plans and programmes’ rather 
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than individual schemes187.  The SEA Directive requires all such proposals to be identified 
and to have their environmental effects assessed for their potential impact.   However, as 
before, case law has exposed the Government’s reluctance to embrace the principles 
underlying the SEA Directive where they delay or frustrate policy ambitions. 
 
In May 2010 the Secretary of State issued to all local planning authorities in England a letter 
in which he stated the government’s intention to abolish Regional Strategies and return 
decision making powers on housing and planning to local councils.  This was followed by a 
Statement to Parliament of the intention to revoke Regional Strategies188.    Although the 
Secretary of State acknowledged that the intention could not be implemented formally 
without a change to primary legislation, nevertheless he maintained that “I am revoking 
Regional Strategies today in order to give clarity to builders, developers and planners.”  On 
the same day the Department for Communities and Local Government issued written advice 
for local planning authorities about the impact of this purported revocation. It was a 
significant change to a political ‘programme’ as it removed an entire tier of planning policy 
throughout England. However, the government did not carry out any formal assessment of 
the potential environmental impact of this change. 
 
Cala Homes were in the process of seeking planning permission for a large residential 
development near Winchester. The designation was supported by the South East Plan - the 
Regional Strategy for that area - and the revocation of the Plan significantly changed the 
strategic planning context for their proposal.  Cala Homes challenged the Government’s 
decision on a number of grounds, including the requirement that the environmental impacts 
of the removal of a core piece of planning policy should have been assessed first.  The 
challenge was successful.  On 10th November Mr Justice Sales ruled that because the 
regional strategy in question could play a ‘decisive role’ in the determination of applications 
its immediate revocation could therefore also have an impact sufficient to require 
assessment.  He agreed with the claimant that the action of the Secretary of State was 
indeed unlawful, in part because the decision was taken without the necessary consideration 
of whether the change was likely to have significant environmental effects, in breach of the 
SEA Directive and Regulations189.  The regional strategies were effectively reinstated and 
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the case functioned as a reminder of the potential for European directives to overrule 
national policy developments in certain cases.   
 
‘Barker’ and ‘Cala Homes’ both show that the Government resists rather than embraces 
environmental regulation and continues to seek ways to reduce the burden of European 
regulatory requirements, as demonstrated by the Government’s response to the 2014 
Technical Consultation confirming that legislative changes would aim to significantly reduce 
the range of proposals coming within the scope of the 2011 EIA regulations190.   The EIA and 
SEA Directives do not include any reference to sustainable development but arguably have 
done more to identify and limit environmental damage than any policy document promoting 
that concept.    
 
3.5 A legal definition? 
 
The notion of sustainable development has been part of English environmental and planning 
policy for 25 years and many different definitions have been used.  The concept is, as Jones 
notes, “caught between political vagueness and legal ambition”.191   The definitions that exist 
do not impose binding responsibilities on the organisations that sign up to them.  As Mr 
Letwin acknowledged in his evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee on 9th 
December 2015 even the most recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals have 
‘absolutely no binding effect on any country’.192   Sustainable development is a term that has 
rhetorical impact but is in practical terms ineffective, due to the lack of an agreed definition 
and the absence of any related enforceable standards based on it. This final part of the 
chapter reviews recent attempts to find a formal, enforceable definition of the term. 
 
The first attempt to legislate for sustainable development in England was the Local 
Government Act 2000 that included a duty to prepare community strategies that would 
promote a new discretionary ‘wellbeing’ power based on the promotion of economic, social 
and environmental concerns and ‘contribute to achieving sustainable development’193. 
However it did not define the term itself within the legislation and no regulations or guidance 
were published on how the aim should be made real. Section 39 of the Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 specifically requires that the plan-making function be 
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exercised so as to contribute ‘to the achievement of sustainable development’.  It was 
recently referred to by Gavin Barwell in the public bill committee proceedings for the 
Neighbourhood Planning Bill as an adequate way of addressing the need to make 
sustainable development the legal purpose of planning.194    
 
The 2004 Act does not offer any definition of the term itself or any guidance as to what the 
exercise might mean in practice.  Indeed, Wright has criticised this legislation for its use of 
“creative interpretations” rather than definitions195.   Nevertheless, there is enough substance 
in section 39 for it to have been formally considered in case law.  In  IM Properties - an 
application for judicial review of a decision to adopt a development plan196 - Mrs Justice 
Patterson described the effect of the duty as importing strategic considerations about 21st 
century needs in relation to housing, economic growth and mitigating climate change.  The 
same duty was also considered in Calverton by Justice Jay who noted that there was in fact 
no ‘express definition’ of the term in the Act (para 10) yet still engaged with the concept, 
taking into account the three dimensions – economic, social and environmental - into 
account, and asserted (para 13) that sustainable development represented ‘a balance’ 
between them197.  
 
On 3rd December 2015 the House of Commons Public Bill Committee considered an 
amendment proposed by the opposition which would insert a new clause 16 into the 
consideration of the Planning and Housing Bill198.   The clause had three main elements: 
 Statutory recognition of the purpose of planning as “the achievement of long term 
sustainable development and place making”; 
 Sustainable development defined as “managing the use, development and protection 
of land and natural resources in a way which enables people and communities to 
provide for their legitimate social, economic and cultural wellbeing while sustaining 
the potential of future generations to meet their own needs”; 
 A range of factors to be taken into account by the local authority seeking to achieve 
sustainable development including: taking social environmental and economic 
interests into account when identifying land, contributing to culture and art, 
contributing to climate change, promoting open decision making and ensuring long 
term management of assets for the community. 
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The proposition was a good one in that it was clearly based on Brundtland and at least 
attempted to define the term in some way.  However the breadth of considerations included 
meant that this clause was not so much a definition of sustainable development as a 
catalogue of the considerations commonly associated with it.  In any event, although the 
Government agreed that sustainable development was integral to the system of planning 
their response was that integration was achieved already through section 39 of the 2004 
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act and the Framework so that there was no purpose in 
adopting anything prescriptive in legislation.  
 
The most recent attempt to create a statutory definition of sustainable development was the 
Committee stage of the Neighbourhood Planning Bill.  Amendment 19 proposed the 
inclusion of a sustainable development test for all planning conditions.199  The opposition 
also proposed, as it had for the Housing and Planning Bill, the inclusion of a new clause 19 
stating that the purpose of planning was ‘the achievement of long-term sustainable 
development and placemaking’ and using the same definition as it had for the Housing and 
Planning Bill.200  The Government’s response echoed that given less than a year previously 
– which was to refer to section 39 of the 2004 Act and the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development in paragraph 14 of the Framework, with the Minister noting that “we 
have had this debate before” and as before both amendments were withdrawn201. 
 
There is only one statutory definition of sustainable development in place. The Wellbeing of 
Future Generations (Wales) Act was given royal assent on 29th April 2015. Sustainable 
Development is defined as “the process of improving the economic, social, environmental 
and cultural well-being of Wales … in accordance with the sustainable development 
principle, aimed at achieving the wellbeing goals”.202 The sustainable development principle 
is set out in section 5, incorporates the Brundtland definition and sets out a range of issues 
to be taken into account including well-being objectives, and well-being goals.  The wellbeing 
goals are set out in a table and include resilience, health and a vibrant culture.  As with the 
definition proposed for the Housing and Planning Bill the aims of the definition cannot be 
faulted but are so wide and aspirational that it is difficult to see how its compliance will ever 
be monitored or, more crucially, enforced.  
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Conclusion 
It is thirty years since the Brundtland definition of sustainable development entered policy 
consciousness.   There is a resulting Brundtland-based, understanding of what the term 
means remains, what Elliot refers to an “idea of sustainable development” that “forms a 
staple part of most debates about environment and development”203    
 
The problem remains that there is still no single, formally acknowledged definition of the term 
in either planning or environmental law or policy. As many commentators including 
Millichip204, Segger and Khalfan (2004 p4)205, Richardson and Wood  (2006 p13)206 and 
Samuels207 have observed, sustainable development is a concept rather than a descriptive 
term, a textual hook onto which meaning can be hung rather than a proscriptive term against 
which proposals can be measured.    Rather than acquiring meaning over time the words 
sustainable development have become a definitional space bloated with a wide range of 
policy aspirations that can contain all meanings or none.  While the text itself retains an 
historic hinterland of association with the environmental agenda adding a sheen of green to 
the policies it inhibits, the term itself has become a catch-all term available to be applied to a 
multiplicity of policy aspirations. 
 
Where no definition is more valid or lasting than any other, definitions can be created and 
imposed on the term by the author using them and used to support a particular agenda 
rather than adhere to any traditional concept of sustainable development.  The Coalition 
government maintained a rhetoric of sustainability and continued to use the words 
sustainable development as it began a policy shift towards equating sustainability with 
growth and environmental issues as financial burdens, while resisting the imposition of any 
quantitative reports and benchmarking.    
 
The current Government has continued with the same approaching, including the rhetoric of 
sustainability in its policies but doing little to secure the proper analysis and mitigation of 
actual environmental impacts while policies continue to re-frame environmental impacts as 
purely economic impacts.  The concept of sustainable development has though been 
repositioned as concerned with delivering economic prosperity rather than protection of the 
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natural environment.   In the meantime the environmental impacts of development have 
been repositioned as purely financial burdens capable of being fully compensated by the 
same means – or even having the potential to create profit. It is hard to disagree with 
Allmendinger’s view that a “‘Treasury view’ of the role of UK planning continues to underpin 
and justify arguments to dismantle planning controls…gaining greater sway under the 
coalition between 2010 and 2015”208 
 
The Environmental Audit Committee is effective in documenting the concerns of 
environmental organisations at the way in which environmental policy is being redefined and 
implemented.  Its most recent report concerns sustainability and the Treasury209 and 
concludes that the Treasury is “arguably the most important department for ensuring the 
Government meets its environmental obligations” (76) but takes inadequate account of 
environmental long-term benefits.   
 
The Environmental Audit Committee remains active in its role of monitoring and reporting on 
environmental sustainability and there are three current, relevant inquiries.  The first, set up 
in July 2015 is into the Government’s approach to sustainable development generally210.  As 
part of its call for evidence, the Committee ‘consciously adopted’ a  definition of sustainable 
development, promoting environmental protection, support for low carbon energy and a 
general aim of improving wellbeing.   The second is an inquiry on EU/UK Environmental 
Policy set up in October 2015 “to assess the extent to which EU environmental objectives 
and policies have succeeded in tackling environmental issues in the UK.”211  Finally, an 
inquiry on the role of HM Treasury in in relation to sustainable development and 
environmental protection was set up in December 2015212.  It asked for evidence to be 
submitted on a number of questions including whether HM Treasury is taking enough 
account of the long term environmental impacts of its appraisal methods and whether there 
is sufficient understanding of the interrelationship of growth and environmental policies.   
However, the Environmental Audit Committee has no power to enforce these 
recommendations, its reports are not widely publicised and the Government is free to 
disregard their content and recommendations.    
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The EIA and SEA Directives remain the only functional environmental controls because they 
are empirically rigorous in terms of measuring and mitigating environmental harm and have 
power to overturn decisions that are non-compliant.   The Great Repeal Bill of 2017 will 
disengage the authority of the European Communities Act over English law, including the 
authority of both the EIA and SEA directives which could result in the deconstruction of both 
regulatory systems.  
 
Within the specific context of planning law, ‘development’ has an enforceable legal definition 
whose meaning has been refined over time, largely through case law.   It is clear from 
existing and proposed legislation that it is possible to define sustainable development and it 
is also clear from the environmental benchmarking system that it is also capable of being 
encoded and measured. The government continues to resist the introduction of any statutory 
concept of sustainable development or robust evaluative criteria.  Sustainable development 
in planning law therefore remains defined primarily by the Framework rather than legislation 
and the next chapter of this research turns its attention to that document.   
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Chapter 4: Sustainable Development in the Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 examined in detail the legal test which must be applied to all proposals for 
planning permission, where the merits of a particular proposal are considered against 
relevant development plan policies and a range of considerations material to that proposal.  
The Framework is always one of those material considerations but where the development 
plan is ‘absent, silent or out of date’ the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
will prevail over the development plan.   
 
Chapter 3 was concerned with the meaning of sustainable development outside the 
Framework.  It reviewed the original Brundtland definition of the term and the diversity of 
definitions it has acquired since its first use.  It proposed that the terms is still generally 
associated with the need to reduce environmental impacts and to ensure that current growth 
does not compromise future societal needs but that since the election of the 2010 Coalition 
government sustainable development has been increasingly associated with delivering 
economic growth while environmental impacts are presented as solely economic costs.  It 
also noted that there are no empirical enforceable standards associated with the term and 
just one legal definition. 
 
This chapter is concerned with the meaning and interpretation of the words sustainable 
development as they are used linguistically in the Framework.  It reviews the political context 
within which the Framework was conceived and produced.  It traces the evolution of the 
document from manifesto promise through to production of the first draft, its progress 
through formal consultation and on to official adoption in March 2012.  Referring to the initial 
draft as ‘Proposal’, the July 2011 consultation document as ‘Consultation’ and the formally 
adopted document as ‘Framework’ respectively, it looks at the text of each one in detail, 
comparing and contrasting key differences in terms of structure between them generally but 
in particular how each one uses and defines the term ‘sustainable’ and ‘sustainable 
development’.   This analysis is supplemented by Tables 1-6 detailing the use of the words 
‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainable’ within each of the documents considered. 
 
The Chapter also considers the extent to which the Framework functions as  political 
discourse as well as planning policy.  It includes a review of literature on the Framework 
since its inception, from parliamentary committees, legal and planning practitioners and 
academics, and concludes with consideration of the current review of the Framework itself.  
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4.1 Context  
The Coalition Government of 2010 inherited an established suite of national planning policy 
documents, including Planning Policy Guidance notes Planning Policy Statements and 
National Policy Statements.  Each one was relatively lengthy, involving detailed 
consideration of individual planning policy topics, updated on an ad hoc basis according to 
need.  They were criticised on the basis that they were unwieldy, liable to go out of date 
quickly and created an overall policy position that tended towards incoherence. 
 
On 20th December 2010 Greg Clerk, the then Minister of State for Decentralisation and 
Planning, formally announced a general review of planning policy including the creation of a 
new, document that would set a  concise and strategic context for planning in England: the 
National Planning Policy Framework213.  Greg Clark also established a ‘Practitioners 
Advisory Group’ (PAG) commissioning four external professionals to produce the first draft of 
this document: Pete Andrew, Director of Land and Planning, Taylor Wimpey UK; Simon 
Marsh, Acting Head of Sustainable Development, RSPB; Cllr Gary Porter, Leader of South 
Holland District Council and then Chair of LGA Environment and Housing Programme 
Board; and John Rhodes, Director of Quod planning consultancy.   This group submitted its 
initial proposal to the Government on 20th May 2011 and a consultation draft was issued by 
the Government in July 2011. The consultation ran until 25th November, 2011 and a 
summary of consultation responses and an impact assessment were published in July 2012. 
 
The Framework was introduced to Parliament the House by Greg Clark, on 27th March 2012 
and brought into immediate effect214.   Its three ‘fundamental objectives’ were stated as 
follows: 
 To put unprecedented power in the hands of communities to shape the places in 
which they live; 
 To better support growth to give the next generation the chance that our generation 
has had to have a decent home, and to allow the jobs to be created on which our 
prosperity depends; and 
 To ensure that the places we cherish - our countryside, towns and cities - are 
bequeathed to the next generation in a better condition than they are now. 
 
4.2 Proposal  
                                                          
213 HC Deb 20 December 2010 Col 144WS 
214 HC Deb 27 March 2012 Volume 542 Col 1337 
 
 
64 
 
 
According to the (now unavailable) website of the Planning Advisory Group its aim was to 
reach ‘a consensus on what planning policy would be required to deliver sustainable 
development’215.    The document that emerged was described as explicitly not a statement 
of government policy, but rather a ‘major contribution to the debate’.  Much of its content was 
nevertheless reproduced in the later consultation, including the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development, described for the first time as a ‘golden thread’ running through 
the policy as a whole.      
 
The Proposal does not contain a contents page and has little formal organisation or structure 
compared to traditional planning policy documents but can broadly be divided into three 
sections:  
 The first is an introduction including, under the heading of ‘Objectives for the planning 
system’ a definition of sustainable development, and a summary of the role of the 
Framework.  The section insists that the growth should decoupled from its 
association with negative environmental consequences and is clear that growth is the 
‘principal function’ of the planning system;  
 The next section is headed ‘Delivering sustainable development’, and begins by 
setting out the principle of the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
presented as the ‘golden thread’ of the planning system as a whole.  It then 
establishes eight core planning principles including the need for plans to take ‘market 
signals’ into account, and for growth to be focussed in locations which are or could 
be sustainable. A page of ‘Business Requirements’ is set out as one of the specific 
elements of the Local Plan, alongside more traditional elements such as environment 
and heritage. This section ends by setting out key principles relating to conditions, 
106 obligations and enforcement, and is followed by a very short summary in 
paragraph 16 of the Secretary of State’s power of call in, to be exercised only ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’; 
 The remainder of the document sets out a summary of planning policy principles 
under 10 different headings: Business and Economic Development, Transport, 
Communications Infrastructure, Minerals, Housing, Design, Green Belt, Climate 
Change, Natural and Local environment, Waste Management and Heritage. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 set out in detail exactly how the words ‘sustainable development’ and 
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‘sustainable’ are used in this document.   The words appear frequently and a number of 
definitions are used but it is not clear whether any are intended to make up a formal 
definition or whether any one takes preference to the others.  
 
Sustainable development is defined for the first time in the introduction section. This 
definition is linguistically close to the Brundtland definition and explicitly references 
Brundtland in the footnotes.  The introduction section also introduces the notion of 
sustainable development as having three roles – social, economic, and environmental.   
 
Page 6 adds to the range of meaning by describing sustainable development in terms of its 
implications rather than its ingredients, governing how plans are prepared, proposals 
decided and policies treated.  It then introduces a set of core planning principles which are 
essential for a planning system to deliver sustainable development without defining what 
sustainable development is.  Under the heading ‘Local plans’  on page 7 there is the 
statement that development plans should aim to achieve sustainable development, and that 
this means policies consistent with the Framework.  Page 7 goes on to use sustainable 
development as the goal of local plans without explaining how it would be tested. 
 
Development management, considered from page 14 onwards, is also presented as having 
the delivery of sustainable development as its central focus, but in this context sustainable 
development means ‘not to hinder or prevent’ development.  Pages 14 and 15 stress the 
centrality of the presumption, which appears, when the term is cross referenced with its 
implications on page 6 solely to mean that proposals should be approved and development 
needs met.   
 
Transport policies are mentioned on page 22 as important in facilitating sustainable 
development but not how.  In relation to the Green Belt, local authorities are advised to show 
what the consequences of new green belt would be for sustainable development, with the 
implication that such proposals would hamper its achievement and need, therefore, to be 
justified.   
 
The position is no clearer in relation to the use of ‘sustainable’ on its own.  It is used to 
describe economic growth on page 18, and again at 21, where it is also used to describe 
rural tourism with no explanation of its meaning in either context.  Sustainable economic 
growth and sustainable economic development are both referred to on page 22 but as policy 
aspirations rather than empirical goals.  Sustainable communities are listed as a key 
objective of housing policies and various ways are proposed on page 33 of achieving this.  
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Minerals – an irreplaceable resource - are described on page 27 as ‘essential to support 
sustainable growth’ while on page 29 a raft of policies supporting the capture and storage of 
non-renewable resources are listed under a heading promoting sustainable use of energy.  
In contrast the section on page 43 that deals with renewables, and the entire policy section 
on the natural environment, are not referred to as a sustainable resource.     
 
4.3 Consultation  
 
The Consultation document has more formal structure than the Proposal and begins with a 
foreword from Greg Clark, the Minister of Planning216.  There are three initial sections 
headed ‘Delivering sustainable development’, ‘Plan-making’ and ‘Development 
Management’ followed by detailed policies on a range of matters set out under three further 
headings: ‘Planning for prosperity’, ‘Planning for people’ and ‘Planning for places’.  The 
Proposal requirement for an assessment of economic development needs is dropped from 
the Consultation, as is the paragraph on waste but text is added on health and wellbeing, 
viability and deliverability.  The paragraphs in the Proposal about how the presumption is to 
be applied are removed but text is added on local development orders, neighbourhood 
planning and community right to build.   
 
In terms of defining what sustainable means and what sustainable development is the 
consultation document is no more coherent than the Proposal and the detailed analysis is 
set out in Table 3 and 4. 
 
The Foreword states twice that the purpose of planning is to help achieve sustainable 
development’.   In an apparent allusion to the Brundtland definition it states that sustainable 
means ‘ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives for future 
generations’.  The Foreword goes on to say that Sustainable Development is ‘about change 
for the better…positive growth’, that development which meets this criterion should ‘go 
ahead without delay’ and that the presumption in favour of sustainable development is the 
basis for ‘every plan and every decision.’  The Introduction refers to the economic, social and 
environmental aspects of planning and stresses the centrality of the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development as the ‘golden thread’ running through the document.   
 
Within the Core Principles, paragraph 19 bullet point 2 presents planning as driving forward 
development and directing all decision makers to ‘assume that the default answer to 
                                                          
216 DCLG ‘Draft National Planning Policy Framework’ (July 2011) 
 
 
67 
 
development proposals is ‘yes’ – a principle imported from the 2011 Budget217.  In the Plan-
making section a similarly positive approach is required towards local plans, with the 
assumption that ‘development needs should be met’.  The Consultation also emphasises the 
need for the planning application process to recognise the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development – presented in this context as inherently connected with a positive 
approach to development proposals.   
 
The Draft then goes on to set out policies specific to a number of areas grouped in three 
headings. Under ‘planning for prosperity’ the word ‘sustainable’ is used nine times without its 
meaning, either generally or within that context, being explained, though again the need to 
apply the presumption is stressed.  In the context of ‘plan-making’ achieving sustainable 
development is described as meaning meeting objectively assessed housing needs.  Under 
‘Planning for places’ applying the presumption in favour of sustainable development means 
not requiring applicants to demonstrate a need for renewable or low-carbon energy and 
approving applications where impacts can be mitigated. 
 
Within the sub section on green belt, there is a requirement to consider the consequences 
for sustainable development of decisions on where to locate new development, without any 
indication of which locations are more sustainable than the others.  Under the sub-heading 
of ‘natural environment’ applying the same presumption means meeting objectively 
assessed development needs, but under the same heading it is acknowledged that 
development affecting sites protected by the Birds or Habitats Directive would not be 
sustainable. 
 
The Consultation considers sustainable communities as a discrete area of policy and states 
that they involve the creation of new built environments.  In rural areas, proximity to services 
promotes sustainable development and good design is also seen as a ‘key element’ in 
achieving sustainable development.  The Consultation is completed by a new, glossary 
section. This does not define sustainable development but makes reference to the ‘whole 
range’ of surface water flood management methods within the definition of sustainable 
drainage system and includes a definition of sustainable transport modes. 
 
4.4 Framework 
 
The Framework follows the Consultation version closely, and begins with a foreword and 
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introduction. Under the heading of ‘Achieving sustainable development’ there is an 
introduction to the concept generally, and the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development in particular.  It sets out a number of core planning principles before setting out 
policies in relation to more discrete areas, including separate sections on development plans 
and decision-taking.  The section on sustainable communities is rebranded as ‘promoting 
healthy communities’ and a new Exception Test is introduced in relation to developments on 
the flood plain, allowing such developments to go ahead where flood risks are outweighed 
by ‘wider sustainability objectives.’  The introductory text in the Draft on housing policies is 
removed. 
 
Many of the responses to the Consultation included requests for clarity on the definition of 
sustainable development, for explicit links with the 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy, 
for explicit equivalence on the three dimensions and for specific types of development to be 
listed that were or were not sustainable.218  In spite of these requests, the definitions and 
interpretations of sustainable development and sustainable remain diffuse and opaque in the 
adopted document and a detailed analysis is set out in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
In the foreword, the initial definition of sustainable – ‘ensuring that better lives for ourselves 
don’t mean worse lives for future generations’ acknowledges the influence of Brundtland, yet 
sustainable development is also described as ‘change for the better…about positive growth’ 
and as the purpose of planning as well as the ‘basis’ for plans and planning decisions.   
There is a new, shorter, general introduction that contains no reference to sustainable 
development as a concept but instead simply states what the status of the document is both 
in terms of policy hierarchy and within the legal test for determining permissions.   
 
The main body of the text is headed ‘Achieving sustainable development’ and begins with a 
word for word rendering of the Brundtland definition, the reintroduction of the three 
dimensions listed in the Proposal, and the addition of the five principles from the 2005 
Sustainability Strategy.    Paragraph 6 introduces a new definition of sustainable 
development as any development that is in broad conformity with the Framework.   Page 3 
states that achieving sustainable development relies on meeting all three dimensions, and 
uses sustainable development as a heading in the section introducing the new presumption.  
Page 4 contains paragraph 14, a detailed definition of the presumption itself, referring to it 
firstly as a ‘golden thread running through plan making and decision taking’ before setting 
out what the presumption in favour of sustainable development ‘means’ in terms of the 
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exercise of each of those functions, and then stressing in paragraph 15 that where 
development is sustainable it should be approved without delay. 
 
Within the core general policies, sustainable development is used in a range of ways. In the 
Draft, the development plan must ‘aim to achieve’ sustainable development; in the 
Framework local plans are promoted as the main way of delivering it.  Sustainable 
Development is described as something that transport policies will facilitate (para 29) and 
that infrastructure should support (para 31).  It is one of the considerations in assessing new 
large scale developments (para 52), the sort of development that can be promoted in rural 
areas (para 55) and a ‘key aspect’ of good design (para 56).  It is something that must be 
taken into account in terms of the consequences of development in the Green Belt (para 82 
and 84).  It is something that plans must deliver and have as their prime objective including 
promoting the three dimensions it comprises (para 150-152).  Paragraph 173 states that 
viability and costs must be taken into account when pursuing sustainable development and it 
is referred to in paragraph 183 as the type of development that neighbourhoods need and 
can shape and direct and whose delivery should be fostered by local planning authorities 
(para 186).  Sustainable development is part of the decision making context for housing 
applications (para 49,197), and is excluded from applying where developments require 
assessment under the Bird or Habitat Directive (para 119). 
 
The use of the word ‘sustainable’ is no more coherent. It is used to promote a range of topics 
including: 
 to define the kind of economic development that planning should ‘drive and support’ 
(para 17); 
 the kind of economic growth that the government will ensure that the planning system 
will support (para 19);  
 the kind of communities whose needs should be taken into account among the 
planning merits of a particular proposal (para 22); 
 the kind of transport solutions that should be maximised (para 29); 
 the type of transport mode that should be facilitated (para 30) taken account of (para 
32) and maximised (para 34); 
 the type of community that should be created through new homes (para 50); 
 that way in which shops, facilities and services should develop (para 70); 
 the kind of development pattern that should be promoted (para 84); 
 a consideration to be taken into account as threatened by floor risk (para 100); 
 the kind of economic growth that can be supported through minerals development 
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(para 142); 
The final sections are concerned with plan-making and decision taking.  Both Local Plans 
and Neighbourhood plans are presented as key to delivering sustainable development.  The 
three dimensions are mentioned but attention must also be paid to viability and cost issues. 
 
None of these documents define sustainable development clearly or reliably and none of 
them are clear on how a development should be assessed for its conformity with the 
Framework as a whole.   The Proposal locates the definition of sustainable development 
within its economic social and environmental roles, but the Consultation disconnects the 
definition of sustainable development from these traditional anchors and aligns it with a more 
general pro-growth agenda.  The Framework follows the Consultation, so that while 
sustainable development is in textual terms a thread running through the whole document 
the Brundtland definition is textually and conceptually isolated from it.  These deficiencies did 
not go unremarked and the next section of the chapter summarises reactions from 
academics and practitioners in the field, and the outcomes of parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
4.5 The Framework as discourse 
 
Keller states that text can be seen as discourse when the production of the text is connected 
with the hierarchy of knowledge behind it and the people engaged in the process219.   He 
argues that no text appears or can be properly understood without regard to its wider social 
and cultural context and subtext, the dominant narratives within and from which the text is 
produced and by which it is informed and given meaning.  
 
Analysing the Framework as discourse considers it as contributing to a particular political 
agenda as well as providing guidance on planning policies.  It requires seeing the document 
in the context of its wider social and political ideologies.  This is an appropriate approach: 
Allmendinger proposes that although land is a concrete reality but it is overlaid with 
constructions such as the green belt that operate as socially produced ideas of what land is 
for220 while Sharp and Richardson recognise, this approach can usefully be applied to 
planning and environmental policy because it enables the policy to be read within the 
specific socio-political context by and through which it was produced.221  
 
                                                          
219 Reiner Keller, Doing Discourse Research An Introduction for Social Scientists (Sage 2013) p 20  
220 Philip Allmendinger, Planning Theory (Palgrave Press 2002) 12 
221 Liz Sharp and Tim Richardson, ‘Reflections on Foucauldian discourse analysis in planning and 
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In terms of context the Planning Framework can be presented as a document supporting a 
wider agenda primarily concerned with delivering growth, as well as a piece of policy 
guidance.  Allmendinger traces the evolution of what he terms ‘neoliberal spatial 
governance’ from its origins in the 1980s through New Labour and the Coalition government 
of 2010 and into the current conservative administration, presenting the phenomenon as 
unashamedly market-oriented yet made politically palatable through a gloss of “public 
interest legitimacy”.222   The ‘development first’ approach of the 1981 Conservative 
government was delivered through a presumption in favour of development.   Although it 
was subsequently replaced by a plan led approach, the need for land to deliver financial 
benefits remained on the political agenda as can be seen in the 2006 commissioning of Kate 
Barker – an economist and not a planner – by the Labour Government to carry out a 
comprehensive review of the system223.   The subsequent Barker Report recommended 
updated policy on planning for economic development, and inclusion of policies to support 
economic growth in all development plans.   
 
The Coalition Government continued to promote a growth agenda in parallel with a re-
presentation of the notion of sustainable development as concerned with delivering that 
growth.  The linguistic repositioning  - referred to by White as a ‘neoliberal mobilisation’ of 
sustainable development.224 is examined in greater detail in Chapter 3 , but began with the  
pre-election green paper ‘Open Source Planning’ that an explicit bias in favour of growth 
through the new housing and commercial development, introduced a new planning 
presumption and described it as a ‘right to build homes and other local buildings”.225  It found 
support in the first Budget statement stated the Government’s intention to introduce a 
presumption in favour of sustainable development ‘where the default answer to development 
is ‘yes’226.     
 
The Framework was a planning policy document, but created to promote a particular kind of 
planning with a particular motivation.  Rydin called it ‘a clear expression of the logic of 
growth-dependent planning”227  while Simon Marsh, one of the original authors of the first 
draft of the Framework, acknowledged when questioned by the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee that “this is what the presumption in favour of sustainable 
                                                          
222 Philip Allmendinger, Neoliberal Spatial Governance Routledge 2016 p 88 
223 Kate Barker Barker Review of Land Use Planning December 2006 
224 Aidan While ‘Resisting the Growth Clamp’ [2012] Planning Theory & Practice, 503 
225 Conservative Party Open Source Planning (Green Paper Policy Green Paper 14 February 2010) p110 
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development was intended to do: deliver more homes”228. Although it removed the ‘default 
yes’ approach present in both the Proposal and the Consultation versions of the Framework, 
the Framework remained clear that planning “does everything it can to support economic 
growth.”  It did not include previous acknowledgements of the need to take account of the 
environmental quality of land when considering its development, and references to 
supporting a low carbon future.   It included the Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development but isolated it within the text rather than integrating it as a central policy 
concern. 
 
Analysing the Framework as discourse also requires the status of the authors to be 
considered.  Foucault asserts that the function of the author is inherently linked to the 
processes that “articulate the universe of discourses”229 Keller argues that the significance of 
the authors or ‘actors’ responsible for producing a text cannot be ignored in terms of 
augmenting its power to create or impose meaning, and that the more power these authors 
have, whether that be in terms of economic or political capital, social or political status, 
knowledge and qualification or the significance (acknowledged or unacknowledged) of their 
position, the greater the potential for that text to have an impact230.  Lombardi et al also 
describe the influence of such key actors as ‘a powerful factor, possibly determinant’231.   
 
The Framework was promoted as providing ‘a practitioner’s perspective on what the National 
Planning Policy Framework should contain’ and four named individuals – rather than the 
usual anonymous civil servants - were commissioned to produce the first draft232. The 
individuals tasked with production of the Proposal were: Pete Andrew, Director of Land and 
Planning, Taylor Wimpey UK; Simon Marsh, Acting Head of Sustainable Development, 
RSPB; Cllr Gary Porter, Leader of South Holland District Council and then Chair of LGA 
Environment and Housing Programme Board; and John Rhodes, Director of Quod planning 
consultancy.  
 
Councillor Porter was the leader of the Conservative group of the Local Government 
Association from 2011 and described himself as having Eric Pickles – the then Secretary of 
                                                          
228 Communities and Local Government Committee Operation of the National Planning Policy Framework (HC 
190 December 2014) Q205 
229 Michel Foucault The Foucault Reader (Paul Rabinow ed, Penguin 1991) 
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231 Rachel Lombardi, Libby Porter, Austin Barber ad Chris D.F. Rogers ‘Conceptualising Sustainability in UK 
Urban Regeneration: a Discursive Formation’ (2010) Urban Stud 48:273 
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State for Communities and Local Government -  ‘on speed dial’233, Pete Andrew’s principal 
responsibility at Taylor Wimpey was stated as overseeing land acquisition for development 
purposes while John Rhodes headed, and still heads, a planning consultancy that lists a 
number of major developers (Argent, Brookfield Europe, Hammerson Plc, Lend Lease, and 
Stanhope) as well as the Home Office among his Quod Planning clients.  The group was 
thus dominated by individuals who were either actively allied with the current political agenda 
or primarily motivated by market forces so that financial rather than environmental concerns 
were always likely to be the primary consideration behind the document’s production. Only 
Simon Marsh had a background in local government as a planning officer, whose 
independent post-publication observation on the draft Framework was that the notion of 
sustainability remained a concept that was simply ‘tacked on to quieten the greenies’.234   
 
As a piece of discourse the Framework can be seen as produced to promote and enable a 
new political agenda; drafted by the development industry for its own purposes and adopted 
to contribute to the establishment of a particular socio-political-economic context for 
development.   
 
4.6 Critical reaction  
 
In terms of comment from planning practitioners Rydin considered sustainable development 
in the context of the Framework within her recent work on the purpose of planning but did 
not engage in any detail with the problem of defining the term within the Framework no doubt 
because, as she acknowledged, the text of her work was finalised before the Consultation 
was published.235   Hugh Ellis criticised the Framework as inadequate in the way it 
articulated the concept of sustainable development and for its neglect in omitting the 
definition of sustainable development contained in the 2005 Sustainable Development 
Strategy236.  Allmendinger’s most recent work also criticised the Framework for its lack of 
clarity in relation to sustainable development, pointing out that the term was in some places 
used to promote economic growth and in others to support environmental considerations.  
He also noted that the document as a whole reads as though there were a number of 
                                                          
233‘Gary Porter the man with three hats and south holland tinted spectacles’ Spalding Guardian (29 April 2013) 
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authors with different agendas writing separate parts of the text237. 
  
The property profession responded to the Framework with an analytical rather than a critical 
approach.  A year after the NPPF came into force Savills looked at decision-making on 
appeals comparing the position before and after adoption of the Framework and 
demonstrated that it was easier to obtain consent post adoption.  They also noted that of the 
11,669 new homes approved, 87% of the decisions were made by the Secretary of State.238   
CPRE brought out its own research in 2014, looking at 58 appeal decisions in the 11-month 
period since the beginning of April 2013, of which two thirds were granted. This report also 
noted that almost half of the decisions were decided by the Secretary of State and that the 
majority of these were approved239. Turley associates subsequently carried out a 2 year 
analysis of appeal decisions recording noting that the chance of success of a proposal at a 
planning inquiry had increased by 50% in the two years since the Framework was 
introduced240.    
 
In terms of comment from an environmental policy context, Ross set out a detailed analysis 
of the coalition government’s approach to sustainable development generally but her work 
predated the formal adoption, or implementation of sustainable development as presumption 
operating within all planning decisions and did not consider it in that context.241   Devine’s 
article in Environmental Law and Management considered the concept of sustainable 
development in the Framework and raised a number of criticisms.242  The definition of 
sustainable development was referred to as ‘clumsy and reductionist’, the requirement for 
the sustainability of a proposal to be assessed for conformity with the Framework as a whole 
was deemed “unworkable…substantially untenable’.  The article concluded that the 
Framework failed to integrate sustainable development into UK legislation and that the 
economic aspects of sustainability were promoted at the expense of the social and 
environmental. 
 
There was some comment from planning lawyers. Morag Ellis questioned the underlying 
motives of the NPPF and the presumption in favour of sustainable development even before 
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the Framework was adopted243.   These criticisms were echoed by Dowden and Hawkins in 
the same year, criticising the Framework for its lack of a clear definition of sustainable 
development and noting the potential as a result for this either to lead to growth in new 
developments or make it more difficult for new developments to come forward244.  One year 
on from adoption, Bird produced a comprehensive review of all of the significant the cases 
considered by the courts in the context of the new Framework since its implementation and 
was one of the few practitioners to focus on new presumption.245 He questioned whether a 
fair balance was struck between the social, economic and environmental elements.  He 
noted that the Framework had the potential to implement a very liberal approach to 
development, and that the result might be approvals of developments that are anything but 
sustainable in terms of established understandings of the word.  Bird also remarked on the 
power of and potential for the Secretary of State to decide what sustainable development 
meant on a case-by-case basis, suggesting that sustainable development could be 
reimagined in this context to become “synonymous with what is necessary or desirable in the 
public interest”.   
 
Parliamentary Committees have produced the most sustained critical analysis of the 
Framework and the new presumption.  The Parliamentary Committee on Communities and 
Local Government began an inquiry on the Planning Framework in October 2011 and 
published its report two months later246.  This raised concerns including its lack of clarity, the 
risk that the document might facilitate unsustainable development, the over-emphasis on 
economic viability and the ‘conflation’ of economic growth and environmental sustainability.   
A separate report published on the same day by the Environmental Audit Committee (UK 
Parliament 2011) noted that the draft NPPF did not achieve a balance between the three 
pillars of sustainable development, and that the NPPF could encourage unsustainable 
development.247   
 
In April 2014 The Communities and Local Government Select Committee launched an 
inquiry into the operation of the National Planning Policy Framework and published its report 
in December that year. Paragraph 6 questioned whether the NPPF was indeed delivering 
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sustainable development and referred to a body of evidence which indicated that ‘the NPPF 
is, in fact, leading to unsustainable development’.   One of the problems it highlighted was 
that greater emphasis seemed, in practice, to be attributed to the economic dimension of 
sustainable development than to the environmental and social. The first recommendation 
was that paragraph 6 - the statement that the policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a 
whole, constitute the Government’s view of what sustainable development means in practice 
– should be removed, and that the page 2 definition – clearly referencing Brundtland – 
should “stand on its own.”    The Government response, published in February 2015, 
rejected that recommendation, stating instead that it was for the planning system to look for 
environmental, social and economic gains, depending on the particular development in its 
specific context248.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Framework was in some ways a much-needed development in planning law and policy, 
consolidating and abbreviating a set of policies that had become too unwieldy and diverse 
for effective use in the determination of applications.  It also presented a prime opportunity to 
merge environmental and planning policy agendas by defining sustainable development in a 
way that was both true to its Brundtland origins but also precise so that it was capable of 
being demonstrably met – or not – by development proposals.   
 
The foreword to the Framework claims that it “sets out clearly what could make a proposed 
plan or development unsustainable’ but the evidence of the text demonstrates otherwise.  
There is no reliable or consistent definition of sustainable development within the 
Framework; rather the diversity of uses and definitions obscures rather than informs and the 
concept of sustainable development haemorrhages, rather than acquires, meaning.  Page 2 
of the document alone uses the same words in a five different ways:  
 as an aspirational heading;  
 as a term defined by Brundtland;  
 as a concept supported by five principles in the 2005 Sustainable Development 
Strategy;  
 as the purpose which the planning system is designed to achieve; and  
 as comprising three – social, economic and environmental – dimensions.   
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The position was well summarised in Dr Ellis’ evidence to the Parliamentary Committee in 
2014: “the definition of sustainable development in the NPPF is completely incoherent and 
does not recognise any of the established definitions.”249 
 
The Framework was promoted as a planning policy document introducing the notion of 
sustainable development as a ‘golden thread’ running through the whole document.  
Although the text is saturated with those words it does not define them and by isolating the 
Brundtland definition from the main text the Framework excludes this definition from the 
range of possibilities available.  The essence of the Brundtland definition is the conscious 
restriction on growth by affluent societies to enable emerging societies to enjoy growth of 
their own, yet paragraph 14 states that sustainable development means ‘approving 
development proposals that accord with the development plan without delay;’ – an overtly 
pro-growth stance.   The term ‘sustainable development’ is potentially textual camouflage for 
the approval of developments that are far from sustainable according to traditional meanings 
and intentions behind the term.    
 
The Framework was not just a planning policy but the product of a particular political agenda 
in a specific socio-economic context where the needs of the economy in general and the 
development industry in particular were seen as dominant over those of the environment.   
The choice of authors for the original Proposal disrupted the normal processes and authorial 
oversight associated with the production of a new policy; making it an explicit product of a 
market rather than government.  Practitioners have drawn valid comparisons between it and 
the development-led planning of 1980s dominated by a presumption in favour of 
development.   
 
There is however a crucial difference between the 1980 presumption in favour of 
development and the Framework presumption: the former is in favour of ‘development’ which 
has a legal definition and is refers to the particular proposal under consideration; the latter is 
in favour of sustainable development generally.  Sustainable development as defined by the 
Framework facilitates the approval, or refusal, of a wide range of developments depending 
on what part of the Framework the decision maker decides to refer to, and the meaning and 
weight attributed by that decision maker.   In this context, in order to decide whether a 
particular proposal is or is not sustainable development, the decision maker - whether that 
be planning officer, planning committee, planning committee or the Secretary of State – must 
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consider whether it meets the aims and ambitions of each and every Framework policy.   
Both the practitioner and the decisions makers who determine them are presented with a 
cornucopia of self-referential, Framework -specific definitions which they must untangle and 
apply to the proposal before them.    
 
In December 2015 the Government began a consultation on a fundamental review of the 
Framework250.  One of the topics it addresses is ‘supporting sustainable new settlements’ 
and the purpose of planning is re-stated as achieving sustainable development’.  However 
the paragraph 6 definition of sustainable development looks likely to remain.  Paragraph 6 of 
the Framework states that that the framework itself, ‘taken as a whole’ is the government’s 
‘view of what sustainable development means.’   It is this Framework-specific, rather than 
the Brundtland definition of sustainable development that forms the central principle of both 
plan making and decision taking functions.  Both the applicant, and the decision maker are in 
a definitional no-mans-land when it comes to sustainable development.  They have a very 
wide scope of policies from which either to assert that a development is sustainable and 
ought to be approved, or to claim that it is not and refuse it.   Compliance with the document 
‘as a whole’ is in most cases simply not possible. 
 
The Secretary of State is the final decision maker on applications of any substance, 
complexity or prominence.  One  - perhaps the only - way of understanding what the 
Secretary of State considers to be sustainable development is to look at the individual 
decisions made under the Framework by the Secretary of State to determine if it is possible 
to derive some consistent sense of what is, or is not, sustainable development from them. 
The next chapter is therefore concerned with a detailed analysis of a selection of planning 
decisions taken over a 20 month period, to see if a definition of ‘sustainable development’ for 
Framework purposes, can be derived from the decisions taken in purported compliance with 
the term.   
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Chapter 5 – Sustainable Development and the Secretary of State 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the Framework does not so much define 
sustainable development as produce a variety of definitional options, underpinned by 
requirement that sustainability of a development proposal is demonstrated primarily through 
conformity with the Framework.  The sustainability or not of a particular development is 
therefore highly dependent on whether the decision maker believes it to be in conformity with 
the Framework, with the decision-makers judgment questioned only when the assessment 
process is procedurally flawed or legally invalid.   
 
Although a large number of development proposals are considered daily by a wide range of 
decision-making individuals and committees, and although 90% of planning appeals are 
determined by Planning Inspectors, all decisions are effectively overseen by the Secretary of 
State.  He is the individual who both selects and considers the decisions with the greatest 
significance in the planning process and who has the final say on how the merits of each 
decision are to be applied.  Where sustainable development is either a material 
consideration or a presumption to be applied, the Secretary of State thus also has the final 
say as to how that presumption is applied and what the term means in practice for planning. 
 
This chapter looks in detail decisions taken over a defined period by the Secretary of State.   
It begins by looking at the powers of call in and recovery themselves and the criteria applied 
by Government before they are exercised.  Its central focus is a review of the analysis of 
actual planning decisions made by the Secretary of State over a specific 20 month period.  
Under those powers and with the Framework and its presumption in favour of sustainable 
development applicable to each one.   
 
The focus is on one aspect of each decision – how, if at all, the notion of sustainable 
development is considered and/or defined to see if a definition of sustainable development – 
or even a consistent approach to its interpretation - can be derived as emerging from them.  
It summarises the methodology involved, explains the content of the four tables of results 
and ends with a summary of the extent to which decisions made by the Secretary of State 
are subject to judicial review, with reference to leading cases and recent case law. 
 
 
5.1 Powers of call in and recovery 
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Section 77 of the 1990 Act allows the Secretary of State to take over or ‘call in’ a planning 
application at any time up to the granting of planning permission by directing that certain 
applications be referred to him at first instance instead of being dealt with by local planning 
authorities.   The local planning authority completes the preliminary work processing and 
makes a preliminary decision indicating whether or not it is minded to grant planning 
permission. The application is then considered by a member of the Planning Inspectorate 
who will fully investigate and report on the application to the Secretary of State, including a 
recommendation as to whether to refuse or approve it. The Secretary of State publishes the 
Inspector’s report with his decision and must have regard to it but has a wide discretion to 
adopt or depart from its recommendations.   
 
The criteria for use of call-in powers are generally referred to as the “Caborn principles” 
because they were first announced by the then Planning Minister, Richard Caborn, in 
response to a PQ on 16 June 1999251.  These are applications that: 
 may conflict with national policies on important matters;  
 could have significant effects beyond their immediate locality;  
 give rise to substantial regional or national controversy;  
 raise significant architectural and urban design issues; or may involve the interests of 
national security or of foreign Governments  
These criteria have been amended as follows: 
 on 26 October 2012 they were widened to include the applications which “may have 
significant long-term impact on economic growth and meeting housing needs across 
a wider area than a single local authority.”252 
 On 16th September 2015  the Government announced that it would actively consider 
calling in applications for oil and gas where a planning authority was identified as 
underperforming253. 
 
Section 79 of the 1990 Act is a parallel power to the section 77 call in power relating to 
applications and allows an equivalent level of intervention in planning appeal decisions.  The 
section allows the Secretary of State to direct that jurisdiction over an appeal is ‘recovered’   
so that the appeal decision is made in his name rather than by an inspector appointed on his 
behalf.  In practice, as with called-in decisions an Inspector considers the appeal documents 
in full and produces a report setting out the main issues, the case made for each party, 
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findings of facts, an evaluation of the planning merits of the proposal, including conditions 
and obligations, and conclusions and recommendations as to how the proposal should be 
decided.   As with called-in decisions the Secretary of State includes this report with his 
decision and must take it into account but the actual decision is his and his alone. He is 
generally free to decide what weight he gives to each element of the Inspector’s report, to 
allow or dismiss the application which is the subject of the appeal and to vary the contents of 
conditions and obligations. 
 
As with use of call-in powers the Secretary of State has a broad discretion to decide whether 
or not to recover a planning appeal; the Secretary of State can direct that he should recover 
the decision making function in relation to any appeal ‘if he thinks fit’,254 though reasons 
must be given, and the power to recover jurisdiction lasts through the whole decision making 
process.   The criteria for the use of recovery powers are established and amended through 
ministerial statements setting out which types of development could be recovered, and why.  
Until recently the position was relatively static and based on the statement made on 30 June 
2008, when the then Secretary of State set out the circumstances in which he would 
consider recovering appeals as follows255:  
 proposals for development of major importance having more than local significance;  
 proposals giving rise to substantial regional or national controversy;  
 proposals which raise important or novel issues of development control, and/or legal 
difficulties;  
 proposals against which another Government department has raised major 
objections or has a major interest;  
 proposals of major significance for the delivery of the Government's climate change 
programme and energy policies;  
 proposals for residential development of over 150 units or on sites of over 5 hectares, 
which would significantly impact on the Government's objective to secure a better 
balance between housing demand and supply and create high quality, sustainable, 
mixed and inclusive communities;  
 proposals which involve any main town centre use or uses where that use or uses 
comprise(s) over 9,000m² gross floorspace (either as a single proposal or as part of 
or in combination with other current proposals) and which are proposed on a site in 
an edge-of- centre or out-of-centre location that is not in accordance with an up-to-
date development plan document;  
                                                          
254 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 Schedule 6 para 3(1)  
255 HC Deb 30 June 2008 col 44WS 
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 proposals for significant development in the Green Belt;  
 major proposals involving the winning and working of minerals;  
 proposals which would have an adverse impact on the outstanding universal value, 
integrity, authenticity and significance of a World Heritage Site;  
 
Since election of the Coalition government in 2011 the criteria have been formally extended 
by the current government on a number of occasions.   
 In October 2012 an additional criterion was added: applications which ‘may have 
significant long-term impact on economic growth and meeting housing needs across 
a wider area than a single local authority’256.  
 In July 2013 recovery powers were extended to include traveller sites in the green 
belt257 and in January 2014 it was announced that this practice would continue 
beyond the original six months proposed.258  
 On 10 October 2013 the Secretary of State announced that he would temporarily 
expand the criteria, for six months, to include recovering appeals for renewable 
energy development259.  On 9 April 2014 the Secretary of State announced that he 
would continue to consider for recovery appeals for renewable energy developments 
for a further 12 months260. 
 On 10 July 2014 the Secretary of State announced that he would like to “consider the 
extent to which the Government’s intentions are being achieved on the ground”, in 
relation to the neighbourhood planning regime introduced under the Localism Act 
2011. The recovery criteria was subsequently amended to include: proposals for 
residential development of over 10 units in areas where a qualifying body has 
submitted a neighbourhood plan proposal to the local planning authority: or where a 
neighbourhood plan had been made261. 
 In July 2016 the criteria for consideration of recovery of planning appeals was 
extended to included proposals for residential development of more than 25 
dwellings in an area where a qualifying body had submitted a plan.262  This was 
extended for a further six months in December 2016.263 
 
                                                          
256 HC Deb 26 Oct 2012 col 72Ws 
257 HC Deb 1 July 2013 col 24WS 
258 HC Deb 17 Jan 2014 col 35WS 
259 HC Deb 10 Oct 2013 col 31WS 
260 HC Deb 9 Apr 2014 col 13WS 
261 HC Deb 9 July 2015 col 7WS  
262 HC Deb 7 july 2016 col 74WS 
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5.2 Parameters of analysis 
 
The primary focus of this chapter is a detailed examination of planning decisions made by 
the Secretary of State under his powers of call in and recovery for the 20 months from the 
date that the Framework came into effect including specific consideration of: 
 the relative weight given to social, environmental and economic concerns; 
 how the terms ‘absent, silent, or… out of date’ have been interpreted in relation to the 
development plan; 
 whether any particular kinds of development proposals have consistently been 
regarded as sustainable; 
 whether is possible to see any consistency evident in his approach to interpreting 
and/or applying the concept of sustainable development in this context;  
 whether it is possible to derive a reliable definition of sustainable development from 
the decisions made.    
 
The source of the data was the Government’s own records of such decisions, published 
online in the form of a letter on the Secretary of State’s behalf with the relevant inspector’s 
report attached.   The decisions lend themselves to comparative analysis because they 
follow a standard format that appears to be based on a uniformly-used decision making 
template.  In each case the heading sets out the relevant statutory provision, the name of the 
applicant/appellant, the address of the property and the planning application reference 
number.    The first paragraph is usually a summary of the decision reached including a 
reference to the inspector’s assessment and report, and details of the public inquiry if 
relevant.  The remainder of the letter follows a relatively standard format identifying the 
relevant issues, how they were considered, and the outcome. 
 
The results of the analysis are contained in tables seven to ten at the end of the research. 
The fields recorded were: 1) the appeal reference and the date of the decision; 2) the 
development in question; 3) the reason given – if any -  for calling in the application; 4) the 
Inspector’s recommendation 5) the Secretary of State’s decision and 6) a summary from the 
text of the extent to which the concept of sustainable development was considered, 
interpreted or applied, either in the context of the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development, or generally. 
 
The original intention was to analyse the decisions as a whole, making a division only 
between those decided under ‘call in’ and ‘recovery’ powers.  However, it became clear that 
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the Secretary of State was using his powers – particularly those of recovery – to ensure that 
he was the final decision maker in relations to two particular types of development: 
 Proposals by members of the gipsy and traveller communities for pitches for 
caravans, grazing and other uses associated with the traveller lifestyle; 
 Proposals relating to renewables developments – specifically wind turbines. 
There was a strong indication that the Secretary of State had made a conscious decision to 
use his powers of intervention in relation to these two specific types of application, even 
where the development in question was small in scale such as a single caravan or wind 
turbine.  It was decided to subdivide the data so that appeal decisions for travellers and 
renewables developments were separately recording, leaving the remaining decisions 
bundled together under the heading of ‘residual’ developments although the primary division 
between call in and recovery was maintained. 
 
5.3 Call – in decisions 
 
The data from these decisions is recorded in Table 7.  In each case the table records the 
appeal reference, the nature of the development, the reason for the call-in, the Inspector’s 
recommendation and the Secretary of State’s decision. In addition, the table records the 
extent to which sustainable development was considered, defined and interpreted by the 
Secretary of State.   
 
There are only 9 decisions made within the chosen period under the call-in powers.  In terms 
of types of development, most are significant either in terms of scale or impact on the 
community, with the exception of number 7 where it is difficult to understand why the 
proposal for one house, however termite-ridden, should have attracted this much attention.  
Potential conflict with national policy was the reason for call in on three of the decisions and 
on another potential cross-border controversy; in the majority of cases no reason was given. 
 
In terms of sustainable development, five of the nine decisions show some awareness of the 
presumption but there was no evidence of a coherent approach either to its meaning or the 
application of the presumption. In four of the decisions the term was not mentioned at all.  
The economic dimension of sustainability was seen as important in the decision 1 and all 
three dimensions were seen as being undermined in decision 9 whereas for decision 3 
restaurant all three were satisfied, but the dimensions were only mentioned in three of the 
nine cases.  Generally, it is not possible to derive any clear trends from it except that in all 
cases the Secretary of State agreed with the Inspector’s decision. 
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5.4 Recovered decisions: travellers 
 
Traditionally, jurisdiction over appeals relating to traveller developments is recovered by the 
Government only when developments are large in scale or particularly controversial but from 
1st July 2013 the power of intervention was extended to all decisions of any scale relating to 
traveller sites in the green belt.264 The statement confirmed that scrutiny was being extended 
so that the Secretary of State could consider the extent to which “Planning Policy for 
Traveller Sites” was meeting the Government’s policy intentions.  In a written ministerial 
statement to Parliament on 17 January 2014 Brandon Lewis, The Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government announced that the Secretary of 
State remained concerned about the issue and intended to continue ‘to consider for 
recovery’ appeal decisions of this type.265 
 
Table 8 is a list of all the appeal decisions recovered by the Secretary of State relating to 
traveller developments.    Of the total of 171 recovered appeal decisions considered, 73 
were in relation to traveller developments and in most cases of the reason given for recovery 
is that it represented a proposal for development by Travellers in the Green Belt though in 
three cases the recovery was due to substantial regional or national controversy and one 
because it was development in a national park.    
 
In terms of the actual developments under scrutiny, physical operations applied for included 
applications for permission for caravans, mobile homes, utility blocks, hardstanding for 
parking, cesspits, oil tanks, stable blocks, landscaping, and fences. The changes of use 
requested included stationing of caravans, caravan sites of various sizes, use of land for 
grazing and/or parking motor vehicles and general storage.  In most cases the development 
proposed was small in scale; in some cases involving a single pitch, or caravan/mobile 
home.   
 
In nearly half (32 of 73) of the cases the Secretary of State disagreed with the inspector’s 
recommendation to permit development and refused permission or reduced the scope of the 
permission recommended to be granted.  In all of the remaining cases, the Secretary of 
State agreed with the Inspector’s recommendation to refuse the grant of planning 
permission, except one where the appeal was allowed.   The approach of the Secretary of 
                                                          
264 HC Deb 1 July 2013 col 24WS 
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State was therefore in most cases to refuse the development, even where this was against 
the Inspector’s recommendation. 
 
Every decision included a heading: ‘Policy Considerations’ and the Framework was referred 
to as a material consideration taken into account in each case.   There was no formal 
acknowledgment of paragraph 14 of the Framework or any mention of the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development.  The actual decisions themselves contained little 
evidence that the concept of sustainable development was considered in any detail. There 
was relatively little attention given, in the Secretary of State’s decisions, of sustainability 
considerations generally and hardly any explicit consideration of the presumption, or its three 
dimensions.  Beyond the standard paragraph in every decision stating that the Framework 
had been taken into account, there was no consistency among the decisions as to how 
sustainability generally and the presumption in particular were weighed in the process.   
Within a total of 73 decisions, only 12 mentioned sustainability or sustainable development. 
Location and accessibility were taken into account most often when assessing sustainability 
and other factors included access to education, healthcare, shops and in one case the ability 
to integrate with the community.   
 
It was not possible to identify, from the cohort of decisions considered a standard approach 
to either the meaning or interpretation of the concept of sustainable development in relation 
to this type of application.   However, given that the Secretary of State refused most 
applications even where the Inspector had recommended otherwise these decisions appear 
to suggest that traveller developments in the Green Belt are inherently unsustainable.  
 
5.5 Recovered decisions: renewables 
 
As with the decisions involving travellers from the summary of all appeal decisions, a subset 
of data was created comprising only decisions relating renewables proposals, detailed in 
table nine.  Of the 171 recovered decisions scrutinised, 31 were in relation to these types of 
development and most related to between 1 and 10 turbines.  The same, limited number of 
fields was used as for traveller developments: the Inspectorate’s own reference for the 
decision, the date of the decision, the type of development in question, the reason given for 
calling in the application and the extent to which either the new presumption in favour of 
sustainable development, or sustainable development itself, were considered.   
 
A number of different reasons were given for recovery of jurisdiction: 
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 ‘The proposal is of major significance for the delivery of the Government’s climate 
change programme and energy policies’. This was used in relation to a range of 
developments including turbines, biomass plants, and solar farms; 
 ‘To enable him to consider the extent to which the new practice guidance.. is meeting 
the Government’s intentions’. This was used for developments involving a small 
number of turbines; 
 ‘Because it involves a renewable energy development’. This was used in appeals 
relating to one or two turbines and a solar park; 
 In one case the reason given for recovery was that they ‘involve proposals against 
which another Government department has raised major objections or has a major 
interest’; 
 In another the reason was simply that ‘6 turbines could be held to have an impact 
beyond the local area’; 
 In three cases no reason was given. 
 
As with traveller developments the Secretary of State generally used his powers of 
intervention to refuse permission even where the inspector’s report recommended approval. 
Of the 31 decisions considered, only 5 were approved, and in 10 of those cases the 
Secretary of State’s decision to refuse overruled the inspector’s recommendation to approve.   
In November 2014 Renewables UK wrote to the Royal Town Planning Institute266 pointing 
out that in relation to renewables decisions: 
 52 projects had been subject to intervention by the Secretary of State since the 
summer of 2013;  
 This was 85% of the total number of appeals for this kind of development; 
 Of the 24 projects where a decision had been made, 21 were refused, 7 of these 
against Inspector recommendation; 
 
Renewables developments can be broadly characterised as a class of development that 
enables the generation of power without drawing on finite natural resources.  In the sense 
that they meet some of the needs of the present population without compromising the needs 
of others, they can be proposed as inherently sustainable in Brundtland terms.  However, the 
decisions made no reference to Brundtland and did not reveal a common approach to 
sustainable development.  In most cases the concept was not considered at all.  Of the five 
developments where it was mentioned, one mentioned consistency with planning policies, 
two had a reference to the planning balance falling in favour of the proposal, and one stated 
                                                          
266 Renewable UK open letter to Trudi Elliot, CEO of the RTPI 21 November 2014 
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that because the development is in conflict with development plan policies, the presumption 
in favour of sustainable development was ‘triggered’, but went no further.   
 
This is a surprising outcome primarily because renewables are a class of developments that 
enable the generation of energy with minimal environmental cost, contributing to meeting the 
energy needs of the present population without compromising those of the future. They are 
entirely consistent with a Brundtland notion of sustainable development as growth that does 
not deplete natural resources but leaves them intact for the populations of the future.  In 
addition renewables were supported by a range of national policies.  The UK Renewable 
Energy Strategy 2009 anticipated more than 30% of energy being generated from 
renewables, and that ‘much of this will be from wind power’267. The 2011 Overarching 
National Policy Statement (‘NPS’) on renewables recognised that they were an abundant 
source of low cost energy, stating in paragraph 3.4.1 that “the UK has committed to sourcing 
15% of its total energy (across the sectors of transport, electricity and heat) from renewable 
sources by 2020 and new projects need to continue to come forward urgently to ensure that 
we meet this target’268. The NPS for Renewable Energy 2011 had a section dedicated to 
onshore wind projects, recognising them (para 2.7.1) as “the most established large-scale 
source of renewable energy in the UK269. 
 
However, a closer examination of the policy context shows that these decisions can be seen 
as part of the evidence demonstrating a policy shift away from this type of development from 
2011 onwards.   The Framework considers renewable energy only briefly under the section 
10 heading of climate change where planning is described as having a ‘key role 
in…supporting the delivery of renewable and low carbon energy”.  Paragraph 97 
recommends maximising renewable energy development but the Technical guidance 
published in parallel with the Framework does not deal with the issue of renewable energy at 
all.  It has a general heading of ‘adapting to climate change’270  but the only formal 
‘programme’ listed is the National Adaptation Programme271.    
 
The 2013 written Ministerial Statement on ‘Local Planning and onshore wind’ continued the 
trend, expressing concern that decisions on wind farms were being made without adequate 
                                                          
267 HM Government The UK Renewable Energy Strategy (CM7686 July 2009) 
268 Department for Environment and Climate Change (DECC) National Policy Statement for Energy (EN-1 The 
Stationery Office July 2011) 
269 DECC National Policy Statement for Renewable Energy Infrastructure  (EN-3 The Stationery Office July 
2011) 
270 DCLG Technical Guidance to the National Planning Policy Framework ( DCLG March 2012) 
271 Environment Agency Adapting to Climate Change: Advice for Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management 
Authorities (Environment Agency April 2016) 
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regard to local wishes272.    The subsequent Written Ministerial Statement on renewable 
energy published in April 2014 announced a new requirement for compulsory pre-application 
consultation for certain onshore wind applications and confirmed the government’s intention 
to continue with its involvement in the decision making process in order to ensure the 
promotion of local interests273.  The online National Planning Policy Guidance was updated 
in June 2015 to confirm that planning applications for wind turbines should not be approved 
unless the proposed development site was in an area identified as suitable for wind 
energy.274  That guidance also recognised that heritage assets were at risk of ‘substantial 
harm’ from wind turbines.275  In February 2015 Tim Yeo, Chairman of the Energy and 
Climate Change Committee wrote to the Secretary of State asking him to clarify the 
Department’s policy towards onshore wind276. The response confirmed that planning policy 
in relation to wind turbines had been “openly changed…to ensure that proper weight should 
be given to the protection of England’s valuable landscape and heritage277. 
 
The outcome of the policy shift is evident in these decisions as the Secretary of State 
consistently came to the view that the protection of cultural and aesthetic resources was 
more ‘sustainable’ in terms of conformity with the Framework than a development’s potential 
to reduce environmental impact or contribute to low carbon energy production.  Although 
environmental benefits were recognised, and even acknowledged as contributing towards 
the achievement of sustainable development, these applications were generally refused 
when they were considered to have a harmful effect on the landscape, particularly if that 
landscape included features of historic or architectural importance.   
 
 
5.6 Recovered decisions: residual 
 
In many ways the decisions under this heading, set out in table 10, are the type and scale of 
decision traditionally seen as traditional territory for the exercise of powers of call in and 
recovery – medium or large in scale, and/or generating a significant amount of local interest 
or controversy and/or raising policy considerations of more than local significance.   Of the 
67 decisions, 56 were residential, or contained a significant residential element, and 
                                                          
272 HC Deb 6 June 2013 Col 114WS 
273 HC Deb 9 Apr 2014 Col 13WS 
274 National Planning Practice Guidance Renewable and Low Carbon Energy (Paragraph: 005 Revision date 18th 
June 2016 
275 National Planning Practice Guidance Paragraph: 019 Reference ID: 5-019-20140306 Revision date 6th March 
2013 
276 Energy and Climate Change Committee letter to Eric Pickles from Tim Yeo 10th February 2015  
277 DCLG letter to Tim Yeo from Eric Pickles 6th March 2015   
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substantial in size - between 100 and 500 units. The range of uses in the remaining cases 
included waste facilities, schools, retail and leisure uses, and one proposal for 
redevelopment of a listed cinema as a church.    
 
The Secretary of State’s decision letter followed the same standard format as the others with 
the second paragraph setting out the reason for recovery of the decision-making function.    
Because of the predominance of medium-large scale residential developments, in most 
cases the reason for recovery was that the proposal involved residential development of 
more than 150 units on a site of over 5 hectares. Other reasons for recovery included: 
 proposals for development of major importance having more than local significance; 
 proposals giving rise to substantial regional or national controversy;  
 proposals which raise important or novel issues of development control and/or legal 
difficulties;  
 proposals against which another Government Department has raised major objections or 
has a major interest;  
 proposals which involve any main town centre use or uses (as set out in paragraph 1.8 
of PPS6) where that use or uses comprise(s) over 9,000m (2) gross floor space  
 proposals for significant development in the green belt;  
 
The Secretary of State disagreed with the Inspector on 11 cases.  He overrode the 
recommendation to refuse 3 times and to grant 8 times, demonstrating a slightly but not 
significantly more restrictive attitude in terms of applying the planning balance.   Where the 
Secretary of State did not agree with the Inspector, so that permission was refused in the 
light of a recommendation to grant, this was either on the grounds of impact on the green 
belt or non-compliance with a neighbourhood plan.   
 
In terms of sustainable development each decision included a standard ‘Policy 
Considerations’ heading and in every decision the Framework was listed within the relevant 
material considerations taken into account.  As with the other decisions, there was little 
evidence of the Secretary of State considering what sustainable development meant or how 
compliance with it should be assessed. There was almost no evidence of conscious 
engagement with or application of the concept of sustainable development in relation to its 
Brundtland origins and not much consistency between decisions on how the concept ought 
to be applied or tested.  In many cases the development was simply summarised as being 
‘sustainable’ without any explanation of why the term was used or how it was defined.  
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Vague terms such as ‘sustainability credentials’ and ‘sustainability spectrum’ were used 
without being explained.   
 
This cohort of decisions did however demonstrate more awareness of the ‘three dimensions’ 
of sustainable development, with the social, economic, and environmental aspects all 
acknowledged and occasionally assessed on an individual basis.   In one case a 
development was described as ‘relatively sustainable’ but failing in terms of design and in 
another sustainability was seen as dependent on the developer establishing a connectivity 
scheme. In addition, where the local authority could not demonstrate a 5 year supply of land 
for housing, the development plan was disregarded as being out of date and the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development was routinely applied.  In practice, this 
resulted in the Framework policies replacing development plan policies in relation to housing 
supply, and where an application was providing new housing it was held to be sustainable 
development on this basis alone.   
 
5.7 Judicial intervention 
 
The Secretary of State’s decision-making capacity is broad and the Courts are, as 
recognised by Leigh and Casely-Hayford, ‘notoroiously loath’ to interfere with it278.   
Nevertheless the government’s guidance in relation to propriety and planning  makes it clear 
that Planning ministers, including the Secretary of State, are under a duty to behave ‘quasi-
judicially’ in the decision-making procedure279.   The Secretary of State must be seen to be 
fair in the handling of evidence and to maintain an objective approach to the consideration of 
the planning issues.  The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling 
parties to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were 
reached on the main issues280.   When these requirements are not met the courts will 
intervene and a number of leading cases help to 1) establish the standard of decision 
making required, 2) demonstrate the general reluctance of the courts to intervene, and 3) 
give examples of circumstances where they have. 
 
                                                          
278 Kevin Leigh, Margaret Casely-Hayford ‘The birth of the Human Rights Act: the death of the planning call-in 
procedure?’[2001] J.P.L.7-11 
279 DCLG Guidance on Planning Propriety Issues (DCLG February 2012) 
280 South Bucks District Council & Anor v. Porter [2004] UKHL 33 [2004] 4 All ER 775, [2004] 
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Bloor Homes is a recent, and currently the leading case in terms of setting the parameters 
for judicial scrutiny of planning decisions.  In paragraph 19 Mr Justice Lindblom identified 
‘seven familiar principles’ to be applied in all cases281 : 
 Decisions are interpreted with a reasonable degree of flexibility and not every 
argument needs to be considered; 
 The reasons must be intelligent and sufficient, but while they should not leave 
significant issues in doubt, only the central issues must be considered; 
 The weight to be assigned to any material planning consideration is “within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the decision-maker. 
 Planning policies should not be interpreted in the same way as legislation or 
contractual provisions; 
 It is important to review the decision considering what the decision maker thought the 
important issues were; 
 Just because a policy is not mentioned does not mean that it was ignored; 
 Consistency is important but not required in all cases. 
 
In Persimmon Homes282  Mr Justice Sullivan considered the Secretary of State’s discretion in 
relating to deciding whether or not to intervene in a decision. He confirmed that this 
discretion was “very wide indeed” and could only be questioned if it was, in all the 
circumstances, irrational, noting that a party seeking a challenge to this type of decision 
faced a “well nigh impossible task”.   Mr Justice Holgate considered the scope of the 
Secretary of State to disagree with a previous decision of an Inspector in the more recent St 
Albans case283.  There were two applications and two appeals. In the first case, the 
Secretary of State confirmed the Inspector’s decision to refuse, but when a second 
application was made, the Secretary of State decided to grant permission for the 
development.  Mr Justice Holgate agreed that the previous decision was material, and that 
consistency was important, but stressed that the decision maker must also exercise his own 
judgment and could disagree with a previous decision, even on a very similar development, 
so long as valid reasons were given and therefore did not interfere with the decision itself. 
 
These cases confirm the breadth of the Secretary of State’s decision-making discretion but 
there are others that serve to define its limits. 
                                                          
281 Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
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282 R (Persimmon Homes Ltd) v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government [2007] EWHC 1985 
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Fox Land involved a challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision to grant permission for a 
residential development against the Inspector’s recommendation 284.  This decision was 
quashed on the basis that although the principle of the disagreement with the Inspector was 
clear, no reasons for that disagreement were given.  In particular, the Secretary of State had 
failed to have regard to another decision on a nearby site, described as an ‘unfortunate 
failure…a striking omission’ by Mr Justice Gilbart.   An appeal against this decision was 
subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal with Lord Justice Pill confirming (para 19) 
that “Further analysis was required by the Secretary of State of the situation that had arisen 
before making his decision”285.  A similar lack of reasoning resulted in another Secretary of 
State decision being quashed in Lark Energy286.  In this case, involving a solar farm, the 
assessment of planning merits in relation to two key policies was described as being so 
different from the original decision that it created an obligation to explain the approach.  Mr 
Justice Lindblom concluded that the reasons left ‘genuine doubt’ that the decision had been 
made in compliance with the legal test.   
 
In Woodcock Holdings the permission granted following an appeal determined by the 
Secretary of State was also quashed with Mr Justice Holgate identifying a number of defects 
in the decision: there was no apparent weighing of the disbenefits and merits of the scheme; 
no reasons were given for the reduced weight applied to one policy; there was ‘sparse 
reasoning’ given for discounting the emerging neighbourhood plan on the grounds of 
prematurity and criteria that were required to be applied were either poorly explained or not 
applied at all287.  A similarly robust approach was taken by Justice Lewison in the Horada 
case288.  Justice Lewison acknowledged the superiority of the Secretary of State’s powers in 
paragraph 36 of the judgement: “the inspector proposes; the Secretary of State disposes” 
but considered (paragraph 49) that the reasons were insufficient “the reader of the decision 
letter would have had to have been not only well-informed but also psychic to have extracted 
from the two laconic sentences of paragraph [15] the elaborate chain of reasoning upon 
which Mr Banner relies”. 
 
                                                          
284 Fox Strategic Land and Property Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & 
Cheshire East Council [2012] EWHC 444 
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There have also been challenges to the Secretary of State’s decision making discretion in 
the specific areas of both travellers and renewables development. 
 
The Secretary of State’s decision to recover appeals relating to traveller sites in the green 
belt was successfully challenged in the Moore case289.  It concerned an application for 
change of use of land to a Caravan Site comprising one pitch, one mobile home and one 
caravan” on land at North Cudham in Bromley.  Planning permission was refused and an 
appeal was lodged. Just seven days before the inquiry was due to be heard the decision 
making function was recovered by the Secretary of State.  His decision – to refuse 
permission – was challenged in June 2014 with the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(‘EHRC’) as an intervening party and on a number of grounds. 
 The singling out of a category of decisions in this way was a breach of the Public 
Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”) imposed on the Secretary of State by s 149 of the 
Disability Act 2010; 
 There was a breach of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”);  
 There was abuse of power and unlawful bias and the Secretary of State acted 
contrary to his declared policy without giving reasons. 
The case was considered by Mr Justice Gilbart who quashed the decision on a number of 
grounds.  His decision included the following findings: 
 By September 2013 all appeals relating to traveller sites in the Green Belt were being 
recovered (para 35,39); 
 Use of recovery powers in this way under the heading of significant development in 
the green belt was difficult to justify (para 74); 
 The policy approach adopted created a clear disparity between traveller and non-
traveller developments(para 65);  
 Substantial delay had been created in the decision-making process: “In the 
experience of this judge, waiting for a decision for 12 months is only to be expected 
in the cases of very substantial development indeed.” 
Mr Justice Gilbart went on to rule that the practice of calling in all cases related to this 
community was directly discriminatory (para 125), that the change in the call in policy had 
the effect of causing significant delay in the decision making process (para 76), and that as a 
result there had been a clear breach both of the Public Sector Equality Duty, and of Article 6 
of the Convention on Human Rights (para 135, 150).   
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The scrutiny to which the decisions were exposed may still have been part of the reason why 
the Government subequently confirmed its intention to ‘de-recover’ appeals for traveller 
developments in the green belt where a decision had not been reached.290 Nevertheless it is 
notable that Mr Justice Gilbart did not dispute the fundamental entitlement of the Secretary 
of State to use the call-in powers in the way that he had – it was the lack of compliance with 
resulting procedural and legal requirements that was at issue.   The unwillingness of the 
courts to intervene with the Secretary of State’s decisions was confirmed in the subsequent 
Connors case where Mr Justice Lewis refused to accept that there was “any evidence, still 
less any firm evidence, that there is differential treatment in the outcome of appeals in 
relation to Gypsy and Traveller sites in the Green Belt as compared with non-Gypsy and 
Traveller appeals” 291.    
 
None of the challenges to renewables decisions were successful. Wind Prospect is the 
leading example of challenges to refusals for renewables developments, where the 
Secretary of State’s decision to refuse permission for 6 wind turbines, against Inspector 
recommendation, was challenged on a number of grounds, including that of failure to give 
adequate reasons and failure to apply his own policies292.  Mrs Justice Lang ruled that the 
Secretary of State was the primary decision maker, that the Inspector’s report functioned as 
no more than a ‘starting point’ for the process and noted in paragraph 45 that the Secretary 
of State was “entitled to substitute his planning judgment for that of the Inspector”.  She 
specifically rejected the proposition that the decision letter ought properly to be a ‘coherent 
reasoned rebuttal’ and declined to impose any standard on the Secretary of State in terms of 
his reasons.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although most planning decisions are made by planning officers, planning committees and 
the planning inspectorate, the Secretary of State is the most significant decision maker in the 
system.  There is no sign that he will limit or reduce the current powers of intervention; if 
anything it looks as if the scope of his powers will continue to expand.  
 
The 171 decisions made under the recovery powers, and the 9 further called in decisions 
represent each and every formal opportunity for the  Secretary of State to exercise his 
                                                          
290 HL5936 Travellers: Caravan Sites: Written question 23 March 2015 
291 Connors & Ors v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors [2014] EWHC 2358  
292 Wind Prospect Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor [2014] EWHC 
4041 (Admin)  
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decision making powers in relation to planning applications over a the 20 month period 
following the introduction of the Framework and its presumption in favour of sustainable 
development.   
 
Some propositions can be made based on the analysis carried out:  
 The primary evaluative exercise carried out in most cases was very much a 
traditional ‘merits-based’ weighing of planning issues, based either on compliance 
with the development plan or with the NPPF;  
 The concept of sustainable development may be a ‘golden thread’ running through 
national planning policy but it was not explicitly considered in every decision, and 
rarely considered as a stand-alone issue; 
 Traveller developments in the green belt, renewables developments that create 
unacceptable impact on the landscape or heritage assets  and housing in the green 
belt or in contravention of a recently adopted local plan appeared, in Framework 
terms at least, to be regarded as inherently unsustainable.  
 The powers of recovery were used to restrict particular types of development, 
including even very small scale proposals such as individual caravans, and 
renewables proposals with impeccable environmental credentials and a significant 
bedrock of policy support; 
 So long as all relevant procedural and legal requirements are observed the breadth 
of discretion available to the Secretary of State was not be restricted by the Courts. 
 
The analysis of these decisions did not reveal either a coherent or consistent approach by 
the Secretary of State to the presumption in favour of sustainable development, what it 
meant or how it should be applied.   The term – if used at all – was simply a label applied 
once the planning assessment had been carried out rather than a determinative criterion.   
Despite the breadth of their content and the length of the time period under consideration, 
the decisions do not make any significant contribution to showing what the Secretary of 
State means when he uses the term sustainable development.   
 
The next chapter considers whether a similar analysis of court decisions offers any greater 
insight. 
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Chapter 6 Sustainable Development and the Judiciary 
 
Introduction 
 
In the 2001 Alconbury case, Lord Clyde referred to the concept of sustainable development 
as ‘essentially a matter of governmental strategy’.293 Twelve years later the Framework 
placed sustainable development at the heart of the legal test for decision making.  As Booth 
recognises, the judiciary, has an “enormous impact” on the planning system, primarily 
through exercising its function of reviewing planning decisions.294  Although the legal test 
has been in place since 1947 and examined in some detail at the highest level on a number 
of occasions, the way in which that legal duty is to be applied, and the scope of the decision-
making discretion within it, remains a live issue.  The primary concern of this chapter is the 
role of the judiciary in relation to the interpretation of sustainable development in the 
Framework and it comprises: 
 A summary of the circumstances in which planning decisions come before the court, and 
the scope and limits of judicial scrutiny in relation to planning cases; 
 A detailed analysis of a significant number of planning cases, including a summary of the 
methodology applied,  a review of the most relevant statements made by individual 
judges and an assessment of the findings; 
 A summary of the current position including an updated summary of recent case law. 
 
6.1 Powers of Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review is used to describe the two ways in which planning decisions come before 
the court: through the use of a planning-specific appeal mechanism built into the planning 
legislation – often also referred to as a ‘statutory appeal’, and through the traditional route of 
judicial review where any public decision can, if challenged, be scrutinised by the courts.  
Statutory appeal is the route used in relation to decisions of planning inspectors and the 
Secretary of State, while judicial review is most often used by individuals who want to 
challenge the decisions of local planning authorities. 
 
When the Secretary of State considers a development proposal either as a result of a calling 
in an application or an appeal he takes the role of the primary decision maker tasked with 
                                                          
293 R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions and other cases [2001] UKHL 23 
294 Philip Booth “The Control of Discretion: Planning and the Common Law Tradition [2007] Planning Theory  
Vol 6(2): 127–145 
 
 
100 
 
applying the legal test ‘de novo’; essentially a re-testing of the planning merits of a particular 
proposal at a particular time and within a particular policy context.    The Secretary of State 
must take previous decisions made in relation to similar applications into account as material 
considerations and be seen to be take them into account but they are not binding. 
 
The role of the courts is fundamentally different; Newsmith established that an application to 
the courts “is not an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an Inspector's 
decision”295 The courts are concerned only with the procedural and legal aspects of the 
decision-making process and seek to determine only whether or not the alleged legal or 
procedural defects are so significant that the decision itself must be quashed and remitted 
back for reconsideration.   Principles established in previous relevant case law are always 
included, including substantial amounts of the actual texts of those judgments, so that key 
issues such as the presumption in favour of sustainable development acquire a legal 
genealogy, and a particular narrative. Moreover, judgments of a superior court are 
automatically binding on the court below.   
 
Statutory appeals are regulated by section 288 of the 1990 Planning Act.  It states: "(1) If 
any person…is aggrieved by any action on the part of the Secretary of State to which this 
section applies and wishes to question the validity of that action on the grounds: (i) that the 
action is not within the powers of this Act, or (ii) that any of the relevant requirements have 
not been complied with in relation to that action, he may make an application to the High 
Court under this section.”  The time limits are four or six weeks depending on the decision 
being challenged.  Judicial review is a general principle of common law rather than statute- a 
right established over time giving all individuals the right to challenge the lawfulness of public 
authority decisions.  It is regulated by Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  The time limit is 
six weeks ‘after the grounds to make the claim first arose’.    
 
Both processes require that the claimant establish that he or she has sufficient interest in the 
case to bring the action and that the claim itself has some merit.  Rule 54(f) defines the 
interested party as  “any person (other than the claimant and defendant) who is directly 
affected by the claim;”  and the issue was considered in detail in Zurich Assurance where Mr 
Justice Sales stressed that the concept was ‘open textured’ and depended primarily on 
fundamental concepts of ‘justice and substance’296.  The requirement to establish the merits 
of the case was introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 allowing the judge 
                                                          
295 Newsmith, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport & the Regions [2001] 
EWHC 74 (Admin)  
296 Zurich Assurance v Winchester [2014] EWHC 758 
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dealing with the application for permission for an application to proceed, to consider whether 
the outcome would have been “substantially different” if the matter of complaint had not 
happened.   As a result of the 2015 Act Judges are also now able to rule that third parties 
should pay their own legal costs, and to make leave dependent on the applicant showing 
how the matter will be funded.  
 
The claimant must establish that the decision maker misdirected himself in law or acted 
irrationally or failed to have regard to relevant considerations or that there was some 
procedural impropriety and a number of cases have established the parameters of valid 
judicial intervention in public decision making generally.   
 
One fundamental principle, generally referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness” was 
established by Lord Green in 1948: 'It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter 
is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts 
can interfere.’297   The 1976 ‘Fairmount’ case established the principle that each party should 
have equal opportunity to see or hear all of the relevant evidence, and be given the 
opportunity to comment on it298.  ‘Seddon Properties’ established that the decision maker 
must not act perversely in the sense of making a decision that no one could reasonably have 
reached that decision based on those particular facts and in that particular decision-making 
context299.   Newsmith also set out principles that if not observed would create a significant 
risk of the decision being considered illegal: 
 Acting on no evidence; 
 Wrong interpretation of a statute; 
 Taking into account matters which were not relevant; 
 Not taking into accounts matters which were relevant; 
 Errors of law. 
 
Hopkins Homes contains a recent and comprehensive, statement of the principles courts 
apply to planning decisions300: 
 The statutory rules governing planning appeal procedures are relevant but not a 
‘complete code’; fairness is a ‘flexible concept’; 
                                                          
297 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation[1948] K.B.223 
298 Fairmount Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 
299 Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 42 P &CR 26 
300 Hopkins Homes Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 132 
(Admin) 
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 Procedural unfairness resulting in prejudice to a party is a ‘good’ ground for quashing 
a decision;  
 Parties should know the case they have to deal with and be given a reasonable 
opportunity to produce evidence in relation to it 
 The main parties should deal with all relevant issues raised by third parties in the 
course of consideration of the appeal 
 Where there is a significant change in the position of one party, all other parties 
ought to be able to comment on it. 
 
Planning decisions – and the reports they are based on – are frequently scrutinised by the 
courts and general principles have been established on what may and may not be reviewed 
by the courts.  The author, and the decision makers, are assumed to have some local and 
theoretical knowledge is assumed but planning reports – whether written by officers for a 
local authority planning committee or inspectors in the course of an appeal - will not be held 
to the same interpretative standards as legislation.301  In Save Britain’s Heritage302 it was 
established that reasons should be ‘proper, intelligible and adequate’ but South Somerset303  
confirmed decisions should not be assessed as though the authors were writing examination 
papers, while in South Buckinghamshire DC v. Porter304 the court required only that the 
reasons given for a planning decision should not misunderstand policy or make irrational 
conclusions.   
 
The breadth of discretion afforded to the decision maker in the assessment of the planning 
merits of a proposal is firmly protected by the judiciary and stated clearly in the 1995 Tesco 
case: “If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that 
matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local planning authority 
or the Secretary of State".305    In terms of how that discretion should be exercised, and how 
the decision maker should demonstrate compliance with it the leading case is still City of 
Edinburgh from 1997306.   The key paragraph is set out in full in Chapter 2 and is often 
quoted in relevant cases; it remains the most explicit prescription of the legal duties of the 
decision maker and the extent of that decision maker’s discretionary scope.    The 2012 
Tesco Stores case307 revisited and to a certain extent updated City of Edinburgh with an 
                                                          
301 Zurich Assurance Ltd v Winchester City Council & Anor [2014] EWHC 758 (Admin) 
302 Save Britain’s Heritage v No. 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153, 
303 South Somerset District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 66 P & CR 83.84 
304 South Buckinghamshire DC v. Porter [2004] 1 WLR  [36]: 
305 Tesco v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W1.R 759, [780] 
306 City of Edinburgh Council v. Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] 1 WLR 1447 
307 Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 13 (21 March 2012)  
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authoritative reassertion of the procedural principles applying to all planning decisions with 
which all planning decisions should comply:  Policy statements should be interpreted 
objectively (para 18); Individual judgments could be applied where policies conflicted (para 
19) and this could include concepts such as ‘suitability’ (para 21).  Nevertheless the decision 
maker was still expected to ‘proceed on a proper understanding’ of the policies it was 
applying (para 17) and a failure to do so could undermine the validity of the decision (para 
23).  Recent cases such as BDW Trading Ltd308 have confirmed that only the decision maker 
can in the end decide which development plan policies are to be taken into account, what 
weight will be attributed to them, and how to evaluate particular proposals in the light of 
policies that compete or conflict.   
 
As well as clarifying and affirming the discretionary space allowed to decision makers the 
2012 Tesco  decision also established its boundaries, stating that a failure to understand 
and/or apply policies would be regarded as a legal defect in that it would amount to having 
regard to an immaterial consideration.  It is equally clear that decisions will be overruled by 
the courts where they ‘can be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense309  or are 
otherwise in breach of legal or procedural requirements.  In Hampton Bishop the judge 
acknowledged the scope of the decision-maker’s discretion, but ruled that this could not 
remove the basic requirement of deciding whether or not the proposal was in conformity with 
or breach of the development plan310.   
 
6.2 Analysis of decisions 
  
This chapter is primarily concerned with the way in which the courts have contributed to an 
understanding of the concept of sustainable development in the framework through detailed 
scrutiny of actual rulings issued in relation to planning decisions brought before them for 
consideration.    
 
As with the Secretary of State decisions the analysis covers a 20 month period, but the 
methodology was adapted in view of the type of data examined.  Appeal decisions are based 
on a standard template and relevant planning policy issues are considered using similar or 
identical text each time.  They are generally no more than 5-10 pages in length and a 
                                                          
308 Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v BDW Trading Ltd (t/a David Wilson Homes 
(Central, Mercia and West Midlands)) [2016] EWCA Civ 493 
309  Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 754 (Admin)).  
310 Hampton Bishop Parish Council, R (On the Application Of) v Herefordshire Council [2013] EWHC 3947 
(Admin)  
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relatively consistent approach is taken to the range of issues considered.  They are therefore 
well suited to being summarised in a table and analysed on a like-for-like basis.   Court 
judgments are also template – based in the sense that there is a consistent initial format, 
listing the case reference, the name of the judge or judges, the advocates for each side and 
the individual parties.   Compared to appeal decisions these judgments are complex, highly 
nuanced texts that examine the relevant issues in depth and with significant regard to their 
legislative and case law context.  The way in which individual judges examine and decide on 
the procedural and legal issues can differ widely depending on the facts and circumstances 
of that particular case, and the knowledge and linguistic idiosyncrasies of individual judges.  
It is not possible to reduce judgments to their component parts or analyse them in the same 
way as appeal decisions.   
 
Some methodological consistency was nevertheless applied as follows: 
 The 20 month period ran from 1st September 2013 to 31st May 2015 beginning six 
months later than that chosen for appeal decisions to allow time for challenges to be 
made to those decisions; 
 All data was sourced from the British Institute of Legal Studies (‘Balli’) database;  
 All tiers of the court system were included: the Administrative division of the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court;  
 The scope of the investigation included every court decision scrutinising the legal and 
procedural aspects of the application of the legal test – whether through judicial 
review or statutory appeal; 
 The results were only examined where they related to a determination under the 
legal test and reported when the issue of sustainable development was specifically 
raised and considered; 
 In each case the full court reference, the date and the name of the judge were 
included, together with any specific references to sustainable development. 
The results are summarised in table 11. References to particular cases in this chapter have 
the number of the case in table 11 added in brackets for ease of reference.  
 
6.3 Outcome of analysis  
 
During the 20 months in question, the first case which specifically referred to the concept of 
sustainable development in the Framework and the presumption in its favour was 
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‘Hunston’311 (1), an appeal against an Inspector’s decision to grant permission for a care 
home in St Albans. The case was primarily concerned with the application of the Green Belt 
policies in the Framework, and the inspector’s decision was ruled to be wrong in law 
because those policies were incorrectly applied.  Mr Justice Pelling noted in his summary of 
the Framework recognition that the previous national policy context had been replaced by 
the NPPF and described the ‘key purpose’ of the NPPF as achieving sustainable 
development. Although in the same paragraph he mentioned that this included the need to 
apply all of the three dimensions of sustainable development equally, and also noted that the 
presumption was a golden thread running through the document, he did not attempt to 
create or apply his own definition, simply stating that the Framework was now a material 
consideration, stating the relevant legal principles to be applied and stating that in the 
absence of an up to date plan the presumption applied.    Although Mr Justice Pelling 
attempted no definition of sustainable development, this case was subsequently considered 
by the Court of Appeal 312 (8) where Lord Justice Keene reflected that the process of 
simplifying planning policy had created a ‘diminution of clarity (para 4), which inhibited the 
judicial process: “I have not found arriving at "a definitive answer" to the interpretative 
problem an easy task, because of ambiguity in the drafting”. Paragraph 14 was referred to 
but not considered further.   
 
Later the same month came the ‘Fordent’313 (2) decision, again considered by Mr Justice 
Pelling, concerned with an Inspector’s decision to refuse planning permission for a caravan 
and camping site.  In paragraphs that virtually replicated those of the previous ruling, Mr 
Justice Pelling set out the three dimensions of sustainable development and its role as a 
‘golden thread’ in the process.  The Inspector’s consideration of the economic dimension 
was held to be sound but although Mr Justice Pelling had stated in this and the previous 
decision that all three dimensions had to be taken into account he specifically declined to 
question how weight had been attributed.   
 
October 2013 brought two more decisions involving the consideration of sustainable 
development. Wakil 314(3), was the first time Mr Justice Lindblom considered the concept of 
sustainable development in the Framework. He noted that there were differences between 
                                                          
311 Hunston Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 2678 
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the definition of sustainable development in the draft and adopted Frameworks but neither 
regarded the changes as significant or assessed the validity of either definition.  He also 
noted that the way in which sustainable development was defined made it particularly 
relevant to housing policies and housing supply. Given that the words “policies for the supply 
of housing” within the context of the Framework are due to be considered by the Supreme 
Court in February 2017 this was an insightful and prophetic statement. 
 
Two days later Mrs Justice Lang issued her judgment in ‘William Davis”315 (4), an appeal 
against a Secretary of State’s decision to refuse planning permission for a residential 
development, primarily on the basis that the NPPF had been misapplied, including the 
specific contention that the presumption in favour of sustainable development was not 
applied. Mrs Justice Lang recognised that the Framework was a material consideration, and 
recited paragraph 14 in full.  She agreed that the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development applied only to development that was ‘found to be sustainable development’ 
(para 37), going on to say that ‘It would be contrary to the fundamental principles of NPFF if 
the presumption in favour of development in paragraph 14 applied equally to sustainable 
and non-sustainable development.’  Mrs Justice Lang implicitly accepted in this case that 
development proposals were capable of being characterised as sustainable development – 
or not - and that there was an abstract concept of sustainable development separate from 
that set out in the Framework.  However she did not give any consideration to what this 
might or might not be.  Instead she noted that the Secretary of State had concluded that this 
particular development was not sustainable development and neither concurred nor 
disagreed with this conclusion, referring to it simply as ‘quintessentially a planning judgment.’   
 
The Scrivens316 case (5) considered in November 2013 can be distinguished from all of the 
other cases considered because it is the only one that explicitly sought to impose a 
traditional notion of sustainable development, overtly wedded to environmental concerns, in 
place of the definitions offered by the Framework.    Mr Scrivens had submitted a planning 
application for the construction of ‘autarkic’ houses – self-sufficient dwellings that were not 
dependent on finite resources. He claimed that these houses were consistent with ‘the true 
meaning and extent of sustainable development’ because they were not dependent on any 
finite source of energy, water or other support.  Although the case involved challenges to a 
number of different planning decisions, all were based on the fundamental assertion that that 
the inspectors involved in the decisions failed to approach or apply the concept of 
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sustainable development properly.   Mr Scrivens insisted that these houses were essentially 
sustainable because of their compliance with what he claimed as five key requirements 
which he referred to as ‘the Pentalogy’: 
 A basic definition of sustainability which means that nature's resources must not be used 
faster than they can be replenished naturally. 
 The definition of sustainable definition contained in Resolution 42/187 of the United 
Nations General Assembly defining sustainable development as meeting the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. 
 The pressing need to prepare for a Low Carbon Future – defined as when hydrocarbon 
reserves are exhausted in or around 2060. 
 The requirements in the Carbon Change Act 2008 for an 80% reduction in CP2 
emissions from the 1990 level by 2050. 
 The general need to mitigate and adapt to the effect of Climate Change required by 
Treaties, Directives, Acts and the NPPF. 
The challenge also sought to apply the definition of sustainable development in the 
Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy 10917/96 – adopting an approach based 
on the original Brundtland definition.  
 
By framing his development proposal as inherently sustainable and asking for it to be 
approved on that basis, Scrivens invited the Judge – in this case Mr Justice Collins – to 
engage with the meaning of sustainable development and its application in the context of 
planning decisions. Justice Collins acknowledged that the EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy (10917/06) was a material consideration, and that it contained a definition of 
sustainable development derived from Brundtland.  He also referred to the requirement 
under s 39 of the 2004 Act for local authorities to exercise plan making functions with the 
aim of contributing to sustainable development.  However, Mr Justice Collins declined to 
accept that any of the definitions proposed by Mr Scrivens should be regarded as 
determining the concept of sustainable development generally or binding on the way that the 
term should be defined or applied in a planning context.  He specifically declined (para 15) 
either to accept the ‘Pentalogy’ definition of sustainable development or to apply his own “I 
was invited to indicate what should be the definition of sustainable development if not the 
Pentalogy. I do not think that it is desirable that I should attempt to do that. What is 
sustainable in any particular circumstance will depend on a number of material factors”. 
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Mr Justice Collins noted the inclusion of the ‘Brundtland’ definition in the Framework, 
referred to the three dimensions listed in paragraph 7 and set out paragraph 14 in full.  He 
also noted that the need for high quality design and the instrinsic character of the 
countryside were of ‘particular relevance’.  However rather than adopting the EU, 
Brundtland-based definition of sustainable development, he preferred to apply an approach 
consistent with paragraph 6 of the Framework.  He was clear that low energy developments 
would not necessarily qualify as sustainable in Framework terms if the development was 
also in breach of green belt or landscape qualities or did not represent good design, or had 
adverse economic effects. He rejected any notion that the ‘Pentalogy’ defined sustainable 
development conclusively and exclusively for NPPF purposes and in paragraph 19 
described as ‘unquestionably correct’ the way in which the Inspector weighted the benefits of 
the scheme against its impact on the character and appearance of the area.  He was also 
clear that in a planning context landscape and design considerations were factors that could 
themselves be seen as having an impact on future generations and could legitimately be 
taken into account.    
 
Mr Justice Collin’s unquestioning adoption of a Framework-specific definition of sustainable 
development was consistent with the previous decisions and indeed with the requirements of 
the Framework itself.  However, he stated that regard needed to be given to the objective of 
achieving sustainable development in deciding every application, and that where the plan 
making function was not exercised with the objective of contributing to the achievement of 
sustainable development, such plans would not ‘prevail’ if they frustrated the achievement of 
sustainable development in Framework terms.  Neither of these statements sit easily with 
Mrs Justice Lang’s previous ruling that the presumption would apply only to development 
that was already found to be sustainable.   
 
The next two cases mentioning sustainable development in the context of the Framework 
were both considered by Mr Justice Lewis.  In Cotswold, (6) – concerning a proposal for 
residential development - Justice Lewis recited the Paragraph 6 definition of sustainable 
development and the three dimensions but did not engage directly with them. Instead he 
focussed on the interpretation of paragraph 47 of the Framework and the extent to which the 
proposals conformed to its requirements to establish sustainable development in Framework 
terms.317    
 
                                                          
317 Cotswold District Council v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor [2013] EWHC 3719 
(Admin)  
 
 
109 
 
Corbett318 (7) was an application for judicial review of the decision of Cornwall County 
council to grant planning permission for five wind turbines.  Submissions made included 
assertions that there were material differences between the draft Framework and final 
document (para 24) so that the final document reduced the emphasis on economic growth 
and increased the need to protect the environment especially the countryside.  Mirroring the 
approach taken by Lindblom in Wakil, Mr Justice Lewis acknowledged that there were 
differences between the definition of sustainable development in the emerging and adopted 
Frameworks, but ruled that there was no change material to this particular development.  He 
reasserted the principle that the Framework was not designed to change the substance of 
national planning policy by instituting a principle in favour of energy policies over others, 
instead proposing that the government’s central purpose was achieving ‘sustainable 
economic growth’ – achieving this in the Framework through including an economic role 
within the three dimensions.   
 
It is clear from this decision in particular that there was no appetite within the judiciary to 
investigate the meaning of the Framework with reference to its predecessor drafts or to 
assign any particular emphasis or importance to any one of the three dimensions.  In a 
detailed rebuttal of the proposition that the NPPF represented a shift in government policy in 
relation to energy developments Mr Justice Lewis concluded that “there is, in my judgment, 
no material change between the planning policies contained in the earlier national planning 
policy guidance, and in particular those dealing with the encouragement of appropriate 
renewable energy schemes, and the later Framework.”  In relation to sustainable 
development in particular he again concluded “there is no material difference between the 
relevant applicable policies in the Draft Framework and the Framework.”   
 
Hampton Bishop319 (9) was a proposal for Hereford Rugby club to relocate its premises and 
to fund that relocation through an associated residential development, outside the 
development boundary of the town.  The parish council applied for the decision to grant 
planning permission to be reviewed, and asserted a number of grounds including 
misapplication of the legal test.   The case was considered by Mr Justice Hickinbottom 
including specific consideration of the issue of sustainable development.  He acknowledged 
that the development plan for the area included its own definition of sustainable development 
that meant: “avoiding or minimising adverse effects on the environment whilst providing 
necessary dwellings and employment together with appropriate infrastructure, services, 
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transport and amenities."    He referred to paragraphs 6 and 14 of the Framework, and ruled 
that the concept of sustainable development was to be approached in the same way as 
decision makers traditionally approached development plans: as an exercise in weighing of 
development plan policies against each other, and reconciliation of different policies which 
might conflict with each other, with the balance in the end being for the decision maker.  This 
decision appears to establish that the Framework approach to sustainable development 
would be preferred even when another definition, contained in a relevant development plan, 
was available. 
  
North Norfolk 320 (10) involved a proposal for a wind turbine, where an Inspector had allowed 
an appeal against a Council’s decision to refuse permission.  Mr Justice Purchase stated 
that the ‘construction’ of development plan policy was for the court, but went on to propose 
that all such development plan policies should be ‘construed as providing for support and 
consideration in the context of sustainable development and climate change, taking account 
of the wide environmental, social and economic benefits of renewable energy gain.’  Mr 
Justice Purchase diverged from the approach taken by his colleagues in his consideration of 
this decision, by using policies in the relevant development plan as well as the Framework to 
assess whether the development was sustainable.   
 
Barrow on Soar321(11) was decided by Mr Justice Collins in February 2014, and this followed 
the approach taken in Cotswold, referring to paragraph 47 of the Framework, confirming that 
where there was a deficit in housing supply the plan would be regarded as out of date and 
the presumption would be engaged, so that the application would be assessed primarily in 
terms of its conformity with the Framework rather the development plan.  Mr Justice Collins 
also confirmed that early completion of a development was not an essential element of its 
sustainability in Framework terms.   
 
Mr Justice Stewart engaged with the notion of sustainable development for the first time in 
the Trafford (11) case involving a renewable energy plant.322   In a departure from decisions 
taken by other members of the Administrative Court, he did not set out either the paragraph 
6 definition or the paragraph 14 presumption, but instead considered the paragraphs of the 
inspector’s decision letter that was the subject of the challenge that dealt with sustainability.  
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In addition, this judgment included an entire appendix headed “Whether the Proposal Would 
Be Sustainable Development?” and involved an analysis of the supply of waste wood, 
explicitly relying on the conclusions produced to conclude in paragraph 631 that “the 
proposal constitutes a sustainable form of development.” Of all the cases within the scope of 
analysis this is the only one to carry out such an assessment of sustainability based on 
empirical analysis of environmental considerations, demonstrating that  it is  certainly within 
the potential scope of a judge’s remit to  depart from a definition of sustainable development 
as limited by paragraphs 6 and 14 of the Framework.    
 
The approach adopted by Mr Justice Stewart was not followed by Mr Justice Foskett when 
he considered Langton Homes323  (13) who instead adopted the more usual approach to a 
challenge based on an assertion of misapplication of the presumption. Although neither 
paragraphs 6 or 14 were mentioned his assessment of the decision making process was as 
an exercise of planning judgment where sustainability equated to conformity with the 
Framework – i.e. very much conforming to the approach set out in paragraph 6.   He 
concluded that this was done correctly so that the challenge did not succeed.   
 
Mr Justice Hickinbottom considered the issue of sustainability in general in the Plant case 
(14) decided in early March 2014.324  He recognised that an individual development plan 
policy could be concerned with sustainable development, but insisted that the most 
appropriate approach in terms of assessing sustainability of planning proposals was one 
which considered the development in its full local and national policy context.   
 
March 2014 also brought Mr Justice Lindblom’s judgment in Bloor Homes (15), a challenge 
to an inspector’s decision to dismiss an appeal against the refusal by Hinckley and Bosworth 
Borough Council of permission for a residential housing development325.   Mr Justice 
Lindblom’s analysis of the way in which the presumption ought to be applied was consistent 
with previous decisions, simply stating that the sustainability or otherwise of the proposal 
against the extent to which it conformed to paragraphs 18- 219 of the Framework.  However, 
in what was a characteristically full and considered judgment, Justice Lindblom included in 
paragraphs 44 to 55 of his ruling a detailed analysis of the terms ‘absent’, ‘silent’ and ‘out of 
date’ in paragraph 14 of the Framework, an analysis which has been referred to and relied 
on a number of times since by various judges.   In terms of the presumption itself he paid no 
regard either to the Brundtland definition or the three dimensions, even though although the 
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three dimensions had been brought up at the Inquiry.  Indeed, when considering sustainable 
development Mr Justice Lindblom stated in paragraph 159 that its significance had been 
exaggerated and ruled that the inspector was not required to carry out assessment than he 
had already done of whether the harm of the proposals “significantly and demonstrably” 
outweighed the benefits.   
 
In Brown326 (16) an application for judicial review of a Council’s decision to grant permission 
for an air freight terminal, Mr Justice Collins maintained an approach that was consistent 
with paragraph 6 of the Framework, assessing sustainable development primarily in terms of 
conformity with the development plan.  It is clear from paragraph 56 of the judgment that in 
spite of his preference for this approach in the Scrivens judgment Mr Justice Collins was 
beginning to find fault with the paragraph 6 approach, in particular in relation to sustainable 
development “The word sustainable in the NPPF is not defined; the reader has to work 
through some 200 paragraphs which indicate what particular matters can be taken into 
account.”   In the subsequent Earl Shilton (17) case Mr Justice Hickinbottom’s judgment also 
noted (para 40) that there was in fact no definition of sustainable development in the 
Framework but otherwise followed established patterns by confirming that the policies in 
paragraphs 18-219 were the basis for an exercise of planning judgment to assess 
sustainability327.    
 
April 2014 also saw the Court of Appeal Judgment in Hopkins Developments328(18), 
concerning a proposal for residential development of land in Wincanton.  This was the first 
time that the Court of Appeal was asked to rule on a case, originally decided in June 
2013,329 specifically involving the Framework and its presumption in favour of sustainable 
development. Sustainability was noted as a problematic concept but the Court did not give 
any specific consideration of the meaning of sustainable development – simply restating its 
position as a ‘golden thread’ running through the NPPF.  Generally, the Court of Appeal 
judges considered only issues of procedural fairness in terms of evidential submissions, 
concluding that there was no irregularity as the Appellant had had a reasonable opportunity 
to make submissions.  
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The Lark Energy case (19) in June 2014 challenged the Secretary of State’s decision, 
against an inspector’s recommendation, to dismiss an appeal against refusal of planning 
permission for a solar farm, on the basis that the increase in the amount of renewable 
energy generated by the appeal scheme did not outweigh the additional harm caused to the 
character and appearance of the area330. Mr Justice Lindblom considered the assertion that 
the Secretary of State failed to apply the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
in paragraph 14 of the NPPF and consider it in relation to the emphasis on renewable 
energy in paragraphs 97 and 98 of the same document.  He acknowledged that the decision 
made no formal reference to the presumption, but ruled in paragraph 63 of the judgment  
that this was not an error of law: ‘The policy in paragraph 14…does not give Lark Energy an 
additional ground of challenge.’ 
 
The case of FCC Environment (20) also involved a renewables application for a wind farm 
decision, and was considered by Mr Justice Stewart.  One of the grounds of challenge was 
that inadequate reasoning had been provided to support the contention that the 
development was not sustainable, and that that the development had been assessed as 
unsustainable simply because of its effect of the landscape331.  Mr Justice Stewart did not 
agree that this was an illegitimate approach.  Instead, he stressed in paragraphs 37 and 38 
the importance of the framework-specific definition of sustainable development in paragraph 
6 of the NPPF and the need to assess sustainability in terms of the Framework as a whole: 
“This ground proceeds on a mistaken premise…The policies in paragraphs 18 – 219, taken 
as a whole, constitute the Government's view of what sustainable development in England 
means in practice for the planning system."  
 
In Wynn-Williams (21) Mr Justice Elvin considered the application of the presumption in 
detail and ruled that the primary concern was the extent to which the proposals accorded 
with the development plan. 332   Once that exercise had been completed, the presumption 
could be applied.  Sustainable development was only to be considered in terms of the 
Framework itself and that consideration was a planning judgment. 
 
In Redhill Aerodrome (22) Mrs Justice Patterson considered an application for a runway and 
stressed the need to interpret policies in the context of context of the Framework as a 
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332 Wynn-Williams, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 
3374 
 
 
114 
 
whole333.   She ruled that the Framework introduced a different policy context, and that the 
Inspector had ‘erred’ in taking non-Green Belt harm into account.   This decision was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal in a decision issued in October (24), with Lord Justice 
Sullivan noting that the Framework, while promoting sustainable development, still operated 
to control development in the Green Belt at least as carefully as it had been controlled 
previously334.       
 
Mr Justice Lewis ruled in Cheshire East (24) that sustainable development required 
consideration of three ‘aspects’: social, economic and environmental allowing significant 
discretion in how that analysis was applied335.  In the subsequent Morris decision (25) Mr 
Justice Collins returned to a definition of sustainable development that relied on Brundtland 
commenting in paragraph 12 on its definition as one which ‘stems from, I think, a UN 
indication relating to climate change’.  He also expressed some resistance to the notion of 
assessing sustainable development in relation to the whole of the Framework336.   
 
Mr Justice Lindblom considered the Crane337 case in February 2015. This involved a 
challenge to the decision to dismiss an appeal against refusal of planning permission for a 
residential/leisure development and required parallel consideration of the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development in the Framework, the emerging neighbourhood plan and 
an out of date local plan.    He began by confirming that the Framework presumption in 
favour of sustainable development was a material consideration to be given some weight.  In 
this case however it was assessed as outweighed by conflicting policies in an emerging 
neighbourhood plan.   He confirmed that the Framework would not ‘displace’ the statutory 
presumption but that in considering the question of sustainable development, ‘the decision-
maker is required...to consider every relevant policy in the NPPF” so that the presumption 
was ‘not irrebutable’.   
 
Mrs Justice Lang’s decision in Cheshire East (27) was decided in the same month; a 
challenge to an Inspector’s decision to allow an appeal against the Council’s refusal of 
permission for residential development338 .  Among the grounds was the assertion that the 
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Inspector failed to understand or correctly apply the requirement of sustainable development 
in paragraph 14 of the NPPF.  Mrs Justice Lang began the consideration of these issues 
with reference to her own Judgment in William Davis, specifically the principle that the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development should only apply to development that 
was sustainable and that the decision maker should consider both the ‘description’ of 
sustainable development in paragraphs 6 to 10 of the Framework and the ‘guidance’ in 
paragraphs 11 to 149.  She went on to describe protection and enhancement of the natural 
environment as a ‘key dimension’ of sustainable development. However she also ruled that 
the assessment of sustainability should be a balancing exercise involving a range of factors 
and a planning judgment reached on the individual circumstances.   The Inspector’s decision 
was quashed, but no defect was identified in the interpretation of sustainable development.   
 
The final four cases considered within the selected time period considered the presumption 
in favour of sustainable development in slightly different ways.  In Phides (28) Mr Justice 
Lindblom considered the presumption in some detail, in particular how explicit the 
consideration of housing policies ought to be if they were to demonstrate compliance with 
paragraph 14 of the Framework.339  He upheld the decision and dismissed the challenge, 
ruling in favour of a ‘broad view’; requiring only a general weighing of benefits and impacts, 
assessed against the Framework as a whole.  In BDW Trading (29) the development plan 
was up to date and Mr Justice Hickinbottom ruled that the dominant presumption would be 
that in favour of the development plan, with the presumption as a material consideration 
only340.    In Wenman, (30) Mrs Justice Lang maintained an approach consistent with her 
previous rulings: the presumption in favour of sustainable development could only apply 
when the development was sustainable341.  She ruled that a detailed assessment of policies 
was required but concluded that on the whole the Inspector was ‘entitled to make a free-
standing assessment of the sustainability of the proposed development.’    Finally, in 
Woodcock (31) Justice Holgate ruled that the concept of sustainable development should 
not be assessed only against adopted, but also emerging development plans and that in the 
case of a deficit of land for houses, the presumption could ‘weigh against’ restrictive housing 
supply policies342. 
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6.4 Recent case law 
 
At the end of the 20 month period, and despite a number of cases raising the issue of the 
application of the new presumption, the position of the judiciary was far from clear.   In 
particular they had not reached an agreed position on whether the definition of sustainable 
development should be restricted to the assessment of a proposal’s conformity with the 
development plan or if wider considerations could be applied.    
 
A number of significant cases have been decided since June 2015 that also consider the 
Framework and its presumption in favour of sustainable development.  Rather than providing 
clarification on this question, they provide further evidence that the judiciary is far from 
reaching a stable position on how it should properly approach the concept. 
 In paragraph 10 of the Malvern Hills ruling in July 2015 Mr Justice Hickinbottom 
stated that sustainable development “is to be defined in terms of development which 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs”; 343  
 In paragraph 10 of Cheshire East in March 2016 Mr Justice Jay described 
sustainable development as “a ‘concept…seeking to secure the attainment of a 
proper balance… a “trade-off between competing desiderata”.  He explicitly rejected 
the proposition that a development would have to be shown to be sustainable before 
paragraph 14 was applied 344; 
 In the Wychavon judgment issued in March 2016 Mr Justice Coulson noted in 
paragraph 41 of his judgment that there were a ‘number’ of paragraphs in the 
Framework referring to sustainable development and that paragraph 14 did not offer 
a “true definition” but rather “an explanation of the effect of the presumption;”345   
 In the Lee Valley Court of Appeal case issued in April 2016 Lord Justice Lindblom 
stated that the "presumption in favour of sustainable development" can operate in 
favour of "sustainable economic development" and that “the three dimensions are 
also not without their relevance.346  
 In East Staffordshire, a judgment issued on 22 November 2016 Mr Justice Green 
noted that paragraph 14 of the Framework had been applied in ‘different and 
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inconsistent ways” and been the subject of conflicting decisions.347  He noted that the 
Wychavon case had proposed a “broad and overarching presumption in favour of the 
approval of sustainable developments.  Mr Justice Green went on to note the 
existence of the Brundtland definition, the five principles contained in the 2005 
Sustainable Development Strategy, the three dimensions of sustainable development 
contained in the Framework itself.  He addressed the competing assertions of the 
parties as to the scope of the presumption in favour of sustainable development, 
specifically whether it was limited to developments that were compliant with 
paragraph 14 or whether there was a ‘residual discretion’ allowing a development to 
be considered sustainable even where it was not compliant with paragraph 14.   The 
judgment concluded that despite paragraph 14 of the Framework, when interpreting 
the concept of sustainable development, there was a ‘residual discretion’ to 
incorporate other definitions and understandings of the term. Paragraph 38 also 
stated that “the concept of "sustainable development" is predominantly 
implemented via the Local Plan”. 
 In paragraph 116 of Barker Mill judgment issued three days later Mr Justice Holgate 
gave the view that the presumption in favour of sustainable development was “solely 
contained within paragraph 14 of the NPPF”. 348   He rejected the wider interpretation 
applied in Wychavon and East Staffordshire and in paragraph 126 described any 
reliance on the phrase “golden thread” to justify wider considerations as “wholly 
misconceived”. 
 Mr Justice Gilbart’s decision in the Muller case was issued on the same day and 
paragraph 15 is clear that  he was following Holgate rather than Green: I do not 
accept that one needs to approach paragraph [14] of NPPF on the basis that it may 
permit the exercise of a residual discretion…There is no need to add a gloss “to that 
long established legal principle. Unhappily the judge in that case does not appear to 
have had Suffolk Coastal put before him… practitioners should cease to confuse 
policies of the SSCLG (or LPAs) which describe what qualifies as sustainable 
development with policies which define particular circumstances in which a 
presumption in favour of sustainable development applies.” 349 
Conclusion 
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In a 1993 speech to a workshop of the Local Government, Planning and Environmental Bar 
Association, the Under Secretary of State for the Environment recognised that “As lawyers, 
we need to be precise with words. We need to know the definitions of the terms we are 
using”.350   Planning decisions are brought before the courts on a range of grounds but often 
include the assertion that the presumption in favour of sustainable development has not 
been properly applied.  In the course of evaluating whether or not this is the case the judge 
reviewing the case is implicitly asked to decide what the term means and whether or not that 
meaning was correctly understood by the decision maker.    
 
The analysis revealed an initial reluctance on the part of the judiciary to intervene and 
interpret the term sustainable development at all.  Most of the judges, considering a 
challenge based on misapplication of the paragraph 14 presumption in favour of sustainable 
development, simply asked whether the approach adopted by the decision maker was 
compliant with paragraph 14 of the Framework.  If it was they were unlikely to interfere with it 
on the basis that the judgment involved was for the decision maker who retained a broad 
discretion to give different policies different weight at different times.   To this extent the 
judiciary did not consider the meaning of sustainable development at all; they simply asked 
whether the presumption was applied in the way that it is required to be.   
 
However, this was not the approach applied every time.  The cases examined demonstrate 
that a range of approaches have been applied to the notion of sustainable development 
since the Framework was adopted and that this diversity of approaches shows no sign of 
reaching an agreed position.   The ‘paragraph 14’ approach is dominant but the Brundtland 
definition, and the three pillars of social, environmental and economic considerations still 
make their interpretative presence felt.  Judges may adopt either the broad approach of 
Collins in Trafford, and assess sustainability based on a forensic assessment of 
environmental impacts, or the narrow approach of Holgate in Barker Mill.  There is an 
ongoing and unusually public debate between members of the judiciary about whether or not 
the definition of sustainable development in the Framework does or does not include 
‘residual discretion’ to consider issues other than conformity with the Framework. 
 
 This enduring state of irresolution has provoked comment from practitioners.  Humphreys 
noted that “The proper application of para.14 has given rise to inconsistent decisions in the 
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High Court…the position remains unclear”351  Bowes noted in his summary of the year’s 
case law in the same journal that “‘Wychavon is seemingly irreconcilable with Cheshire 
East’352 while Ground, in his summary of current issues commented: “Even after four years 
the Courts have not definitively led on the meaning of the presumption”353    
 
The courts do not reconsider the planning merits of a particular decision, or interfere with the 
decision in relation to the weight attributed to competing plan policies, or to individual 
material considerations.   It is not therefore surprising that they did not propose or impose a 
legal definition of sustainable development.  They have supported and reinforced the 
concept of a discrete, framework-specific definition of sustainable development so that in the 
context of planning proposals decision makers can legitimately define it in a way that is 
entirely separate from other policy based definitions of the same words.  It is surprising that 
the judiciary has not, nearly five years on from the introduction of the Framework, provided a 
consistent view on how the concept ought properly to be approached by decision makers.  
Indeed the Muller decision and the two decisions following demonstrate that the judiciary is 
in a stage of open dispute on whether or not the Framework provides an exclusive definition 
of sustainable development or whether there is scope for other definitions to be considered. 
 
Neither a detailed examination of the Framework itself nor a review of the decisions made by 
the Secretary of State following its adoption show what the Government understands 
sustainable development to mean or how it should be applied.  Chapter 5 concluded that the 
Secretary of State applied the presumption in favour of sustainable development in a way 
that muddied its meaning and purpose.  Chapter 6 concludes that the judiciary are unlikely to 
provide the clarity that decision makers need. 
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Chapter 7 Sustainable Development: the Humpty Dumpty approach 
 
Introduction 
 
This research is concerned with the meaning of sustainable development, in particular the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development in the Framework.  The research began 
with the following hypotheses: 
 That the legal mechanisms related to the determination of planning permission, are  
constructed so that the meaning of sustainable development in the Framework is 
derived on a retrospective, case-by-case basis in actual decisions made; 
 That Development approved as sustainable development within the terms of the 
Framework is not consistent with traditional or established understandings of the 
term; 
 That this derived meaning is inherently unstable, and  determined primarily by 
whatever the decision maker wants it to mean. 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to review the work done so far, and then review these 
hypotheses in the light of its findings.  It also reflects on two issues that have a particularly 
important role in the determination of applications for planning permission:  
 The exercise of discretion by planning decision-makers, and how the exercise of that 
discretion at a local level is increasingly subject to government intervention; 
 The way in which the judiciary contributes to the meaning and interpretation of 
language in planning decisions 
 
7.1 Review  
 
Chapter 1 set out the general context for the research including a brief summary of the 
interaction of the English planning system with its legislative context from the 1909 Act 
onwards.   It highlighted the significance of the legal test for determining applications, the 
way in which that test preserves a discretionary space for individual decision makers to 
consider particular development proposals, and how this space is affected by changes in 
planning policy, and the introduction from time to time of presumptions in favour of 
development or relevant plan policies.   Chapter 1 went on to introduce the concept of 
sustainable development generally, its particular role as a policy presumption in planning 
decisions since 2012, and the potential difficulties of using a term of this kind within the 
context of planning decisions. It concluded with a review of the available literature, noting a 
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relative lack of detailed consideration of the use of the term sustainable development within 
the specific context of the Framework and as applied in planning decisions. 
 
Chapter 2 was a detailed examination of the legal context for decision making on planning 
applications under section 38(6) of the Planning Act 2004 and section 70(2) of the Planning 
Act 1990.  It showed how the words of the legal test function as part of the legal and 
procedural superstructure setting a framework for planning decisions, but that the essence of 
planning decisions is a discretionary exercise of planning judgment where the merits of a 
particular development proposal are considered and weighed by a planning officer, planning 
committee or planning inspector rather than lawyers.  Chapter 2 went on to dissect the 
decision-making process in detail showing, with reference to the 1995 City of Edinburgh 
decision how the decision maker is required to balance law, policy, and all other material 
considerations relating to a development proposal in order for a decision to be legally and 
procedurally compliant.  Chapter 2 explored how the introduction from time to time of 
presumptions – sometimes in favour of development, sometimes in favour of the 
development plan – introduce a mandatory bias to the planning process in favour either of 
local plan policies or the particular development proposed.  It showed how the Secretary of 
State, through the introduction of such a presumption such as that in favour of sustainable 
development, could legitimately constrain the discretionary scope of local decision makers 
and the consequent importance of understanding its meaning. 
    
Chapter 3 was the first of three chapters searching for the meaning of sustainable 
development and was concerned with what could be called the ‘ordinary and natural’ 
meaning of the term, established before the Framework was adopted and existing outside it.  
It began with the historical origins of modern environmental concerns, and showed how 
those concerns were initially incorporated in international and national policy documents.  It 
identified the first use of the term sustainable development in an international policy context 
in 1972, and showed how it diffused into European, UK and English policy, used in some 
contexts as a way of stressing the importance of acknowledging and mitigating 
environmental impacts and in others more as a textual gloss.   
 
This chapter showed that although the term was widely used in a number of policy contexts 
it was never given a formal definition and that as a result policies began to acquire a 
rhetorical appearance of environmental concern without including substantive provisions that 
would measure or limit environmental impacts.  It also noted that although by 2005 there 
was a Sustainable Development Strategy in place there was hardly any planning policy that 
recognised the term, incorporated it as a planning goal or defined it for planning purposes. It 
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nevertheless concluded that the term was still generally understood to mean consciously 
restricted growth including the mitigation of environmental impacts.   
 
Chapter 3 also considered the role of the Coalition government in relation to sustainable 
development, in particular its claim to be ‘the greenest government ever’.354   It showed that 
despite this claim the Coalition government abolished a number of organisations concerned 
with securing sustainable development, replaced the 2005 Sustainable Development 
Strategy with an approach that it referred to as ‘mainstreaming’ sustainability, promoted 
sustainable development as a concept associated primarily with economic growth, while 
environmental impacts were presented as economic burdens.355   The subsequent 
Conservative government continued to use the term sustainable development in a number of 
policy contexts, but resisted proposals to include a specific definition in legislation, despite 
an established precedent in the Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.     
 
Chapter 4 also looked at the meaning of sustainable development, but this time in the 
specific context of the Planning Framework.  It focussed on the actual language of the 
document, reviewing the original proposal, the consultation version and the final Framework 
document adopted in March 2012.  It noted that although the concepts of sustainable 
development was heralded as the ‘golden thread’ running through the document and 
promoted as a key factor in the determination of every application for planning permission, 
the document was drafted in such a way as to obscure rather than clarify the meaning of 
sustainable development. The traditional Brundtland definition was included within the text 
but not actually used, the principles of the 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy were 
mentioned but not relied on and although three ‘dimensions’ - economic, social and 
environmental – were included,  there was no guidance on how they should be weighed 
against each other.  Instead the Framework proposed a range of meanings that reduced 
rather than contributed to clarity – the Foreword alone proposing five different ways of 
understanding the term as 1) the purpose of planning 2) not compromising the future at the 
expense of the past 3) growth 4) positive growth 5) requiring development to go ahead 
without delay.   
 
Chapter 4 noted the concern raised by practitioners, academics and Parliamentary 
committees about the lack of definition and considered the extent to which the absence of a 
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definition enabled the promotion of a pro-growth agenda and the government’s wider political 
aims rather than sustainable development as it was traditionally understood.   It concluded 
that because sustainable development in the context of the Framework was achieved 
primarily through compliance with the Framework, the meaning of the term in this context 
would in practice be decided by the decision maker, and on a case by case basis. 
 
Chapter 5 was a detailed analysis of planning decisions made by the Secretary of State to 
see if a general meaning of sustainable development could be derived through an 
examination of its consideration by the Secretary of State on a case by case basis. It 
collated and compared 20 months of recovered and called-in planning decisions made by 
the Secretary of State and looked at each one of them for how the Framework presumption 
in favour of sustainable development was considered and applied.  The results showed that 
the Framework was mentioned as a material consideration in each decision, and that most 
decisions also mentioned the new presumption in favour of sustainable development.   The 
decisions did not however consider the meaning of sustainable development in any depth. 
They analysed the proposal against the Framework policies as required by Paragraph 6 and 
assessed the proposal as sustainable or not based on the analysis but very few referenced 
or considered the concept of sustainable development in its wider sense.  The exercise also 
showed that the Secretary of State’s powers of recovery and call in were being used to 
intervene in appeals involving traveller and renewables development, usually resulting in 
refusal, suggesting that these types of development were regarded as inherently 
unsustainable in Framework terms. 
 
Chapter 6 was also a detailed analysis of decisions to see what they might reveal about the 
meaning of sustainable development in the Framework.  It examined all of the court 
judgments issued over a 20 month period that were concerned with planning issues and that 
considered the concept of sustainable development in the context of the Framework.  The 
courts appeared to grapple with the concept of sustainable development more than the 
Secretary of State, but they did not clarify its meaning or even what approach should be 
taken to interpretation.  In most cases the primary consideration was whether the decision 
maker had properly evaluated compliance with the Framework as required by paragraph 6 of 
the Framework.   Unless the decision maker’s analysis in this context was legally or 
procedurally defective, the courts tended not to interfere with the outcome of that exercise.   
The chapter also showed that on the whole the courts would not generally intervene in the 
discretionary aspects of the decision and in most cases explicitly declined to investigate the 
meaning of sustainable development.  
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Although all decisions depended in theory on a proper understanding of the meaning of 
sustainable development, the term was never defined nor did the judiciary seek to find or 
impose one.  Rather the courts seemed satisfied with a meaning that would fluctuate 
depending on the particular development, its particular planning context and the individual 
planning judgment of the decision maker.    In addition, the analysis of case law revealed an 
increasing uncertainty in the approach to sustainable development generally.  A review of 
the case law from June 2015 to December 2016 demonstrated a continuing lack of clarity or 
consistency on how the concept of sustainable development was considered, and 
culminated in an overt dispute between Mr Justice Green who recognised a ‘residual 
discretion’ in the interpretation of sustainable development and Mr Justice Gilbart and 
Holgate who continued to promote an interpretation of sustainable development based solely 
on the conformity of a proposal with the Framework. 
 
7.2 Planning and discretion 
 
The enduring failure to find a meaning for sustainable development is due partly to the 
etymological origins and socio-political context of the term itself.  The words are widely used 
outside the context of planning decisions, where their meaning is assumed or imposed 
rather than understood through reference to a standard interpretation.   
 
In the context of the Framework there is an additional barriers to deciding on the meaning 
and interpretation of sustainable development.  The paragraph 14 presumption combined 
with the paragraph 6 ‘meaning’ ensure that the words must function as an evaluative 
criterion within a discretionary test whose scope is extremely widely drawn.  Planning law 
permits and preserves a wide discretion to the planning decision maker in the application 
and weighing of any particular planning proposal against its policy context and the courts are 
enduringly reluctant to interfere in this exercise of planning judgment, especially where the 
discretion is exercised by the Secretary of State.   
 
The breadth of discretion was summarised in the 1995 Tesco case  where Lord Keith 
confirmed (para 24) that a local planning authority determining an application for planning 
permission is free, "provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality" to give 
material considerations "whatever weight [it] thinks fit or no weight at all"356   It was 
reinforced by the Supreme Court in the 2012 Tesco case357 where Lord Reed confirmed 
                                                          
356 Tesco Stores Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759 
357 Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13 
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(para 18) that it was for the local authority to judge which ‘broad’ statement of policy should 
be favoured when it was impossible to reconcile one with another, and how to apply the 
language of the development plan to a ‘given set of facts’. The principles were recently 
restated in Bloor Homes where Justice Lindblom confirmed that "Decisions of the Secretary 
of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be 
construed in a reasonably flexible way".358  
 
While the courts are enduringly unwilling to interfere with the exercise of decision-making 
discretion in planning decisions, the Secretary of State is not.  Although the Secretary of 
State’s decision-making discretion remains unfettered, he is also empowered to restrict the 
decision-making discretion of local authorities through the introduction of new legislation and 
new policies, and those policies can, as confirmed by the 2001 Alconbury case, legitimately 
be influenced by the political aspirations and policies of the relevant administration.359  
 
This power is increasingly being exercised through written ministerial statements and this 
practice was called into account with the West Berkshire in July 2015.360  The case 
concerned a Written Ministerial Statement made by the Secretary of State in November 
2014 which excluded developments of a certain size/scale from affordable housing 
obligations361.   This was challenged by a number of local authorities led by West Berkshire, 
with one of the central issues for consideration being the issue of whether or not the 
Secretary of State’s power to impose policy in this way was inconsistent with the statutory 
planning regime as a whole.  In the High Court, Mr Justice Holgate ruled that the new policy 
was ‘improper because, in effect, it purports to override relevant policies in the statutory 
development plan… and the need to carry out the weighing process” (para 134) and 
quashed the policy on that basis.   
 
The decision was reconsidered by the Court of Appeal in May 2016 who overturned Justice 
Holgate’s decision.  Like Justice Holgate, the Court of Appeal focussed on the tension 
between the principles that 1) a decision-makers discretion in the application of plan policies 
should not be fettered and 2) the general freedom of a policy maker such as the Secretary of 
State to express his policies without acknowledging exceptions.  However they concluded 
that a statement made in this way did not frustrate the ‘statutory scheme’ for planning as 
                                                          
358 Bloor Homes East Midlands Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 754  
359 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23 
360 Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v West Berkshire District Council & Anor [2016] 
EWCA Civ 441 
361 HCWS50 28 November 2014, vol 558, col 53WS 
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articulated in s38(6) and s70(2) of the 1990 Act and that once this was accepted, the 
specificity of the language used to change the policy  was not “unobjectionable”.   
 
This decision has attracted criticism from senior planning law practitioners, with Bowes 
commenting that the decision lacked “an appreciation of the reality of planning decision 
taking”362 while Ground went slightly further noting that it represented “a very non-
interventionist approach to regulating policy making” leaving the Secretary of State’s powers 
“extremely widely drawn”.363  In his 2016 article on the “West Berkshire” decision John Pugh 
Smith asked “does the statutory under-girding of the plan-led development system provided 
by Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 still have structural 
integrity faced with so many greater material considerations resulting from, now, Ministerial 
Statements finessing the NPPF”364.     
 
This is a very good question. The Court of Appeal ruling in West Berkshire appears to 
establish that the Secretary of State can make significant changes to national planning 
policy, that have serious implications for local authority plans and planning, without warning, 
consultation or consideration of the wider procedural context.  Another Written Statement 
was issued in Parliament less than a month ago and it is already the subject of preliminary 
court proceedings. 
 
Gavin Barwell, the Minister of State for Housing and Planning and Minister for London made 
the statement to the House on 12th December.  In it he introduced a raft of new policies in 
relation to housing supply and neighbourhood plans confirming that: 
 neighbourhood plans should not be deemed to be out-of-date unless there is a 
significant lack of land supply for housing in the wider area; 
 development plans should not be deemed out of date where: 
o The written ministerial statement was less than two years old, or: 
o The neighbourhood plan had been part of the development plan for two years 
or less; 
o The neighbourhood plan allocated sites for housing; and 
o The local planning authority could demonstrate a three-year supply of 
deliverable housing sites. 
                                                          
362Ashley Bowes, “A review of the year” Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 2016, 1195-1204 
363 Richard Ground, “Ch-Ch-Changes’ Journal of Planning and Environmental Law, OP 114-OP128  
364 John Pugh-Smith ‘Only a partial victory?” (2016) Local Government Lawyer  
<http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27172%3Aonly-
a-partial-victory&catid=63%3Aplanning-articles&Itemid=31> accessed on 20th August 2016 
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There was no prior consultation or warning that the Statement would be issued, yet it was 
introduced with the intention that it would apply to “decisions made on planning applications 
and appeals from today.”365  
 
On 30th December, Eversheds solicitors issued a pre-action protocol letter to the 
Government Legal Service; the required first stage for any legal challenge.366  It is a class 
action on behalf of land promotion companies, national and regional house builders and 
challenges the written ministerial statement on the grounds that 1) there was a legitimate 
expectation of consultation but none was carried out; 2) that the policy itself was irrational 
and unreasonable; 3) that there was no compliance with the public sector equality duty.  
These are virtually identical to the grounds of challenge in West Berkshire;  if the claim 
proceeds, and if it is successful in the High Court, it is likely, given the Court of Appeal 
decision in West Berkshire, that the matter will be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
 
7.3 Meaning and Interpretation in theory 
 
If the scope of decision-making discretion is a complicating factor in the search for the  
meaning and interpretation of sustainable development in the Framework, the question of 
who assigns meaning and takes on the primary interpretative function is also far from clear 
generally.    Since the legal test requires the assessment of development proposals against 
a range of planning policies, the meaning or effect of the wording of those policies is often 
called into question, with Lord Clyde making it clear in the City of Edinburgh case that a 
decision would be open to challenge where there was a failure to interpret plan policies 
properly367.      In theory, the judiciary interfere only where the judgment applied in the 
assessment of policy compliance is ‘irrational or perverse”.368  They may assign meaning but 
only the planning decision makers exercise planning judgment or interpret the policies.  In 
practice the distinction is without substance, the courts regularly operate as linguistic as well 
as legal arbiters, and judges regularly interpret and assign meaning to text.    
 
The 2012 Tesco Stores case369 is a prime example of this – and the leading judgment on 
interpretation generally.  It involved an application by Asda for a superstore on a derelict 
                                                          
365 HCWS346 12 December 2016 Vol 618 
366 John Geoghegan “Legal Threat to Government’s Move to Strengthen Neighbourhood Plans 
http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1419675/legal-threat-governments-move-strengthen-neighbourhood-
plans accessed 7th January 2017 
367 City of Edinburgh Council v. Secretary of State for Scotland and Others  [1997] UKHL 38,  
368 Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment & Ors [1995] 1 WLR 759  
369 Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 13 
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factory site. The Council acknowledged granted permission on the basis that the conflict with 
existing development plan policies was outweighed by other material considerations. The 
decision was challenged based on a claim that the local authority had interpreted "suitable" 
as "suitable for the development proposed by the applicant" rather than "suitable for meeting 
identified deficiencies in retail provision in the area". The whole case therefore rested on the 
meaning - and interpretation - of the word ‘suitable’ in a particular context. Lord Reed (para 
19) established that: 
 The court had a role in interpreting planning policies, in the interests of securing 
consistency and direction in the exercise of discretionary powers; 
 Policy was not to be interpreted in the same way as statute but should always be 
“interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in its 
proper context”; 
 The application of policy to a set of facts required the use of planning judgment but 
should not be irrational or perverse. 
 
This ruling was supplemented by the ‘Bloor Homes’ 2014 decision where Lindblom recited 
what he referred to as ‘seven familiar principles’370  to be applied in interpreting inspector’s 
decision including:  
 Matters of planning judgment are for the decision maker and not the courts; 
 Planning policies are not to be ‘construed’ in the same way as a statute but may be  
interpreted by the courts ‘objectively…in accordance with the language used and in 
its proper context’; 
 Consistency in interpretation is important but not essential. 
 
The 2012 Tesco decision restated a familiar distinction between meaning and interpretation 
– allocating responsibility for interpretation to the planning decision maker and reserving the 
attribution of meaning to the court.  In paragraph 21 for instance, Lord Reed was clear that 
the concept of ‘suitability’ was not a planning issue but required a purely linguistic 
construction of meaning within context.  In paragraph 35 he went on to say that this exercise 
of textual interpretation, and the attribution of meaning, was for the courts and not the 
planning decision maker: “The meaning to be given to the crucial phrase is not a matter that 
can be left to the judgment of the planning authority.”  In making this distinction, Lord Reed 
appeared to be relying primarily on Brooke LJ in Derbyshire County Council371 who 
                                                          
370  Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 754 (Admin)  
371 R v Derbyshire County Council, Ex p Woods [1997] EWCA Civ 971  
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established that where there was a dispute about the meaning of words in a policy document 
the court should determine the meaning ‘as a matter of law’.   
 
7.4 Meaning and interpretation in practice 
 
The difficulties of using legal minds to evaluate planning policies are as real now as in 1980 
when Lord Diplock commented that “‘Policy… is a protean word and much confusion in the 
instant case has, in my view, been caused by a failure to define the sense in which it can 
properly be used” 372.  Hutton asserts that “unless the text is puzzling on its face, the judge is 
unlikely to embark on an in-depth philological investigation”373 but Emmerson has separately 
noted that judges will impose meaning both on policy considerations such as ‘any other 
harm’ and also more substantive terms such as Framework paragraphs 89 (‘building’) and 
90 (‘mineral extraction’)374.   As Keene375  recognises the distinction between the meaning 
and interpretation and the division of responsibility between the decision maker and the 
courts is not always drawn clearly or consistently – for example Justice Lindbloom in Bloor 
Homes stated in the fourth of the seven familiar principles that “the proper interpretation of 
planning policy is ultimately a matter of law for the court”. 376 
 
The issue is problematic, firstly because the distinction itself rests on shaky syntactical 
foundations.  The Oxford English Dictionary377 distinguishes the terms as follows: 
 Meaning: “What is meant by a word, text, concept or action” 
 Interpretation: “The action of explaining the meaning of something:” 
It is difficult to discern any significant or meaningful difference between these two functions, 
and almost impossible to understand what they meaning in terms of distinguishing between 
the function of the decision makers and the courts in the consideration of development 
proposals.   Given that the research is concerned primarily with the way in which the words 
sustainable development are interpreted and applied in a particular policy context, it is 
important to understand what the distinction means in practice.   
 
                                                          
372 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1980] UKHL 1 [1981]AC   
373 Chris Hutton Language, meaning and the law Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009 p85 
374 Heather Emmerson ‘The NPPF – what does it mean?’ [2014] Local Government Lawyer  
<http://localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20013%3Athe-nppf-
what-does-it-mean&catid=63&Itemid=31> accessed 7th August 2016 
375 David Keene, ‘Recent trends in judicial control’ Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 1998, Occ Pap 
26, 30-37 
376 Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 754 (Admin) 
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This part of the chapter reviews and reports on an analysis carried out on a selection of 
decisions on planning cases looking specifically at the way the judges considered the issue 
of meaning and interpretation of language.   The parameters of this examination were as 
follows: 
 It included the cases reported on in Chapter 6 – i.e. those issued between 1st 
October 2013 and 31st May 2015; 
 It extended the scope of investigation for a further year - from 1 June 2015 to 31st 
May 2016 to provide a more up to date position and to extend the range of data 
considered; 
 All tiers of the court system were included: the Administrative division of the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court; 
 The results were only examined where they related to a determination under the 
legal test, and where the court specifically considered the question of ‘meaning’ and 
‘interpretation’. 
The results are summarised in table 12.  A total of thirty nine cases are listed and where they 
are referred to in this chapter their number in the table is inserted in brackets for easy 
referencing.   
 
The 2012 “Tesco” case was a frequent starting point (referred to in seventeen of the cases 
considered) for considerations of meaning and interpretation because it was a House of 
Lords decision.  Eleven of those cases re-used its distinction between the role of the 
decision maker and the courts, re-stating the principle, often on a word-for-word basis, that 
interpretation, or construction of planning policy was for the courts, while nine also stated 
that meaning was to be attributed by the decision maker, the body or individual exercising 
planning judgment.  
 
In a number of cases the courts both offered and imposed their understanding of the 
meaning of particular words: 
 In Bloor Homes,(10) the meaning of ‘silent’ in relation to  a development plan was 
considered by Lindblom J: who at one point stated that the meaning of the term 
should be interpreted objectively and yet went on to attribute his own meaning in that 
particular context: ”The term "silent" in this context does not convey some universal 
and immutable meaning… silence in this context must surely mean an absence of 
relevant policy…in my view a plan containing general policies for development 
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control that will enable the authority to say whether or not the project before it ought 
to be approved or rejected … could hardly be said to be silent378; 
 The question of need was considered twice in Mole Valley (12).  In the High Court 
Justice Haddon Cave had extensively (paragraphs 89-106) considered the meaning 
of ‘need’ in this context, imposing his own definition of the word and quashed the  
grant of the permission partly on the basis that need, as so defined, had not been 
demonstrated379.   However the court of appeal acknowledged that there was more 
than one possible meaning of the term: “the word "need" has a protean or 
chameleon-like character… and is capable of encompassing necessity at one end of 
the spectrum and demand or desire at the other”380; 
 An equivalent diversity of approaches was demonstrated in Redhill Aerodrome, 
where in the High Court (14) Justice Patterson, gave a considered account of the 
meaning of ‘any other harm’ as contained in paragraph 88 of the Framework.381  
When the case reached the Court of Appeal (15) that decision was overturned and 
the court stated that the process that the original judge’s interpretation of the text led 
to ‘imbalances in the weighing process’382  adding that (para 18) ‘the works in 
paragraph 88 should not be construed in isolation and must be construed in the 
context of the Framework as a whole’; 
 A number of other cases involved judges considering and deciding on the meaning of 
a number of different words 
o In ‘Lark Energy’ the meaning of the term “given this”383; (13) 
o In ‘Ashburton’ the word ‘generally’ in the context of a policy384 (16); 
o In ‘Phides’ a clear distinction was drawn between a “requirement” and a 
“target”385(18);    
o In ‘Old Hunstanton’ the meaning of “local"386 (28);  
                                                          
378 Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 754 
379 Cherkley Campaign Ltd, R (on the application of) v Longshot Cherkley Court Ltd [2013] EWHC 2582 
380Cherkley Campaign Ltd, R (on the application of) v Mole Valley District Council & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 
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381 Redhill Aerodrome Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors [2014] EWHC 
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382 Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors v Redhill Aerodrome Ltd [2014] EWCA 
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383 Lark Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor [2014] EWHC 2006  
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o In ‘Milwood Land’ the meaning of  ‘intention’387(26); 
o In Thornhill and St Modwen the meaning of  ‘now’388 (31) 389 (39) 
o In Williams the the meaning of ‘affect’ and, the way in which the concept of 
beauty should be applied390 (38). 
A number of cases considered the meaning of particular development plan policies.  In 
‘Pertemps investments’ (29) the judge considered the application of policy P17 at some 
length and ruled that the inspector’s misconstruction amounted to an error of law391.  A 
similarly instructive approach was taken in ‘Nicholson’ (30) to the interpretation of REM 
10392, in ‘Gallagher’ (36) to policy Bicester 13393 and to DL 20 in ‘Cheshire East394(37).    
 
The judiciary continue to assign meaning to, and interpret the meaning of, disputed text in 
planning decisions, most recently Mr Justice Green in East Staffordshire. 395     His ruling, 
concerned primarily with the reach of the paragraph presumption in favour of sustainable 
development, also engaged in some detailed analysis of the meaning of words – and indeed 
the meaning of meaning as follows: 
 (para 28) paragraph [14] did not lay down a hermetically sealed analysis which 
eschewed flexibility in all respects; 
 (para 36) a construction which furthers predictability and transparency based on 
adherence to the Local Plan is one which is to be preferred; 
 (para 39) the contents of the Impact Assessment are admissible as one source of 
guidance to an interpretation of the NPPF;  
 (para 40) "means" …is to be treated as "equates to" or "must lead to" or some other 
proxy phrase…  
 The reference to the "golden thread" … is merely a metaphor…it cannot be used to 
support a conclusion that the presumption has a broader "at large" operation.  
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EWHC 571  
395 East Staffordshire Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor 
[2016] EWHC 2973 
 
 
133 
 
It is clear from this analysis that a wide range of relatively innocuous words and phrases 
have the capacity to generate a significant volume of case law when they are part of a 
planning policy.   The phrase that has the greatest current significance is “policies for the 
supply of housing” in paragraph 49 of the Framework.  The phrase is significant because 
where the local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable 
housing sites, paragraph 49 makes all policies that qualify as ‘policies for the supply of 
housing’ automatically ‘out of date’, and the decision maker must apply the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development over the relevant development plan policies.   
 
The issue of the meaning of this phrase – and the scope of the policies to which it applies - 
was considered in a Court of Appeal ruling by issued in March 2016 relating to two conjoined 
appeals from the High Court396.     The leading judgment was given by Lord Justice Lindblom 
who noted (para 20) that the issue had been considered in seven separate cases since 2013 
resulting in “two or three distinctly possible interpretations”(para 21).   The ruling included a 
summary of the interpretative approaches taken, so that differentiation could be made 
between “the "narrow" interpretation…the "wider" or "comprehensive" interpretation” and 
“…the so-called "intermediate" or "compromise" interpretation.”  Counsel representing the 
local authorities argued for a narrow approach while those acting on behalf of the developers 
contended for a ‘wider’ construction.   
 
Lord Justice Lindblom referred to the 2012 ‘Tesco’ decision and established the Court’s 
position in relation to the interpretation of policy as being “faithful to the words of the policy, 
read in their full context and not in isolation from it.”(para 25).  He then went on to dissect the 
words themselves in detail: 
 (Para 33): The word "for" is one of the more versatile prepositions in the English 
language. It has a large number of common meanings. These include, according to 
the Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd edition (revised), "affecting, with regard to, or in 
respect of".  
 (para 33) A "supply" is simply a "stock or amount of something supplied or available 
for use" – again, the relevant definition in the Oxford Dictionary of English. The 
"supply" with which the policy is concerned, as the policy in paragraph 49 says, is a 
demonstrable "five-year supply of deliverable housing sites". Interpreting the policy in 
this way does not strain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words its draftsman 
has used. 
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 (para 34) The "narrow" interpretation of the policy, in which the words "[relevant] 
policies for the supply of housing" are construed as meaning "[relevant] policies 
providing for the amount and distribution of new housing development and the 
allocation of sites for such development", or something like that, is in our view plainly 
wrong. 
 
Lord Justice Lindblom ruled in favour of the wider approach  so that the concept of “policies 
for the supply of housing" now potentially expands to policies relating to the  Green Belt, 
countryside, landscape , conservation or cultural heritage or (para 33) “whose purpose is to 
protect the local environment in one way or another by preventing or limiting development.”    
Nevertheless, the issue remains unresolved. Permission was given to appeal the decision, 
and it is now due to be considered by the Supreme Court in February 2017. 
 
7.5 Humpty Dumpty and the Masters of Planning 
 
Alice’s encounter with Humpty Dumpty in Wonderland, in particular her rejection of his 
assertion that “`When I use a word,' ...`it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more 
nor less” has featured more prominently in issues of legal interpretation than Lewis Carroll 
could ever have anticipated.397  During the parliamentary committee debates on the Housing 
and Planning Bill Lord Greaves reflected “This is not Humpty-Dumpty land. Words actually 
have a meaning and, when it comes to the law, words have more of a meaning than they do 
in chat in the pub or on breakfast-time television”398.  In the Redhill decision Lord Justice 
Sullivan reflected that “The Framework means what it says, and not what the Secretary of 
State would like it to mean”399  and in the RSPB case Lord Justice Sullivan’s judgment at 
paragraph 21 included the observation that the conservation policies in question, though not 
statutory, nevertheless were not subject to arbitrary interpretation: “they mean what they say, 
and do not mean what the Secretary of State, or for that matter, Natural England or the 
RSPB, might wish that they had said”400.  
The next lines of the dialogue are never reported.  Alice challenges Humpty Dumpty’s 
assertion, questioning “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”  His 
response suggests that the better question is “which is to be master”.   Hutton proposes that 
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power structures operate to impose order on “the conceptual chaos of language” 401  and this 
this question is certainly relevant to the English planning system where a high position in the 
decision- making hierarchy brings with it the power to assign meaning to words on an ad hoc 
basis in much the same way as Humpty Dumpty suggests.     
 
If what really matters in relation to the meaning of sustainable development is the status of 
the person who applies the policy, there are two ‘masters’ of the meaning of sustainable 
development in the Framework: the Secretary of State and the judiciary 
 
The Secretary of State may propose, adopt and amend national planning policy through a 
range of measures including issuing new policy documents, changes to the National 
Planning Policy Guidance and through Minsterial Statements.   West Berkshire has both 
confirmed and if anything increased the scope of the Secretary of State’s powers in relation 
to planning policy. By using these powers to set new policy, and change existing policy local 
plan policies affected become automatically ‘absent, silent or out of date’ for paragraph 14 
purposes, bringing the presumption in favour of development automatically into play. He can 
use his powers of call in and recovery to insert himself as the decision maker in a wide range 
of planning proposals.  Once in position as the decision maker he is free to apply and 
interpret his own policies and will be the final arbitrator of any dispute as to how the term 
sustainable development is interpreted and applied.   
 
Although Padfield established that statutory discretion should be exercised so as to promote 
the policy or objectives of the legislation402, Alconbury acknowledged and preserved the right 
of the Secretary of State to promote a political agenda through planning decisions: “He is not 
independent.  Indeed it is not suggested that he is.”403   In terms of sustainable development 
the Secretary of State may determine its meaning on a case by case basis and with regard 
only to the conformity of a particular proposal with his own policy, disregarding all of the 
‘ordinary’ meanings of sustainable development established in the wider national and 
international policy context.     
 
In the Barker Mill decision Mr Justice Holgate criticised the legal profession for promoting  
particular “interpretations of policy” for judges to consider on the basis that those 
interpretations were “strained”, resulted in “excessive legalism”, required the courts to listen 
to “exegetical analysis” and were against the principles of interpretation of policy set out in 
                                                          
401 Chris Hutton Language, meaning and the law Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009 p5  
402 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 
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the 2012 Tesco case.404.  Nevertheless, the Judiciary, as seen above, often promote 
strained interpretations themselves and are no strangers to textual analysis. They regularly 
consider a wide range of planning cases that often include challenges based on 
misapplication or misinterpretation of the paragraph 14 presumption in favour of sustainable 
development.   There are frequent references to the distinction between meaning and 
interpretation but in practice the judiciary scrutinise, review and correct previous 
interpretative exercises and will engage in detailed examination of the meaning of specific 
words when this becomes central to the outcome of a particular case.  Brierly has 
commented on the tendency of judges to investigate the meaning of text rather than the 
purpose of the policy405 and in Cranage Mr Justice Davies noted that this was unusual and 
‘by no means of course mirrors the approach ordinarily otherwise adopted by the courts in 
other civil contexts’.406   
 
When assigning meaning or offering interpretation judges often refer to abstract notions of 
linguistic norms.  In paragraph 18 of the 2012 Tesco decision – the leading case on 
interpretation - Lord Reed states that the words in policy statements should be interpreted 
‘objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in its proper context”.  In 
paragraph 25 he refers to something he calls a ‘natural reading’ of a policy.  In paragraph 35 
he refers to a reading of the words that is ‘objective and in accordance with the proper 
context.’    
 
This approach is a common one in planning decisions. Of the 39 cases considered in Table 
12, 9 refer to a “proper/sensible” approach, seven to a ‘proper understanding”, five to a 
‘natural use of language’, 2 to a ‘correct approach’ and 1 to a ‘proper construction’.    This 
pragmatic approach to interpretation may essential where, as in the 2012 Tesco decision it 
resolves a long and expensive dispute.   However, it is a narrow basis for interpretation as it 
rests on the assumption that there is an authoritative, and commonly understood canon of 
‘meaning’ which exists, albeit in an abstract form and simply needs to be applied.  It ignores 
the extent to which language is produced and finds its meaning from a shifting political-
linguistic context and pays no regard to the potential evolution of meaning through use 
external forces.  And it never questions who decides what the established canons of 
meanings should contain.  The ‘St Modwen’ case refers to a ‘bespoke approach’ to 
interpretation but the tailors in question are a small and distinct group of judges in the High 
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Court, Appeal Court and Supreme Court. They are not representative either of the English 
population as a whole or the particular community where specific developments are located 
yet often theirs is the last word on whether a proposal is, or is not sustainable development 
and ought therefore to be permitted.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to revisit the original hypotheses and consider 
whether, taking into account the research as a whole, it was possible to reach any 
conclusion about the meaning of sustainable development in the Framework. 
 
The first hypothesis appears to be supported.  Apart from some rogue decisions by judges 
such as Mr Justice Green, sustainable development for planning purposes is assessed 
primarily as paragraphs 6 and 14 of the Framework require it to be.  Development that is in 
conformity with the Framework is presumed to be sustainable, development that is not 
compliant is not.  Sustainability is assigned on a case by case basis and there is no absolute 
standard. 
 
The second hypothesis is also supported.  Sustainable development existed as a concept 
long before the Framework and there is an established, Brundtland-based understanding of 
what it means, as Humphreys acknowledges: “The widely used definition of sustainability, in 
terms of development, over the last 25 years has been: ‘Development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’.”407  Paragraph 6 of the Framework purports to state what sustainable development 
‘means’ in a planning context but offers a process rather than a definition, a floating concept, 
applied primarily to describe development proposals that are compliant with the Framework 
rather than inherently sustainable in the traditional sense.   The Framework uses the same 
words, but sustainable development in this context is not the same as sustainable 
development outside it.  
 
The meaning of sustainable development is thus specific to the particular proposal which is 
the subject of that evaluative process.   A comprehensive, retrospective analysis of decisions 
made by the Secretary of State demonstrated little specific consideration of the concept and 
hardly any consistency of approach. If anything, as the term was used in an increasingly 
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broad range of contexts its actual meaning was diluted rather than distilled.   Although the 
judiciary often both assign meaning to words in a planning context and offer interpretations 
of individual words, they tend not to assign any consistent meaning to the term sustainable 
development itself, and pay little regard to the ‘ordinary ad natural’ Brundtland-based 
meaning of the words, beyond an occasional rogue reference to residual discretion. 
 
The third hypothesis brings us back to Humpty Dumpty.    The principle of interpretation 
most often referred to from Tesco is that the planning authority does not live in the world of 
humpty dumpty and cannot make a development plan policy mean what it wants it to mean.    
After a significant and sustained process of analysis of both appeal decisions and planning 
case law it does seem that the Secretary of State free to decide which developments are, or 
are not, compliant with the Framework. The courts rarely intervene with the Secretary of 
State’s decision making process, restricting their scrutiny to considering the way in which the 
proposal has been weighed for consistency and conformity with the Framework itself.   He is 
a de facto Humpty Dumpty. 
 
The research has supported the hypotheses, leaving the concept of sustainable 
development without a stable or reliable meaning.  The final part of this thesis considers the 
implications for the planning system generally and whether there are any more palatable 
alternatives. 
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Planning in Wonderland 
 
Summary 
 
On 20th December 2010 the Minister of State at the Department for Communities and Local 
Government announced plans to publish “a simple and consolidated national planning 
framework that covers all forms of development and sets out national economic, 
environmental and social priorities”408.   This document would also include a presumption in 
favour of sustainable development, as part of a “strong basis for economic growth.”   
 
Unlike all previous presumptions - in favour either of a specific development plan or of a 
particular development - this presumption applied to any development considered 
‘sustainable’.   It imported an evaluative criterion into the legal test that – unlike the concept 
of development – had no formal or enforceable definition.  The term ‘sustainable 
development did have a strong historical association with concern for protection of the 
natural environment and improvement of global prospects for less prosperous nations.   
The presumption in favour of sustainable development was intended to act as a golden 
thread running through the Framework.  Instead it planted an inherent tension between the 
Framework’s overt intention of establishing a policy foundation for national economic growth 
and a policy presumption that came with its own hinterland of environmental concerns and 
conscious growth restriction. 
 
This research was undertaken with the aim of exploring that tension, to understand as fully 
as possible what the new presumption meant in the particular context of the Framework.   
The research began with a summary of the existing legal test for the determination of 
planning decisions including the role of policy presumptions.  The origins and development 
of the concept of sustainable development in international, national and UK policy were 
explored to establish the ‘ordinary and natural’ meaning of the term. The proposal, draft, 
consultation, and adopted versions of the Framework were scrutinised for their use, in a 
purely linguistic sense, of the term sustainable development.  The research explored the 
practical effect of the new presumption through a detailed analysis of a substantial cross-
section of planning appeal decisions and court judgments, to see if there was any 
consistency in terms of assessing sustainability, whether there were any commonly used 
interpretative methods and the extent to which notions of sustainable development within the 
context of the Framework conformed to established understandings of that term. 
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The research did not uncover a consistent definition or even widely accepted understanding 
of what sustainable development meant in the context of the Framework.  The Framework 
refers to three dimensions of sustainable development and even recites the Brundtland 
definition, but customises the concept of sustainable development through the intersecting 
consequences of the requirements of paragraphs six and fourteen.  The sustainability or 
otherwise of a proposal is assessed primarily on whether it is consistent with the Framework.  
Appeals are determined on a case-by-case basis with no consistent evaluative standards 
applied so that assessment of sustainability is a qualitative, individual exercise entirely 
dependent on the unique combination of the proposal, its locality and the planning policy 
context.  The judiciary, unwilling to interfere with the decision maker’s discretionary scope, 
also generally limit their consideration of sustainable development to whether or not 
conformity with the Framework has been properly considered. 
 
The research did reveal a number of ways in which the claims made for the Framework 
when it was introduced were not upheld in practice.   
 
The 2010 statement introducing the Framework stated that it would be “used as a 
mechanism for delivering Government objectives only where it is relevant, proportionate and 
effective to do so”.   Chapter 4 revealed a strong selection bias in the use of call in and 
recovery powers by the government to intervene in the decision making process relating to 
renewables and traveller developments – even in some cases for proposals involving a 
single caravan. Government powers of intervention have since the introduction of the 
Framework been used more frequently, in relation to a wider scope of applications and 
appeals, and arguably to greater effect, reducing significantly the prospects of any traveller 
or renewables developments being approved on appeal. 
 
The 2010 statement said that “The framework will be: localist in its approach, handing power 
back to local communities to decide what is right for them”.  In theory, there are a very wide 
range of actors involved in the planning process including planning officers, local authority 
members, and the community affected.   Technically, all should have a say in whether or not 
a development is sustainable.  In practice, particularly in relation to larger scale and more 
contentious proposals, the assessment of sustainability can easily be taken out of the hands 
of the local authority, by the use of the Secretary of State’s powers of recovery or call in.   
The result is that in relation to a proposal of any significance, the exercise of planning 
judgment, including the determination of whether or not the proposal constitutes sustainable 
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development in the terms set out in the Framework, is carried out by a planning inspector or 
the Secretary of State himself.  
 
The 2010 statement said that the Framework would provide “clear policies on making robust 
local and neighbourhood plans and development management decisions.”   As chapters 6 
and 7 show, because sustainability is assessed based primarily on conformity with the 
Framework a number of Framework policies, most notably paragraph 4, have proved very 
difficult to interpret so that a simple phrase such as ‘policies for the supply of housing’ is now 
set to be interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
 
The meaning of sustainable development remains the most opaque policy area of all. There 
is an inherent tension between the concept of sustainable development as it is traditionally 
understood and its use as the bedrock for a policy intended to function as a “strong basis for 
economic growth.”  Sustainable development for planning purposes is defined primarily in 
terms of its conformity with a pro-growth document - part of what Allmendinger has referred 
to as a system is “rigged to promote growth”409   The Framework refers to three dimensions 
of sustainable development and even recites the Brundtland concept, but the essence of the 
concept - the need to restrict the growth of some world populations to preserve 
environmental capacity for others - is rarely acknowledged or applied.   The environmental or 
social impacts of a particular decision are easily ignored in favour of perceived economic 
benefits, usually linked to creation of jobs or housing.  Nevertheless, echoes of Brundtland 
remain, as is shown in the current war of words between High Court judges over whether the 
words include an element of residual discretion.   
 
Scope for further research 
 
There are three areas of related research that could usefully be undertaken but are beyond 
the scope of this work. 
 
Central government influence over the planning system appears to be increasing in scope 
and significance.  The government seems increasingly keen to use its powers to alter policy 
through written ministerial statements and influence local decision making through call in and 
recovery powers.  There also seems to be an increasing central appetite for the use of 
powers to intervene in the plan-making process – for example a new power under the 2016 
Housing and Planning Act was used to intervene in Birmingham City plan process and the 
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emerging Neighbourhood Planning Bill includes powers to direct County Councils to make 
plans on behalf of their districts.   This is combined with an increasing tendency to 
encourage the emergence of planning at a neighbourhood level.   The emerging 
Neighbourhood Planning Bill includes proposals making it easier to adopt and modify these 
plans and to ensure that they are considered in the decision-making process. The tension 
between these two movements – and the implications for the local authorities in the middle – 
would be an interesting area of future study, particularly in view of the likely challenge to the 
most recent ministerial statement on neighbourhood plans. 
 
Another area worth further consideration is the impact of Brexit on the planning system.  The 
EIA Directive currently requires the environmental assessment of development proposals 
and is the only empirical control of this kind on planning proposals.  Once the Great Repeal 
Act is brought in the government will be able to choose whether to re-impose these controls 
and if that re-imposition should be on a national, regional or local basis.  In a political context 
where the ‘cost’ of growth is already resisted, there may be little if any appetite to replicate 
them when they are no longer required.   The Environmental Audit Committee noted in April 
2016 that “if the UK were free to set its own environmental standards, it would set them at a 
less stringent level than has been imposed by the EU”.410  Post-referendum, Caroline Lucas 
expressed her concerns more directly: “it is all very well importing all of this EU law into 
national legislation but then who plays the part of the Commission?”  Given that the answer 
provided by Rob Cooke (Director of Biodiversity National England) was “we have the 
Supreme Court.  Whether that is the appropriate mechanism I do not know I am afraid” this 
is an area that will benefit from extended scrutiny as the Great Repeal Bill makes its way 
through parliament. 
 
Finally, in December 2015 the Government began a review of the Framework itself through a 
consultation that proposed a range of changes including a new definition of affordable 
housing, increased density standards around commuter hubs and ‘sustainable new 
settlements’.411   The Government’s response to the outcome of the consultation is likely to 
be published at the same time as the Government’s response to the report of the Local 
Plans Expert Group412  and in parallel with a Housing White Paper.   That White Paper may 
well include a new presumption, this time in favour of housing on suitable brownfield land.413 
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It is not at all clear how, or if any of these changes will affect the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development but it is certainly worth monitoring.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 1980s were dominated by the ‘planning by appeal’ approach facilitated by the 
introduction of a presumption in favour of development and supported by a growth-focussed 
political agenda aimed at delivering economic recovery.  In 2017 England is once again 
struggling to recover from a sustained period of economic depression, not entirely unlike that 
of the 1980s.  Once again the property sector, in particular the housing market, is seen as a 
key mechanism for delivery, not only of new homes but also of economic recovery and 
growth.  Once again the orientation of the planning system has been shifted by the 
introduction of a presumption. The legal test for deciding planning permissions has survived 
that 30 years with few changes to its text. In the meantime, the policy context within which it 
operates has come full circle.   However, the new presumption is not – as it was previously - 
a presumption in favour of a particular development, but a presumption in favour of any 
development – so long as it is sustainable as that term is defined in the Framework.    
 
The Framework is a relevant, material consideration in the determination of each and every 
application for planning permission. The meaning of ‘sustainable development’ within the 
Framework is being considered daily as the benchmark for whether or not planning 
permission should be granted in relation to a wide range of proposals by planning officers, 
planning committees, planning inspectors, and the secretary of state.   The term has many 
meanings in the planning context – and none.  The definitional possibilities of sustainable 
development are ring-fenced by the content of the Framework itself and whether a 
development is considered sustainable is entirely dependent on the constantly mutating 
interaction between the development proposed, local circumstances and the policy context.  
The presumption in favour of sustainable development can be used to restrict or permit 
planning permission for a wide range of developments, with little regard either to previous 
local or national policy approaches or traditional understandings of sustainable development.    
This undermines, rather than preserves the Brundtland principles from which the term 
sustainable development has evolved.  
 
In the 2012 Tesco case Lord Reed asserted that “planning authorities do not live in the world 
of Humpty Dumpty: they cannot make the development plan mean whatever they would like 
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it to mean”414.   This may or may not be true in relation to local authorities and development 
plans; in relation to sustainable development, the combination of the wide discretion 
available to the decision maker and the vague, contingent way in which that term is defined 
and employed in this particular context facilitates what can only be described as a ‘Humpty 
Dumpty’ approach to decision making.   As the maker of policy, and with the scope to insert 
himself as decision maker into any planning consent process, the Secretary of State is the 
‘master’ of the relevant discretionary space, the decision maker “sitting at the apex of the 
planning system”. 415  Securely perched at the top of the decision-making hierarchy the 
Secretary of State is indeed the master of planning and able to adopt a Humpty Dumpty 
approach to the meaning of sustainable development. 
 
In December 2014 The Communities and Local Government Select Committee published its 
report on the NPPF. The first recommendation was that paragraph 6 - the statement that the 
policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a whole, constitute the Government’s view of what 
sustainable development means in practice – should be removed, and that the page 2 
definition – clearly referencing Brundtland – should “stand on its own.”    The Government 
response, published in February 2015, rejected that recommendation, stating instead that it 
was for the planning system to look for environmental, social and economic gains, 
depending on the particular development in its specific context416.   The government also 
rejected opposition proposals for statutory definitions of sustainable development in the 
committee proceedings prior to enactment of 2016 Housing and Planning Act and currently 
underway for the Neighbourhood Planning bill.  
 
The government shows no appetite for changing the current definition of sustainable 
development in the Framework or for adopting a new definition in any of the emerging 
legislation.   A definition is nevertheless required.  There are already two legislative 
examples – section 39 of the 2004 Act or section 2 of the Wellbeing of Future Generations 
(Wales) Act 2015.  Alternatively the Government could adopt sustainable development goals 
for planning that would enable a sustainable development ‘scorecard’ to be produced for 
proposed developments.    
 
It seems unlikely that the Government will introduce either a statutory definition of 
sustainable development or any kind of empirical analysis of the sustainability of particular 
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proposals.  Unfortunately this leaves judges, rather than policy makers and communities, as 
the individuals who consider and rule on the meaning of sustainable development.  Even 
more unfortunately this seems likely to produce outcomes like that of paragraph 53 of Mr 
Justice Green’s judgement in East Staffordshire and set out on below in full.417   
 
‘The third material error in the Inspector's Decision is that he found that the proposal was a 
"sustainable development" as that term is defined in the NPPF. I do consider this to be an 
error essentially for the reasons set out above in relation to the second error: The Inspector 
has not explained why the Proposed Development is "sustainable" when it prima facie is 
inconsistent with significant policies in the Local Plan. There is one aspect of the argument 
that has caused me some hesitation. The Inspector says that the proposal was a "sustainable 
development". This is expressly set out in the second sentence of paragraph [40] of his 
Decision (see paragraph [18] above). I agree with Mr Justice Jay in Cheshire at paragraph 
[24] where he states that the point of paragraph [14] is to lead decision makers "… along a 
tightly defined and constrained path, at the end of which the decision must be: is this 
sustainable development or not?". The reference to "or not" is a reference to the binary 
outcome of the paragraph [14] process. But that conclusion is not decisive because (as was 
also recognised by Mr Justice Jay) it is accepted that there is a discretion outside of paragraph 
[14]. It is therefore, in principle, open to a decision maker to approve a proposal which is not, 
technically speaking, "sustainable development" within the meaning of paragraph [14]. In all 
probability if a development was approved outside the scope of paragraph [14] it would have 
to be "sustainable" else it is hard to see how or why it could or would have been properly 
approved. Mr Choongh for the Developer gave an illustration of a site that might he argued 
theoretically fall outside of a Local Plan but would nonetheless be "sustainable". He 
hypothesised a scenario whereby ten sites were initially submitted to the authority as possible 
sites for development. Each of these sites was eminently sustainable in a physical sense. 
However the authority chose only 8 of the 10 sites upon the basis that only 8 sites were 
needed when set against the present economic and policy based assessment of housing need. 
It was argued that this would not, without more, indicate that sites 9 and 10 were 
"unsustainable". They would have been rejected for reasons other than their intrinsic 
"sustainability". As such, he argued that paragraph [14] could not lead, inexorably, to a 
conclusion that any proposal inconsistent with the Local Plan was for a site which was 
necessarily unsustainable. However, counsel for both the Local Authority and Secretary of 
State declined to pin their forensic colours to an endorsement of this proposition. Both 
considered that it would be highly unlikely that a development on an unplanned site would be 
acceptable or "sustainable" and they pointed out that under paragraph [7] NPPF a site might 
well be defined as unsustainable for a variety of micro or macro-economic, social or 
environmental reasons such that Mr Choongh's example they considered begged more 
questions than it answered. I see some force in this argument but it does not wholly explain 
how one categorises a development which is inconsistent with a Local Plan yet is still, quite 
properly, to be approved: would such a development not, ex hypothesi, be sustainable?  
 
If this is indeed the ‘meaning’ of sustainable development then the planning system is indeed 
heading for Wonderland.    
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Table 1: use of ‘sustainable development’ in Framework proposal 
P3: means development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs 
P3:the core principle underpinning planning 
P3: recognises the importance of ensuring that all people should be able to supply their 
basic needs 
P3: means planning for prosperity 
P3: means using the planning system to promote strong vibrant communities 
P3: means using the planning system to help tackle climate change 
P5: the National Planning Policy Framework…will play a key role in supporting 
sustainable development 
P6: Heading: Delivering sustainable development 
P6: presumption in favour of sustainable development… a golden thread running through 
both plan making and decision taking 
P 6: applying the presumption in favour of sustainable development in this context will 
mean… 
P6 : principles are key to building a planning system that makes the best use of land to 
deliver sustainable development 
P7 : development plans must aim to achieve the objective of sustainable development 
P7 : documents...should only be necessary…where their production can help to bring 
forward sustainable development 
P14: development management and plan making…should recognise the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development 
P15: local planning authorities should apply the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development 
P22:Transport Policies...facilitating sustainable development 
P37: If proposing a new Green Belt, local planning authorities should..show what the 
concequences of the proposal would be for sustainable development 
P38: the need to promote sustainable patterns…consider the consequences for 
sustainable development …ensure consistency with the Local Plan strategy for meeting 
identified requirements for sustainable development 
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Table 2: use of ‘sustainable’ in Framework proposal  
P3:Planning has a key role in securing and delivering a sustainable future 
P3: planning system must play an active role in guiding development to sustainable 
solutions 
P4: enabling the delivery of the homes, infrastructure and work places that the country 
needs in a sustainable way is the principal function of the planning system 
P18: the government is committed to securing sustainable economic growth 
P18 to help achieve sustainable economic growth, the government’s objectives are… 
P21: Local planning authorities should support sustainable growth…sustainable rural 
tourism 
P22: infrastructure necessary to support sustainable economic growth 
P22: local authorities should consider whether the opportunities for sustainable transport 
have been taken up 
P22: the need to encourage  increased delivery  of homes and sustainable economic 
development 
P27: minerals are essential to support economic growth 
P27 : The government’s objective for the planning system is to…facilitate sustainable use 
of energy materials 
P29 : (Heading) facilitate sustainable use of energy materials 
P32 : government is seeking to: create sustainable inclusive and mixed communities 
P33 : (heading) create sustainable communities 
P33: to create sustainable and inclusive communities, local planning authorities should… 
P52: local planning authorities should recognise that the ability to move waste by more 
sustainable modes can justify an extension of the proximity principle 
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Table 3: Use of “Sustainable development” in Framework consultation 
Foreword: 
The purpose of planning is to help achieve sustainable development 
Sustainable development is about change for the better 
Sustainable development is about positive growth 
A presumption in favour of sustainable development that is the basis for every plan, 
and every decision 
In order to fulfil its purpose of helping achieve sustainable development, planning must 
not simply be about scrutiny 
P1: Taken together, these policies articulate the Government’s vision of sustainable 
development 
P4: At the heart of the planning system is a presumption in favour of sustainable 
development..  
P4: All plans should be based upon and contain the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development 
P7: Development plans must aim to achieve the objective of sustainable 
development…including the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
P13: Neighbourhood plans will be …subject to the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development 
P15: The primary objective of development management is to foster the delivery of 
sustainable development 
P15: The relationship between development management and plan making should be 
seamless and both should recognise the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development  
P16: In assessing and determining development proposals, local planning authorities 
should apply the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
P19: In considering applications for planning permission, local planning authorities 
should apply the presumption in favour of sustainable development  
P31: The presumption in favour of sustainable development means that Local Plans 
should be prepared on the basis that objectively assessed development needs should 
be met 
P31: To promote sustainable development, housing in rural areas should not be 
located in places distant from local services 
P33:  good design…is a key element in achieving sustainable development 
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P43: local planning authorities should apply the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development  
P46: Plans should allocate land with the least environmental or amenity value where 
practical, having regard to other policies in the Framework including the presumption 
in favour of sustainable development 
 P48: when determining planning applications in accordance with the Local Plan and 
the presumption in favour of sustainable development, local planning authorities 
should aim to conserve and enhance biodiversity 
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Table 4: Use of “Sustainable” in Framework consultation 
P1: Planning has a key role in securing a sustainable future 
P4: Development likely to have a significant effect on sites protected under the Birds 
and Habitats Directives would not be sustainable 
P18:  The Government is committed to securing sustainable economic growth 
P18:To help achieve sustainable economic growth, the Government’s objectives are 
P20: Planning policies should support sustainable economic growth..support the 
sustainable growth of rural businesses 
P21:The transport system needs to be balanced in favour of sustainable transport 
modes 
P21:The planning system should therefor support…sustainable modes of transport 
P21: the provision of viable infrastructure necessary to support sustainable economic 
growth 
P21: planning policies and decisions should consider whether the opportunities for 
sustainable transport modes have been taken up 
P22: planning strategies should protect and exploit opportunities for the use of 
sustainable transport modes 
P30: Everyone should have the opportunity to live in high quality, well designed 
homes, which they can afford, in a community where they want to live. This 
means…creating sustainable, inclusive and missed communities. 
P35: (Heading) Sustainable Communities 
P35: planning policies and decisions should…ensure that established shops, facilities 
and services are able to develop and modernise in a way that is sustainable 
P48: development likely to have a significant effect on sites protected under the Birds 
and Habitats Directives would not be sustainable under the terms of the presumption 
in favour of sustainable development 
P58: (definition) Sustainable Drainage Systems cover the whole range of sustainable 
approaches to surface drainage management 
P58: (definition) Sustainable transport modes: any means of transport with low impact 
on the environment including walking and cycling, green or low emission vehicles, car 
sharing and public transport 
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Table 5: Use of “sustainable development” in Framework  
Foreword:  
Sustainable development is about change for the better 
sustainable development is about positive growth 
presumption in favour of sustainable development that is the basis for every plan 
in order to fulfil its purpose of helping achieve sustainable development, planning must 
not simply be about scrutiny 
P2:broad principles of sustainable development…sustainable development as meeting 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs…five ‘guiding principles’ of sustainable development 
P2: The policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a whole, constitute the Government’s 
view of what sustainable development in England means in practice for the planning 
system 
P2: there are three dimensions to sustainable development 
P3: to achieve sustainable development, economic, social and environmental gains 
should be sought jointly and simultaneously 
P3: pursuing sustainable development involves seeking positive improvements 
P3: plans and decisions need to take local circumstances into account, so that they 
respond to the different opportunities for achieving sustainable development. 
P3: (heading) the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
P4: at the heart of the National Planning Policy Framework is a presumption in favour of 
sustainable development 
P4: policies in local plans should follow the approach of the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development…all plans should be based upon and reflect the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development 
P9:Transport policies have an important role to play in facilitating sustainable 
development 
P9: local authorities should work with neighbouring authorities and transport providers to 
develop strategies for the provision of viable infrastructure necessary to support 
sustainable development 
P13: Housing applications should be considered in the context of the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development 
P13/14: new settlements...local planning authorities should consider whether such 
opportunities provide the best way of achieving sustainable development 
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P14: to promote sustainable development in rural areas, housing should be located 
where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities 
P14: good design is a key aspect of sustainable development 
P19: if proposing a Green Belt, local planning authorities should…show what the 
consequences of the proposal would be for sustainable development 
P20: when drawing up or reviewing Green Belt boundaries local planning authorities 
should…consider the consequences for sustainable development 
P20: when defining boundaries, local planning authorities should ensure consistency with 
the local plan strategy for meeting identified requirements for sustainable development 
P28: the presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply where 
developments requiring appropriate assessment under the Birds or Habitats Directives is 
being considered. 
P37: Local Plans are the key to delivering sustainable development 
P37: Local plans must be prepared with the objective of contributing to the achievement 
of sustainable development 
P37: local planning authorities should seek opportunities to achieve each of the 
economic, social and environmental dimentions of sustainable development 
P41: pursuing sustainable development requires careful attention to viability and costs in 
plan-making and decision-taking 
P43: neighbourhood planning gives communities direct power to..deliver the sustainable 
development they need 
P44: neighbourhood plans will be able to shape and direct sustainable development 
P45: local planning authorities should approach decision-taking in a positive way to foster 
the delivery of sustainable development 
P46: in assessing and determining development proposals local planning authorities 
should apply the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
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Table 6: Use of “sustainable” in Framework  
Foreword: Sustainable means ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse 
lives for future generations 
Foreword: development that is sustainable should go ahead without delay 
P4:development which is sustainable can be approved without delay 
P5: planning should…proactively drive and support sustainable economic development 
P6:The Government is committed to ensuring that the planning system does everything it 
can to support sustainable economic growth 
P7: applications for alternative uses of land or building should be treated on their merits 
having regard to…the relative need for different land uses to support sustainable 
communities 
P9: different policies and measures will be required…to maximise sustainable transport  
P9: local authorities should...support a pattern of development which, where reasonable 
to do so, facilitates the use of sustainable modes of transport 
P10: plans and decisions should take account of whether…the opportunities for 
sustainable transport modes have been taken up 
P10: plans and decisions should ensure development that generate significant movement 
are located where the need to travel will be minimised and the use of sustainable 
transport modes can be maximised 
P11: high quality communications infrastructure is essential for sustainable economic 
growth 
P13: To deliver a wide choice of high quality homes, widen opportunities for home 
ownership and create sustainable inclusive and mixed communities.. 
P17: planning policies and decisions should.. ensure that established shops, facilities and 
services are able to develop and modernise in a way that is sustainable 
P19: the need to promote sustainable patterns of development 
P23: where climate change is expected to increase flood risk ..some existing 
development may not be sustainable in the long term 
P32: minerals are essential to support sustainable economic growth 
P57: (definition) Sustainable transport modes: any efficient, safe and accessible means of 
transport with overall low impact on the environment 
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Table 7: Call-in decisions 
 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
1 APP/L2250/V/10/
2131934                    
APP/L2250/V/10/
2131936 
10/4/13 
Runway 
extension and 
'starter 
extension' to the 
north/ south 
runway”.  
Passenger 
terminal and car 
park   
Proposals may 
conflict with 
national 
policies on 
important 
matters. 
Grant Grant 35: the core planning 
principle set out at NPPF 
paragraph 17 for planning 
to proactively drive and 
support sustainable 
economic development to 
deliver the homes, 
business and industrial 
units, infrastructure and 
thriving local places that 
the country needs is of 
particular relevance. 
2 APP/W2275/V/11/
2158341 
11/7/2013 
Extension of 
Quarry; variation 
of conditions  
Proposals may 
conflict with 
national 
policies on 
important 
matters. 
Grant Grant 
 
26: whilst there are a 
number of other 
considerations to be 
weighed in the balance, 
there is no reason why 
the scheme should be 
considered unsustainable 
3 APP/E3715/V/12/
2179915 
7/8/13 
Restaurant, 
Business, hotel, 
leisure with 
associated car 
parking and 
landscaping 
Proposals may 
conflict with 
national 
policies on 
important 
matters.  
Grant  Grant 
 
Page 2 heading 
“Development plan and 
sustainable development” 
9: proposal 
would…accord with the 3 
dimensions to sustainable 
development set out in 
paragraph 7 of the 
Framework (IR8.45). 
4 APP/M2270/V/10/
2126410 
APP/M2270/V/10/
2127645 
1/5/14 
Demolition of 
three listed 
structures 
No reason 
given 
Grant  Grant 
 
Not mentioned 
5 APP/N5660/V/13/
2205181                    
APP/N5660/V/13/
2205182                    
APP/N5660/V/13/
2205183                    
APP/N5660/V/13/
2205185 
5/6/14 
Mixed use 
development of 
offices 
residential retail 
leisure 
community uses 
and  transport 
infrastructure 
No reason 
given 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
6 APP/G2815/V/12/
2190175   11/6/14 
Home and 
garden centre, 
retail units, 
restaurant, 
lakeside visitor 
centre,  
No reason 
given 
Grant Grant 13. key policies and 
provisions in the adopted 
development plan are out 
of date…applying 
paragraphs 18 to 219 of 
the Framework as a 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
outline 
application for 
the erection of a 
hotel, crèche 
and leisure club  
whole, the proposal 
amounts to sustainable 
development  
7 APP/X1118/V/13/
2201290 
13/6/14 
demolition of 
existing and the 
erection of 1 
new dwelling 
together with 
refurbishment of 
an existing 
annexe,  
No reason 
given 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
8 New Barnfield, 
Hatfield  
 
PP/M1900/V/13/2
192045 
 
8/7/14 
demolition of 
existing library 
buildings and 
construction and 
operation of a 
Recycling and 
Energy 
Recovery 
Facility (RERF)  
proposal 
involved 
matters giving 
rise to 
substantial 
cross 
boundary or 
national 
controversy 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
9 APP/K5030/V/13/
2205294 
8/7/14 
office and retail 
with associated 
servicing and 
access  
None given Refuse Refuse 33: the application would 
…seriously undermine 
any economic, social or 
environmental benefits 
otherwise arising from the 
development, such that 
the proposal would not 
represent sustainable 
development 
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TABLE 8: Recovered Appeals: Travellers 
 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
1 APP/C1950/C/12/
2171233 
APP/C1950/C/12/
2171238 
APP/C1950/A/12/
2171238 
10/4/13 
Enforcement: 
use of land for 5 
caravans and 
hard standing,  
Major 
development 
in Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not considered 
2 APP/C3620/A/12/
2169062, 
2169066  
2169068;  
APP/C3620/C/12/
2172090, 
2172094, 
2172095, 
2172099, 
2172104, 
2172106, 
2172116 2172145   
10/4/13 
Caravan 
pitches, utility 
buildings, 
pitches for 
mobile homes, 
paddocks, 
associated hard 
standing and 
buildings 
Major 
development 
in Green Belt 
Grant Grant Not considered 
3 APP/G1630/C/12/
2180596 
APP/G1630/C/12/
2180598 
10/7/13 
Enforcement: 
residential 
caravan use, 
parking, 
storage, hard 
standing walls 
piers fencing 
lights 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Page 6  heading 
Sustainable Location … 
the site is not ideally 
located to encourage the 
use of modes of transport 
other than the private 
car…occupiers would be 
primarily reliant on a 
private motor car for most 
journeys  
4 APP/Q3630/A/12/
2169543 
11/7/13 
Extension of 
mobile home 
site for 28 
pitches. 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Grant Grant  
5 APP/G5180/A/11/
2154680 Croydon 
Road Keston 
14/8/13 
Residential 
gypsy site, 
fencing and 
hard standing 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Heading ‘Sustainability 
and accessibility …site is 
in a generally accessible 
location …no objections 
to either scheme on 
grounds of sustainability 
or accessibility 
6 APP/R0660/A/12/
2183629 Spinks 
Lane Knutsford 
22/8/13 
 
Site for 3 mobile 
homes, 3 
caravans, hard 
standing 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
7 APP/E3715/C/11/
2153638  
APP/E3715/C/11/
2154137  
APP/E3715/A/11/
2153749 
27/8/13 
Enforcement: 
use of the land 
for residential  
caravan site 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant Refuse Heading of 
‘sustainability’…the site is 
reasonably well located 
with regard to 
accessibility, and that 
there would be some 
other sustainability 
benefits arising from the 
development, 
8 APP/P0240/A/12/
2179237 
27/8/13 
Application for  
6 caravans 
ancillary 
buildings and 
hard standing 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant  Grant  Not mentioned 
9 APP/J1915/C/11/
2165291                    
APP/J1915/C/11/
2165292                    
APP/J1915/A/11/
2168447 
29/8/13 
Enforcement: 
change of use to 
caravan site for 
3  mobile 
homes, 3 
caravans,  hard 
standing  
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse Heading of 
“Sustainability”…‘site 
…would provide many 
other sustainable  
benefits.. can be afforded 
modest weight’ 
10 APP/J1915/C/10/
2133783;       
2133788; 
2133790; 
2133791; 
2133859; 
2133863; 
2133866; 
2133868; 
2133869; 
2133871; 
2133873; 
2133875; 
2133876; 
2133877; 
2133878; 
2133883; 
2133884; 
2168537    
4/9/13 
use of the site 
for mobile 
homes and 
caravans 
keeping 
animals, 
construction of 
stable building, 
hard standing  
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse “Sustainability” heading 
Para 22 ‘ the site 
occupies a highly 
sustainable location in 
respect of access to 
services and facilities and 
is a location that is 
potentially conducive to 
integration of gypsies and 
travelers with the settled 
community’ 
11 APP/J1915/C/12/
2179609 
Esbies Estate  
4/9/13 
Enforcement:  
mobile home 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
12 APP/H1515/C/12/
2180289, 90, 91, 
92, 93, 94, 95, 96 
& 97 
18/9/13 
Enforcement: 
change of use to 
residential 
caravan site. 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
 
 
161 
 
 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
13 APP/H1515/A/12/
2173169 
18/9/13 
Change of use 
to provide pitch 
for traveller 
family. 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant  Refuse Para 14 ‘ reliance on the 
car, the distance to 
services and the 
deterioration of the track 
all count against the 
proposal in terms of 
achieving a sustainable 
form of development  
14 APP/V1505/A/11/
2156547    
 
Change of use 
of land from 
grazing to 
residential and 
stabling   
proposals 
giving rise to 
substantial 
regional or 
national 
controversy 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
15 APP/T3725/A/13/
2192556 
22/10/13 
Change of use 
to 9 pitch 
traveler site and 
associated 
remedial works  
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse  Not mentioned 
16 APP/L3625/A/12/
2188747  
30/10/13 
Change of use 
to house and 
caravan site 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
17 APP/L3625/A/12/
2188740   
30/10/13 
Change of use 
to caravan site  
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
18 APP/Q4625/A/13/
2195328  
21/11/13 
Change of use 
of land for 
residential 
caravans 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant Refuse 27…deficiencies are more 
than outweighed by other 
factors of sustainability;  
19 APP/A0665/A/12/
2181449 
19/12/13 
 
Change of use 
to caravan site 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse 13. … the site is in a 
sustainable location and 
that considerable weight 
should be attached  
20 APP/J1535/A/12/
2177311 &                  
APP/J1535/C/12/
2181659      
16/1/14  
Enforcement: 
stationing of 
caravans hard 
standing  
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
21 APP/P5870/A/13/
2191403   
22/1/14 
Replacement 
bungalow 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
22 APP/X4725/A/13/
2197675  
28/1/14  
Change of use 
from grazing to 
10 gypsy 
caravan pitches 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
23 APP/V1505/C/12/
2172410,2172413
, 2172414 and 
2172415    
29/1/14 
Use of site for 
residential 
purposes 
Substantial 
regional or 
national 
controversy 
Quash 
all 
notices  
Quash 
one, 
uphold 
others 
Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
24 APP/Y3425/A/13/
219 5269   
11/2/14 
Change of use 
to mobile homes 
and hard 
standing 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
25 APP/Q3630/C/12/
2181871 and 
APP/Q3630/A/12/
2181860   
18/2/14  
Enforcement: 
mobile home 
and use as 
gypsy pitch 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
26 APP/M0655/A/12/
2177362  
27/2/14  
Change of use 
to showmen’s 
family quarters,  
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
27 APP/P0119/A/12/
2178088      
5/3/14  
Replacement 
dwelling 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
28 2187806 and 
2183467  
5/3/14  
Enforcement: 
use of site for 
residential 
caravan and two 
mobile homes 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
29 APP/R4408/A/12/
2180999    
23/4/14 
 
Residential 
caravans 
Significant 
development 
in green belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
30 PP/X1355/A/12/2
173888  
23/4/14 
 
Replacement of 
single storey 
with 2 storey 
house 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
31 APP/R4408/A/12/
2181184    
29/4/14 
 
Residential 
caravan site for 
3 families 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
32 APP/H1840/A/12/
2170076  
29/4/14 
29  April 2014    
1 mobile home 
and caravan for 
one family 
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
33 APP/G2245/A/12/
2185283  
30/4/14  
 
Use of site for 
mobile home 
caravan and 
building  
Significant 
development 
in Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
34 APP/E2734/A/13/
2200726                    
APP/E2734/C/13/
2193766      
22/5/14 
Use of land as a 
private gypsy 
site for one 
family 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
35 APP/A0665/A/12/
2187406   
27/5/14 
 
Change of use 
to  caravan site 
for 3 gypsy 
families 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt.   
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
36 APP/H4315/C/12/
2174652  
28/5/14  
Residential 
development 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
. 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
37 APP/N0410/A/12/
2185586  
3/6/14 
Two Gypsy and 
Traveler pitches 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse  
38 APP/F4410/A/13/
2208605  
3/6/14 
Change of use 
to site for two 
Traveler families 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt.    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
39 APP/Q5300/A/13/
2198024                       
5/6/14    
Change of use 
to caravan site 
for one traveler 
family 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
40 APP/K0425/A/11/
2159978  
APP/K0425/A/12/
2183066    
5/6/14 
Change of use 
for traveler site 
including 2 
mobile homes 
and 2 caravans 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
41 APP/F4410/A/13/
2208600  
10/6/14 
Application for 
change of use to 
keeping horses 
and residential 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
42 APP/M1005/C/12/
2180387 & 
APP/M1005/C/12/
2180391    
12/6/14 
Use of land for 
residential 
caravan 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Heading:  Whether the 
appeal site represents a 
sustainable location  
43 APP/K3415A/12/2
1778761                       
18/6/14    
Application for 
residential 
occupation for 
traveler family 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
44 APP/Y3615/A/12/
2180027  
1/7/14 
One additional 
pitch on an 
existing 6 pitch 
site 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
45 APP/B5480/C/13/
2201240 
1/7/14  
Enforcement:2 
mobile homes 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
46 APP/B5480/C/12/
2177932 and 
2181567  
1/7/14  
Enforcement:  4 
gypsy and 
traveler pitches 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
47 APP/Y3615/C/220
6135 and 
APP/Y3615/A/13/
2206124  
8/7/14 
 
Enforcement: 
change of use 
from woodland 
to caravan site 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
48 APP/M3645/A/13/
2193478       
9/7/14 
 
Cchange of use 
to a gypsy and 
traveler caravan 
site with one 
pitch 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant  Grant –  15. the proposed site 
would provide easier 
access to health, 
education and other 
essential services … site 
would be economically 
sustainable…site would 
be sustainable  
49 APP/R2330/A/13/
2203895 
15/7/14        
 
Change of use 
of land for the 
keeping of 
horses and as a 
residential 
caravan site  
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
50 APP/M0655/A/13/
2191920   
25/7/14 
 25 July 2014   
Enforcement:  
change of use 
for stationing of 
caravans for 
residential 
occupation by 
travelers 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt.   
Grant Grant  Not mentioned 
51 APP/R5510/C/13/
2192003/04      
29/7/14 
 
Enforcement:  
use of land for 
mobile home 
and touring 
caravan for 
residential 
purposes  
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
52 APP/N2739/A/12/
2176525       
30/7/14 
Use as traveler 
site 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
53 APR/R1845/A/12/
2183527     
30/7/14 
Enforcement: 
stationing of 
caravans for 
residential 
purposes 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
54 APP/E3715/A/13/
2192742   
5/8/14 
 
Change of use 
of land to a 
private gypsy 
caravan site 
comprising one 
static and one 
mobile caravan 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt.   
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
55 APP/P2365/C/12/
2179831 and 
APP/P2365/A/12/
2177366  5/8/14       
Enforcement: 
residential 
caravans 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
56 APP/D0650/A/13/
2196163        
24/9/14 
use of site for 
keeping horses 
and  caravan 
Significant 
development n 
the Green Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
57 APP/K0235/A/12/
2187276    
1/10/14 
 
Change of use 
to caravan site 
hard standing 
and landscaping 
High level of 
objections, 
planning 
history and 
controversy 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
58 APP/W3710/A/12/
2181556    
1/10/14 
 
Change of use 
to residential 
caravan site 3 
caravans, 2 
static homes; 
two transit 
pitches and hard 
standing 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
59 APP/W3005/A/13/
2208844   
20/10/14 
 
Residential 
caravan site for 
3 pitches hard 
standing and 
new access  
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
60 APP/E3715/A/13/
2192798   
20/10/14 
Two mobile 
homes, one day 
room and  hard 
standing 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
61 APP/Y9507/A/13/
2203067  
23/10/14       
Change of use 
of to a traveler 
site 
Traveler site in 
South Downs 
National Park.   
Grant Refuse …the proposal is broadly 
consistent with the wider 
sustainability objectives in 
the PPTS...proposal 
would have an adverse 
effect on the character 
and appearance of the 
area, contrary to the… 
environmental dimension 
of sustainability  
62 APP/R5510/A/13/
2196141                   
27/10/14    
 
Use of the land 
as a gypsy and 
traveler caravan 
site and for the 
keeping horses 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
63 APP/T0355/A/13/
2205599   
30/10/14 
 
Change of use 
of land to  use 
as a residential 
caravan site for 
8 gypsy families  
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt 
Refuse Refuse Sustainability... the site is 
not contrary to the 
requirement to be 
sustainable economically, 
socially and 
environmentally … a 
neutral factor in the 
planning balance  
64 APP/J3720/A/12/
21805707   
30/10/14  
 
Change of use 
to gypsy site 3 
mobile homes, 3 
caravans,.   
 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Reduc
e time 
limits 
Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
65 APP/U2235/A/12/
2178069  
15/11/14 
Land at 
Nettlestead 
Maidstone Kent 
 
Stationing 4 
mobile homes 
storage of 4 
touring caravans 
hard standing, 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant  Reduc
e time 
limits  
Not mentioned 
66 APP/H1840/A/13/
2192787   
5/11/14 
 
Application for  
change of use of 
land for 
stationing 1 
caravan 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Reduc
e time 
limits  
Not mentioned 
67 APP/R0660/A/13/
2198596   
11/11/14 
 
Application for 
use of land for 
stationing 
caravans on 1 
pitch 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
68 APP/N1920/C/13/
2198021                
10/11/14   
 
Enforcement: 
use of land for 
stationing 
caravans and 
mobile homes 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
69 APP/G2245/A/13/
2206402   
11/11/14 
Change of use 
to traveler site 
Significant 
development 
in the Green 
Belt  
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
70 APP/A0665/A/14/
2213546        
12/11/14 
Enforcement: 
change of use 
from agricultural 
use to  
residential 
caravan site. 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt.   
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
71 APP/P1940/A/13/
2209705     
20/11/14   
Change of use 
to residential 
caravan site 
Traveler site in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
72 APP/Q3630/C/12/
2184256, 
2124259, 
2184257, 
2184258 & 
2184254   
26/11/14 
Enforcement:  
use of land for 
stationing 
mobile home 
and use as 
traveler pitch 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
73 APP/L3245/A/12/
2179881  
27/11/14 
 
Change of use 
gypsy and 
traveler caravan 
site comprising 
one mobile 
home and two 
touring caravans 
Traveler site in 
the Green 
Belt. 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
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TABLE 9: Recovered Appeals: Renewables 
 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
1 APP/F5540/A/12/
2174323 
15/5/2013 
20MW 
biomass 
fuelled 
renewable 
energy plant 
with 
associated 
development 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant Grant Government’s planning 
policies offer strong 
support for an increase in 
generating capacity from 
renewable sources…the 
proposal constitutes a 
sustainable form of 
development 
2 APP/E0915/A/12/
2170838 and 
APP/E0915/A/12/
21777996 
23/5/13 
Six wind 
turbines ad 
nine wind 
turbine 
generators,  
Another 
Government 
department has 
raised major 
objections/ has 
a major interest.    
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
3 APP/D0515/A/12/
2181777   and             
APP/A2525/A/12/
2184954 
9/10/13 
Six wind 
turbines 
 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
4 APP/T3535/A/13/
2193543 
16/10/13 
24MW solar 
farm and 
associated 
infrastructure 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies  
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
5 APP/Z0923/A/13/
2191361 
4/12/13 
6 Wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
6 APP/Y0435/A/10/
2140401;    
APP/K0235/A/11/
2149434; 
APP/H2835/A/11/
2149437 
17/12/13  
 
 
 
12 turbines  Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
7 APP/MO993/A/12
/2185234 
28/1/14 
1 turbine Secretary of 
State 
announcement 
10/10/13 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
8 APP/Q9495/A/12/
218858 
11 Feb 2014 
1 wind turbine Secretary of 
State 
announcement 
10/10/13 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
9 APP/X1545/A/12/
2174982 
APP/X1545/A/12/
2179484 
APP/X1545/A/12/
2179225 
7 wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant Grant :..it would be sustainable 
development to which the 
presumption in favour set 
out in Framework would 
apply 
10 APP/V3310/A/12/
2186162 
25/2/14 
4 wind 
turbines 
No reason given Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
11 APP/Y2430/A/13/
2191290 
4/3/14 
9 wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
12 APP/D0840/A/12/
2189476 
14/4/14 
1 wind turbine Renewable 
Energy 
Development 
Grant Grant …the proposal would be 
sustainable development 
to which the presumption 
in favour set out in 
Framework would apply  
13 APP/G0908/A/13/
2191503 
18/4/14 
1 wind turbine Secretary of 
State 
announcement 
10/10/13 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
14 APP/N2739/A/13/
2204642 
15/5/14 
1 wind turbine Secretary of 
State 
announcement 
10/10/13 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
15 APP/E2001/A/13/
2190363 
21/5/14 
 
9 wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
 
 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
16 APP/J3530/A/13/
2193911 
22/5/14 
Solar park Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
17 APP/Y2736/A/13/
2201109 
27/5/14 
10 wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
18 APP/P2935/A/13/
2193153 
29/7/14 
2 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development   .    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
19 APP/Y0435/A/12/
2186522 
29/7/14 
5 wind 
turbines 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant  Refuse Not mentioned 
20 APP/V3310/A/13/
2197449 
31/7/14 
4 wind 
turbines 
Secretary of 
State’s 
announcement 
10/10/13 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
21 APP/Y2003/A/12/
2180725 
31/7/14 
10 wind 
turbines 
No reason Refuse Refuse the development 
is…contrary to the 
development 
plan…presumption in 
favour of sustainable 
development in the 
Framework is not 
triggered 
22 APP/P2935/A/13/
2194915 
31/7/14 
5 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
23 APP/D2510/A/13/
2200887 
28/8/14 
3 wind 
turbines 
No reason Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
24 APP/F2605/A/12/
2185306 
25/9/14 
2 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development   .    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
25 APP/B3030/A/12/
2183042 
29/9/14 
3 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
26 APP/J3720/A/13/
2193579 
1/10/14 
4 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development   .    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
27 APP/E2001/A/13/
2207817 
15/10/14 
6 wind 
turbines 
Impact beyond 
the local area 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
28 APP/A3010/A/13/
2201459 
21/10/14 
biomass 
fuelled 
combined heat 
and power 
plant 
Proposal of 
major 
significance for 
delivery of the 
Government’s 
climate change 
programme and 
energy policies 
Grant Grant  against the policies in the 
Framework as a whole, 
the proposal represents a 
sustainable form of 
development 
29 APP/L2630/A/13/
2207755 
27/10/14 
4 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
30 APP/Y2810/A/13/
2203312 
17/11/14 
One wind 
turbine 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
31 APP/B3030/A/13/
2208417 
19/11/14 
2 wind 
turbines 
Renewable 
Energy 
Development    
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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TABLE 10: Recovered Appeals: Residual 
 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
1 APP/W4515/A/12/
2175554 
8/5/13 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … the proposal would 
have acceptable 
sustainability credentials 
… the appeal scheme 
would represent a 
sustainable form of 
development. 
2 APP/U4230/A/12/
2170252 
8/5/13 
Residential, 
leisure, retail 
Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
3 APP/X2410/A/12/
2173673 
 
14//5/2013 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … the presumption in 
favour of sustainable 
development set out in 
paragraph 14 of the 
Framework is engaged  
… while there are harmful 
aspects …these have to 
be weighed against the 
very substantial 
contribution to housing 
needs … the presumption 
in favour of sustainable 
development should be 
the decisive factor. 
4 APP/U5930/E/11/
2165344                   
APP/U5930/A/11/
2165348                   
APP/U5930/A/12/
2183662   
22/5/13 
Change of use 
for religious 
purposes 
Proposals giving 
rise to 
substantial 
regional or 
national 
controversy.   
Refuse Refuse  Not mentioned 
5 APP/Z2260/A/11/
2163595 
13/6/13 
Retail and 
residential 
Town centre use 
in a 
development of 
over 9,000 
square metres 
gross floor 
space in an out-
of-centre 
location 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
6 APP/C1435/A/12/
2186147 
18/6/13 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned except in 
heading: “whether the 
proposal would be a 
sustainable form of 
development”  
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
7 APP/W4705/A/11/
2161990               
APP/W4705/A/11/
2162739                 
APP/W4705/E/11/
2162736 
19/6/13 
Residential, 
infrastructure 
Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Refuse 16… the proposal 
represents a sustainable 
form of development 
8 APP/M1520/A/12/
2177157 
26/4/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Allow Refuse Not mentioned 
9 APP/W4515/A/12/
2186878 
3/7/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant …there is no fundamental 
reason to disagree with 
the assessment of the 
appellant that the 
proposal would represent 
sustainable development  
10 APP/Z2830/A/12/
2183859 
14/7/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant 14…the presumption in 
favour of sustainable 
development … is 
engaged…failure to 
demonstrate a 5 year 
supply of deliverable 
housing sites is a matter 
to which substantial 
weight must be accorded. 
11 APP/J4423/A/12/
2178393 
18/7/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … proposal would comply 
with CS policies CS64 
and CS65 and would be a 
sustainable form of 
development for which 
there is a presumption in 
favour  
12 APP/R0660/A/12/
2187264 
18/7/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
13 APP/N1160/A/12/
2169472 
5/8/13 
 
Mixed use and 
residential 
Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Refuse … the scheme would not 
amount to sustainable 
development and would 
conflict with the relevant 
CS policies and the 
Framework (IR15.82). 
14 APP/A0665/A/11/
2167430 
29/8/133 
Residential Substantial 
regional or 
national 
controversy  
Refuse  Grant …the scheme may be 
placed on the positive end 
of the sustainability 
spectrum (IR200).    
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
15 APP/W4515/A/12/
2175554 
3/9/13 
Residential Not mentioned Grant Grant Not mentioned 
16 APP/P1133/A/12/
2188938   
10/9/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant the “presumption in favour 
of sustainable 
development” set out in 
the Framework applies 
and permitting the 
proposed development 
would take a positive step 
forward towards 
addressing the District’s 
current shortfall in 
housing provision which 
would outweigh the harm 
caused in other respect 
17 APP/G3110/A/13/
2195679 
11/9/13 
Change of use 
from  D2 to 
use class D1 
Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance . 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
18 APP/H1705/A/12/
2188125  
APP/H1705/A/12/
2188137 
11/9/13 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
19 APP/E5900/A/12/
2178920 
23/9/11 
Business and 
residential 
Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
20 APP/C3105/A/12/
2184094 
23/9/11 
Residential Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Grant The scheme represents 
sustainable development 
which would make a 
significant contribution 
towards addressing the 
undersupply of housing in 
the District. 
21 APP/C3105/A/13/
2189896 
23/9/13 
Residential To enable 
consideration at 
the same time 
as three other 
appeals 
Grant Grant …represents sustainable 
development which would 
make a significant 
contribution towards 
addressing the 
undersupply of housing in 
the District 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
22 APP/C3105/A/12/
2189191 
23/9/13 
 
Residential To enable 
consideration at 
the same time 
as three other 
appeals 
Grant Grant …represents sustainable 
development which would 
make a significant 
contribution towards 
addressing the 
undersupply of housing in 
the District 
23 APP/C3105/A/12/
2178521 
23/9/13 
 
Residential To enable 
consideration at 
the same time 
as three other 
appeals 
Grant Grant …represents sustainable 
development which would 
make a significant 
contribution towards 
addressing the 
undersupply of housing in 
the District 
24 APP/H0738/A/13/
219538 
26/9/13 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not considered 
25 APP/V0728/A/13/
2190009 
26/9/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant …appeal scheme 
represents sustainable 
development making a 
contribution to the 
undersupply of housing 
including housing for a 
variety of types of 
households 
26 APP/B3410/A/13/
2189989  3/10/13 
Residential 
and local 
centre 
Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant .. proposal can be 
regarded as a sustainable 
development, and under 
the Framework there is a 
presumption in favour of 
granting permission 
27 APP/R0660/A/10/
2141564 
17/10/13 
 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Grant … purpose of the 
planning system is to 
contribute to the 
achievement of 
sustainable 
development… requires 
decision makers to take a 
positive attitude to 
development proposals … 
identifies three 
dimensions … appeal 
proposals would fulfill an 
economic role …it would 
fulfil an important social 
role...the appeal 
proposals represent 
sustainable development. 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
28 APP/M2325/A/13/
2192188                  
APP/M2325/A/13/
2196027 
7/11/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant When assessed against 
the Framework as a 
whole, he concludes the 
schemes would comprise 
sustainable development  
29 APP/B3410/A/13/
2197299 
12/11/13 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant …satisfied that the appeal 
site is in a sustainable 
location for housing 
development 
30 APP/W3710/A/13/
2192451 &      
APP/W3710/A/13/
2195969 
14/11/13 
 
Canal marina 
and residential 
Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Refuse Not considered 
31 APP/A0665/A/12/
2179410 &              
APP/A0665/A/12/
2179374 
18/11/13 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … impact in combination 
or individually would not 
significantly and 
demonstrably outweigh 
the benefits of the 
proposals...the proposals 
represent sustainable 
development 
32 APP/E2340/A/13/
2195745 
26/11/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Refuse … the scheme is relatively 
unsustainable because of 
failings with the design 
approach...the adverse 
impacts of the 
scheme…significantly and 
demonstrably outweigh 
the identified 
benefits…would not meet 
the tests as regards the 
presumption in favour of 
sustainable development.   
33 APP/M2325/A/13/
2196027    
26/11/13 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
34 APP/H0900/A/12/
2187327 
12/12/13 
Disposal of 
nuclear waste 
Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance.    
Refuse Refuse …development would 
represent a substantial 
financial interest …needs 
to be balanced against 
the harm…little of no 
social benefit .. few 
sustainability benefits. 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
35 APP/F0114/A/13/
2191952 
18/12/13 
Bath 
Retail and 
business 
Town Centre 
use more than 
9,000 sq. m in 
an edge-of-
centre or out-of-
centre location  
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
36 APP/E5900/A/13/
2203743 
21/1/14 
 
Free school Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance.    
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
37 APP/T2350/A/13/
2194601 
23/1/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Refuse Refuse … no 5-year housing land 
supply...planning 
permission should be 
granted for a housing 
scheme if that can be 
judged sustainable...minor 
to moderate 
objections…not  sufficient 
to outweigh the 
presumption in favour of 
sustainable 
development…adverse 
impacts of allowing the 
appeal proposal would 
significantly and 
demonstratively outweigh 
the benefits 
38 APP/MO655/A/13
/2203059 
4/2/14 
School Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance.    
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
39 APP/B3410/A/13/
2193657 
12/2/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant …the appeal site is in a 
sustainable location for 
housing development;  
40 APP/T2350/A/13/
2190088 
20/2/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … planning balance falls 
strongly in 
favour…accords with the 
policies in the Framework 
including the presumption.   
41 APP/F0114/A/13/
2195351 
4/3/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Refuse … the appeal site, being 
relatively close to the 
centre of the village, 
cannot be said to be 
unsustainable  
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
42 APP/F0114/A/13/
2199958 
5th March 
Residential Significant 
development in 
the Green Belt.      
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
43 APP/J3720/A/13/
2202101 and 
APP/J3720/A/13/
2205529 
5/3/14 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
44 APP/X2410/A/13/
2196928 &                  
APP/X2410/A/13/
2196929 
8/4/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant ...overall, the scheme 
represents a suitable and 
sustainable development 
where other material 
considerations outweigh 
the limited development 
plan conflict.    
45 APP/A1530/A/13/
2195924 
16/4/14 
Stour Valley 
Visitor Centre 
Substantial 
regional or 
national 
controversy.  
Refuse Refuse … site cannot be 
considered to be in a 
sustainable location …the 
scheme is in an inherently 
unsustainable location 
46 APP/F2415/A/12/
2183653 
17/4/14 
 
Residential 
and sports 
Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Refuse …Paragraph 185 of the 
Framework states that.. 
neighbourhood plans will 
be able to shape and 
direct sustainable 
development… 
47 APP/T2350/A/13/
2197091 
22/4/14 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant ... planning balance falls 
strongly in favour of the 
proposal…it accords with 
the policies in the 
Framework including the 
presumption in favour of 
sustainable development. 
48 APP/D3830/A/13/
2198213  and 
2198214 
1/5/14 
Care home 
and residential 
Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Grant … it is a sustainable form 
of development capable 
of meeting the housing 
need of the District ... 
proposals are sustainable 
forms of development 
entitled to the 
presumption in favour of 
development. 
49 APP/V1505/A/13/
2204850 
17/6/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
 
 
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
50 APP/B2002/A/13/
2203957 
19/6/14 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … proposal accords with 
policies in the Framework 
including the presumption 
in favour of sustainable 
development. 
51 APP/H1840/A/13/
2202364 
2/7/14 
Long Marston 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … appeal scheme should 
be regarded as being in 
accordance with 
paragraph 17 of the 
Framework as being a 
location which can be 
made sustainable… 
appeal scheme would 
contribute to the 
achievement of the 
environmental role of 
sustainable development. 
52 APP/H1840/A/13/
2199085 
APP/H1840/A/13/
2199426 
2/7/14 
 
residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant … Appeal A scheme is 
sustainable in terms of 
economic, environmental 
and social benefits 
53 APP/B1930/A/09/
2109433 
14/7/14 
Strategic rail 
freight 
interchange 
More than local 
significance, 
development 
within Green 
Belt 
Grant Grant Not mentioned 
54 APP/L2630/A/13/
2196884 
7/8/14 
Norfolk 
Housing Because of 
court judgment 
18 February 
2014 on the 
case of Barnwell 
Manor Wind 
Energy Limited 
v 
Northamptonshir
e District 
Council  
Refuse Refuse …site is appropriately 
located in relation to 
services and facilities but 
would fail to protect the 
natural and historic 
environment…as such the 
weight afforded to the 
provision of sustainable 
development is limited  
55 APP/D3830/A/12/
2189451 
4/9/14 
Housing Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Refuse … main consideration in 
this case is whether the 
proposal constitutes 
sustainable development 
within the context of the 
Framework. 
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
56 APP/D3830/A/13/
2203080 
4/9/14 
 
Housing Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Grant …whether the proposal 
constitutes sustainable 
development … 
represents a sustainable 
form of development 
which accords with the 
emerging NP  
57 APP/D3830/V/14/
2211499 
4/9/14 
 
Housing Proposal 
includes matters 
which may 
conflict with 
national policies 
on important 
matters. . 
Refuse Refuse … proposal fails to satisfy 
the environmental 
dimension of sustainable 
development as set out in 
the Framework 
58 APP/Y3940/A/13/
2200503 
8/9/14 
Wiltshire 
Residential Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Refuse Not mentioned 
59 APP/E5900/A/12/
2186269 
16/9/14 
Concrete 
batching plant 
Another 
Government 
department has 
raised major 
objections or 
has a major 
interest.   
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
60 APP/N0410/A/14/
2215541 
17/9/14 
 
Change of use 
to school 
Development of 
major 
importance 
having more 
than local 
significance. 
Refuse Grant Not mentioned 
61 APP/H1705/A/13/
2205929 
 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Grant …planning balance falls 
strongly in favour of the 
proposal and the adverse 
impacts do not come 
close to significantly and 
demonstrably outweighing 
the benefits …proposal 
benefits from the 
presumption in favour of 
sustainable development  
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
62 APP/B1930/A/13/
2207696 
13/10/14 
residential Significant 
development in 
the Green Belt 
Grant Grant Environmental Role … in 
respect of location and 
movement to a low 
carbon economy, the 
sustainability of the 
appeal site is 
positive….Social 
Role…proposed housing 
would contribute to the 
support, strengthening 
and vibrancy of the local 
community… 
Economic Role…proposal 
would enhance the 
economy of the 
community by the creation 
of jobs  
63 APP/M0655/A/13/
2201665 
23/10/14 
Landfill 
extension 
Significant 
development in 
the Green Belt  
Refuse Refuse Not mentioned 
64 APP/Y3940/A/13/
2206963 
27/10/14 
Residential Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Refuse … it would represent a 
sustainable form of 
development…does not 
consider that the benefits 
of the scheme 
significantly or 
demonstrably outweigh its 
adverse impacts 
65 APP/Z2260/A/14/
2213265 
29/10/14 
 
Residential Proposals raise 
important or 
novel issues of 
development 
control and/or 
legal difficulties 
Grant Grant … provision of housing, 
including family and 
affordable dwellings, and 
the school and community 
facilities, would all 
contribute positively to the 
social role of sustainable 
development and that the 
activity of developing the 
site would also contribute 
to the economic role…the 
scheme amounts to 
sustainable development 
66 APP/K2420/A/13/
2208318 
18/11/13 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
 
 
 
Grant Grant … scheme amounts to 
sustainable development  
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 Appeal Ref and 
date 
Development Reason  INS  SoS  Sustainable 
Development 
67 APP/J0405/A/13/
2205858 
20/11/14 
Residential Residential 
development of 
over 150 units, 
or on sites of 
over 5 hectares 
Grant Refuse … proposal would provide 
sustainable homes that 
would have economic, 
social and environmental 
benefits …absence of a 5 
year housing land 
supply…resulting social 
benefits attract significant 
weight in favour of the 
development…the 
relevant housing policies 
in the Winslow 
Neighbourhood Plan are 
out of date… presumption 
in favour of sustainable 
development in the 
Framework means that 
the appeal should be 
allowed 
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TABLE 11 Case Summaries: Sustainable Development 
1 Name: Hunston Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
[2013] EWHC 2678   
Date: 5/9/13 
Judge: Pelling 
Development: Residential, care home and associated facilities  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Reference to paragraph 6 of the Framework, including the three dimensions, and 
stressing need to focus on all of them (12) 
 Acknowledged that the presumption was applicable in this case (27, 29) 
 Primarily concerned with application of the Framework as a whole (29) 
2 Name: Fordent Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & 
Anor [2013] EWHC 2844  
Date: 26/9/13 
Judge: Pelling 
Development: Caravan and camping site  
Consideration of Sustainable Development  
 Reference to paragraph 6 of the Framework, including the three dimensions, and 
stressing need to focus on all of them (6) 
 Some consideration of the weight to be given to economic considerations (36 - 39) 
3 Name: Wakil (t/a Orya Textiles) & Ors v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham [2013] 
EWHC 2833  
Date: 9/10/13 
Judge: High Court, Admin, Justice Lindlom 
Development: mixed use redevelopment  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Considered whether publication of the final version of the Framework should have 
resulted in reconsideration of the whole issue; 
 NPPF “the authentic expression of the present administration's planning policy for 
England” (107) 
 “Although the Government's definition of sustainable development was refined after the 
consultation on the draft NPPF, the change was of no significance”   (113) 
 Noted paragraph 49  and link between sustainable development and  housing (114)  
4 Name: William Davis Ltd & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Governments & Anor [2013] EWHC 3058  
Date:  11/10/13 
Judge: Justice Lang 
Development: residential and associated development  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
  “the Inspector and the Secretary of State directed themselves correctly by asking the 
question whether the proposed development was "sustainable development 
(37)…quintessentially a planning judgment”(38).   
 “paragraph 14 NPFF only applies to a scheme which has been found to be 
sustainable development. It would be contrary to the fundamental principles of NPFF if 
the presumption in favour of development in paragraph 14 applied equally to 
sustainable and non-sustainable development” (37)  
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5 Name: Scrivens v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2013] EWHC 
3549 
Date:  11/11/13 
Judge: Collins 
Development: ‘autarktic’ or self-sufficient dwelling  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 applicant relied on the definition in the Renewed EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy (10917/06), and on the ‘Brundtland’ definition in   Resolution 42/187 of the 
United Nations General Assembly  
 “in deciding any individual application for planning permission, regard must be had to 
the objective of achieving sustainable development and, if the existing plans do not 
meet the requirements of s.39, they will not prevail if in such a case the need to 
achieve sustainable development would be frustrated” (7) 
 “the concept is very wide and is not necessarily limited to particular concerns about 
energy” (10).   
 “What is sustainable in any particular circumstance will depend on a number of 
material factors” (15).   
 stressed the need to consider present economic needs and the effect of ‘unsightly’ 
developments on future generations (16)   
 stressed the need for a ‘judgment’ to be applied within the context of the NPPF 
enabling the Inspector to have regard to issues other than those identified (17) 
 “energy considerations do not constitute a trump card”(19) 
6 Name: Cotswold District Council v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government 
& Anor [2013] EWHC 3719  
Date: 27/11/13 
Judge: Lewis 
Development: outline planning permission for residential development  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
“The material considerations relevant to any planning application include the Framework… 
Paragraph 6 explains that the purpose of the planning system is to contribute to sustainable 
development and the policies set out in paragraphs 18 to 219 of the Framework constitute the 
Government's view of what sustainable development in England means in practice for the 
planning system. Paragraph 7 explains that there are three dimensions to sustainable 
development: economic, social and environmental. The social dimension includes "supporting 
strong, vibrant healthy communities by providing the supply of housing required to meet the 
needs of present and future generations" (9) 
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7 Name: Corbett, R (On the Application Of) v Cornwall Council [2013] EWHC 3958 (Admin) 
Date:12/12/13 
Judge: Lewis 
Development: five wind turbine generators at Higher Denzell Farm, St Mawgan Cornwall. 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Considered whether  the application should have been formally reconsidered following 
adoption of the Framework because of differences between the draft and final 
document 
 “the critical issue is whether or not there is a material change between the earlier 
relevant policies and the later policies” (27),  
 in relation to renewable energy there was not (29, 32, 33, 39) 
 sustainable development had “three broad roles or components, an economic role to 
contribute to building a strong economy, a social role to support strong, vibrant and 
healthy communities and an environmental role”(30) 
8 Name: St Albans v Hunston Properties Ltd, R (On the Application Of) & Anor [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1610 
Date: 12/12/13  
Judges: Lord Justice Kay, Lord Justice Ryder, Lord Justice Keene 
Development: 116 dwellings, a care home and facilities  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 “I have not found arriving at "a definitive answer" to the interpretative problem an easy task, 
because of ambiguity in the drafting… it would seem sensible for the Secretary of State to 
review and to clarify what his policy is intended to mean.”(4) 
9 Name: Hampton Bishop Parish Council, R (On the Application Of) v Herefordshire Council 
[2013] EWHC 3947  
Date: 16/12/13 
Judge: Hickinbottom 
Development: Relocation of rugby club. 
Consideration of sustainable development 
 Reference to presumption in paragraph 14 and the three dimensions (61) 
 Likens concept of sustainable development to role of  development plan, seeking to 
“reconcile policies reflecting numerous conflicting interests, including the need for 
more housing, the need for more sports and recreational facilities, and the need to 
protect certain environmental and other assets" (121) 
 Refers to a presumption in favour of granting permission where there is insufficient 
land for housing (125) 
10 Name: North Norfolk District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government & Anor [2014] EWHC 279  
Date: 14/2/14 
Judge: Justice Purchas 
Development: Wind Turbine 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
policy should be construed as providing for support and consideration in the context of 
sustainable development and climate change, taking account of the wide environmental, 
social and economic benefits of renewable energy gain and their contribution to overcoming 
energy supply problems as a general policy to be applied when renewable energy proposals 
are put forward (40) 
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11 Name: Barrow Upon Soar Parish Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local 
Government & Ors [2014] EWHC 274  
Date: 19/2/14 
Judge: Collins 
Development: outline residential planning permission  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Paragraph 14 of the NPPF applied (5)  
 in this context it required “consideration of the policies contained in Paragraphs 18 to 
219 taken as a whole.” (6)  
 particular reliance was placed on paragraph 173 (9) 
  “Even if the meaning of deliverable in the footnote to Paragraph 47 can be generally 
imported into Paragraph 173, there is no requirement that in order to be regarded as 
sustainable the development must be completed within 5 years.” (10) 
 “Since the NPPF was in the circumstances a highly material consideration, the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development clearly pointed in favour of the grant 
of permission. On the inspector's findings, this was sustainable development. That 
conclusion was, as I have said, a proper one” (22) 
12 Name: Trafford Borough Council v (Secretary of State for Communities And Local 
Government & Anor [2014] EWHC 424 
Date: 24/2/14 
Judge: Stewart 
Development: 20 mega-watt biomass fuelled renewable energy plant  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Appendix III headed “Whether the Proposal Would Be Sustainable Development?” 
and considered evidence on the supply of waste wood and the assertions of 
sustainability.   
 Noted that “the supply situation is unlikely to be as clear cut” (621) but also that it 
could not be concluded that capacity exceeded supply (624, 627).  The new evidence 
was material but not definitive (626).  Greater weight would be given to the policy 
support for the position (627, 630) 
 On this basis “the proposal constitutes a sustainable form of development.” (631) 
13 Name: Langton Homes Limited v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government 
& Anor [2014] EWHC 487  
Date:27/2/2014 
Judge: Foskett 
Development: demolition of public house and construction of 7 dwellings 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
The interrelationship of policies depended on the local planning context. The inspector’s 
approach was “articulated intelligibly…cannot further be criticised as an exercise in planning 
judgment.” (61) 
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14 Name: Plant, R (On the Application Of) v Pembrokeshire County Council & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 1040  
Date: 4/3/14 
Judge: Hickinbottom 
Development: 2 wind turbines 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Considered assertion that any policy that contravened an environmental aspiration 
could not be sustainable (31) 
 recognised competing environmental credentials of renewable power sources and 
impact on landscape (31) and that SP1 was ‘concerned with "sustainable 
development"’ (32) 
 development could not become unsustainable because of isolated negative impacts; 
instead “whether a development is sustainable requires an assessment of whether 
overall the development achieves a positive economic, social and environmental 
impact; i.e. whether, on the basis of all the material factors, the proposed development 
is appropriate and acceptable in planning terms” (32) 
15 Name: Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government & Anor [2014] EWHC 754 
Date: 19/3/14 
Judge: Lindblom 
Development: 91 houses  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 ruled on the meaning of the words ‘absent’, ‘silent’ and ‘out of date’ in paragraph 14 
(44, 45) and stated that this was a matter of ‘objective interpretation” (52).   
 it was for the decision maker to decide how the policy should be applied (46, 57) 
 plan was not absent or silent so the presumption did not apply (58, 61).  
 Inspector’s report was “an exercise of planning judgment shaped by the relevant 
provisions of the development plan”(61) and was not defective (63) 
 “I do not think he had to spell out that in this very obvious sense the development 
would be unsustainable.”   (179) 
16 Name: Brown v Carlisle City Council [2014] EWHC 707 
Date: 21/3/14 
Judge: Collins 
Development: freight distribution centre 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 considered assertion that failure to comply with a planning policy meant that 
development was not to be regarded as sustainable.”(55) 
 The NPPF did not prevent the grant of a planning permission with “planning 
advantages” even where the policy context was unfavourable.  Development could be 
regarded as sustainable where “the advantages in planning terms outweigh the 
disadvantages”  
 “the word sustainable in the NPPF is not defined; the reader has to work through 
some 200 paragraphs which indicate what particular matters can be taken into 
account”.  
 It was for the decision maker to balance the merits and “nothing in the NPPF detracts 
from, or varies that.” (56) 
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17 Name: Earl Shilton Action Group, R (on the application of) v Hinckley and Bosworth Borough 
Council & Ors [2014] EWHC 1764 
Date: 7/4/14 
Judge: Hickinbottom 
Development: caravan site 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
"Sustainable development" is not specifically defined in the NPPF, but is usually defined 
terms of development which meets the needs of the present without the compromising ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs. It is said in paragraph 6 of the NPPF that the 
policies set out in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a whole, constitute the Government's view 
of what sustainable development means in practice for the planning system. "Sustainability" 
therefore inherently requires a balance to be made of the factors that favour the proposed 
development and those that favour refusing it, in accordance with the relevant and national 
local policies.” (14) 
18 Name: Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Hopkins Developments 
Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 470  
Date: 15/4/14 
Judges: Lord Justice Jackson, Beatson, Clarke 
Development: outline planning permission for 58 dwellings  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Jackson ruled that the question of sustainability was  a live issue (68) and there was 
no procedural unfairness in it being a reason for refusal (69) 
 Beatson agreed and referred to “the issue of the sustainability of the development in 
the sense that term is used in the Framework  - “the NPPF regards sustainable 
development as "a golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-
taking" and states (paragraph 14) that "a presumption in favour of sustainable 
development lies at its heart" ‘(88)  
 sustainability was acknowledged as ‘problematic’ (90) 
19 Name: Lark Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor 
[2014] EWHC 2006  
Date: 20/6/14 
Judge: Lindblom 
Development: Solar farm 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 considered assertion that the Secretary of State did not take enough account of 
policies on renewable development (3) 
 The plan was not absent, silent or out of date so the Secretary of State did not have to 
refer to the presumption (62).   
20 Name: FCC Environment v (1) Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government (2) 
East Riding of Yorkshire Council [2014] EWHC 2035   
Date: 23/6/14 
Judge: Stewart     Development: Wind Turbine 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 considered how proposal failed to represent sustainable development (35), how 
moderate harm to landscape could make development unsustainable (36) 
 overall conclusion that the turbines were unsustainable was ‘justifiable’ in this context 
(39) 
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21 Name: Wynn-Williams, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government [2014] EWHC 3374  
Date: 03/7/14 
Judge: Elvin 
Development: change of use to a tennis court 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Considered assertion that inspector applied Development Plan in preference to the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development  
 the effect of Paragraph 14 was simply to “set out consequences under "decision-
making" which depend on the application of judgment by the decision-maker” (30).  
 The age of a policy did not make it inconsistent with the Framework (34) 
 Paragraph 14 of the Framework had the same ‘starting point’ as “section 38(6), 
namely whether the development proposals accord with the Development Plan” (30)  
 presumption could not be applied until that exercise had been gone through (36)  
 “paragraph 6 makes quite clear that what sustainable development means in terms of 
the NPPF is that which is set out in the substance of paragraphs 18 to 219.” (37)   
 “providing the decision maker has properly understood the issues, has not 
misunderstood the meaning of policy and has taken account of all material 
considerations, then there is no prescription the court should apply to the process 
undertaken by the decision-maker” (39) 
22 Name: Redhill Aerodrome Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & 
Ors [2014] 
Date: 18/7/14 
Judge: Patterson 
Development: Replacement runway 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 ”the policies must be construed in context and, in relation to the NPPF, that is a 
consideration of the document as a whole. Construed as a whole it is clear that the 
NPPF is seeking to simplify the previous plethora of planning policy; to make the 
planning system more accessible and encourage sustainable patterns of growth.” (46).  
 what mattered was determining decisions “in a NPPF policy context” (60) 
23 Name: Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors v Redhill Aerodrome 
Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1386 
Date: 24/10/14 
Judges: Lord Justice Sullivan, Lord Justice Tomlinson, Lord Justice Lewison 
Development: Replacement runway 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
  “The Framework now places a presumption in favour of sustainable development at 
the heart of national planning policy” 
 There was a presumption in favour of grant “where relevant policies in the 
development plan are out of date”  
 This did not apply where Framework policies indicated that development should be 
restricted…“far from there being any indication that placing the presumption in favour 
of sustainable development at the heart of the Framework is intended to effect a 
change in Green Belt policy, there is a clear statement to the contrary.” (34) 
24 Name: Cheshire East Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & 
Ors [2014] EWHC 3536  
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Date: 28/10/14 
Judge: Lewis 
Development: 94 Houses 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 considered whether the inspector erred in excluding housing development from 
assessment of whether the proposed development represented sustainable 
development (28) 
 The inspector was aware of the difference between housing development and 
economic development. Sustainable development “has three aspects which need to 
be considered, economic, social and environmental” and the inspector rightly 
considered the contribution of housing “to the economic dimension of sustainability” 
(41) 
25 Name Morris, R (on the application of) v Wealden District Council [2014] EWHC 4081 
(Admin) 
Date: 4/11/14 
Judge: Collins 
Development floodlights on a tennis court 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Sustainable development is defined as that which provides for the needs of the future, 
including improvement as to quality of life in a way that minimises damage to local as 
well as local environment… it stems from, I think, a UN indication relating to climate 
change and a strategy which should be adopted in all countries. (12) 
 according to the NPPF, what is sustainable development is to be gleaned from 
reading 200 paragraphs in the NPPF itself. However, as I have already indicated, I do 
not find that submission acceptable (26).  
26 Name: Crane v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2015] 
EWHC 425 (Admin) 
Date: 23/2/15 
Judge: Lindblom 
Development: 111 dwellings, a sports hall, a neighbourhood centre, sports pitches,  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Secretary of State was entitled to decide that the presumption was outweighed 
because of its adverse impacts (65) 
  Paragraph 14 did not prescribe the weight to be given to out of date policies (71)  
 “the decision-maker is required, when applying the presumption in favour of 
"sustainable development", to consider every relevant policy in the NPPF.”(73) 
 l the decision “ was not a conclusion beyond the range of reasonable planning 
judgment allowed to a decision-maker when undertaking the balancing exercise 
required by government policy in paragraph 14 of the NPPF.” (78) 
 it was reasonably open to the Secretary of State to conclude that the "adverse 
impacts" of the appeal proposal, and especially its conflict with the Broughton Astley 
Neighbourhood Plan, would "significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits in 
terms of increasing housing supply". This was, in my view, a wholly unimpeachable 
planning judgment (79) 
27 Name: Cheshire East Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government & Anor [2015] EWHC 410  
Date: 25/2/15 
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Judge: Lang 
Development: outline planning permission for up to 146 dwellings  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 “the presumption in paragraph 14 of the NPPF only applies in favour of "sustainable" 
development. (17).   
 “In deciding whether or not a development is "sustainable", an Inspector has to 
consider both the description of sustainable development in paragraphs 6 to 10 of the 
NPPF, and the guidance on the way in which sustainable development may be 
achieved, set out in paragraphs 11 to 149 of the NPPF” (19) 
 logical for the Inspector in this appeal to decide what weight he should attach to the 
development plan, and to determine the issue of housing supply, before he considered 
the issue of sustainability(20) 
 the question whether or not the development is sustainable is a planning judgment for 
the Inspector to make on the evidence  (24) 
28 Name: Phides Estates (Overseas) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government & Ors [2015] EWHC 827  
Date: 26/3/15 
Judge: Lindblom 
Development:  development of housing on land at the former Lympne Airfield in Kent 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 considered assertion that when presumption was engaged "the decision-maker must 
consider not only whether the plan's policies for the supply of housing are out of date, 
but also, specifically, which policies are out of date (62) 
 In the absence of a five year housing supply the presumption was engaged (67) and 
properly applied (68, 69, 71).  
 Inspector was entitled to make the judgments she did (72, 73) and there was nothing 
wrong with the way the policy presumption was applied “ (74) 
 Conclusion reached by deciding that the "substantial benefits" of the proposal were 
"significantly and demonstrably outweighed by the adverse impacts, when assessed 
against the policies in [the NPPF] as a whole" – “unmistakably in the language of 
paragraph 14 of the NPPF.” (74) 
29 Name: BDW Trading Ltd (t/as David Wilson Homes (Central, Mercia and West Midlands)) v 
The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2015] EWHC 886 
(Admin) 
Date: 1/4/15 
Judge: Hickinbottom 
Development: 114 dwellings  
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 “rather than there being a presumption for development because there was no up to 
date plan, where the presumption lay depended upon whether the development was 
or was not in accordance with the new Stafford Plan” 
 There was therefore no substance to the second ground of the challenge –that the 
presumption was misapplied. 
30 Name: Wenman v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor 
[2015] EWHC 925  
Date: 21/4/15 
Judge: Lang 
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Development: use of land for stationing a caravan 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 in order for the paragraph 14 assessment to be made properly, the decision maker 
had to carry out which housing policies were considered out of date, which were given 
weight and why (70) 
 “the Inspector was entitled to make a free-standing assessment of the sustainability of 
the proposed development, in the exercise of his planning judgment, at an appropriate 
stage in his reasoning process” (79) 
31 Name: Woodcock Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government 
& Anor [2015] EWHC 1173 (Admin) 
Date: 1/5/15 
Judge: Holgate 
Development: outline planning permission for 120 dwellings, community facility/office space, 
care home and retail units 
Consideration of Sustainable Development 
 Presumption described as “simply a broad statement of general application” (103)  
 “it does no violence to the language of paragraph 14 to treat the presumption in favour 
of sustainable development as weighing against housing supply policies” (104) 
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TABLE 12 Case Summaries: Meaning and Interpretation 
 Case details Comments on meaning and interpretation 
1 RWE Npower 
Renewables 
Ltd, R (on the 
application of) 
v Ecotricity  
Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 751  
it is now well established that planning policy statements, for example, in a 
development plan, have to be interpreted objectively in accordance with 
the language used read in its proper context. That task of interpretation 
(as distinct from any judgement involved in the application of any such 
policy) is a matter for the court itself: see Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee 
City Council [2012] UKSC 13, [2012] PTSR 983 see eg per Lord Reed at 
[18]-[19].  
2 Hunston 
Properties Ltd 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government 
[2013] EWHC 
2678  
…proper construction of the NPPF requires the document to be read as a 
whole…it is necessary to take account of all the words used, that means 
that it is necessary to take account of the opening words of the paragraph 
– "To boost significantly the supply of housing... the suggestion that the 
words "… in so far as is consistent with the policies set out in this 
Framework …" requires or permits a decision maker to adopt an old RSS 
figure is unsustainable as a matter of language.  
3 Fordent 
Holdings Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2013] 
EWHC 2844  
…The singular "it" does not lie easily with that word being intended to 
refer either to the plural "new buildings" in the opening sentence of 
Paragraph 89 or "appropriate facilities" in the opening line of the second 
bullet point…  
… in my judgment in the context in which it is used, the word "it" in 
Paragraph 89 refers to and can only be referring to the "facilities" 
contemplated by the proposal being considered by the decision maker...  
the use of the singular as referring to something that is or might be plural 
does not justify departing from what otherwise is clear from the context.  
4  William Davis 
Ltd & Anor v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Governments 
& Anor [2013] 
EWHC 3058  
..I should apply the approach taken to the interpretation of development 
plans by the Supreme Court in Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City 
Council [2012] UKSC 13.  
 
5 Cotswold 
District Council 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2013] 
EWHC 3719  
 
It is now well established that the Secretary of State would be required to 
proceed upon a proper interpretation of the relevant planning policies and, 
for present purposes, the Framework. As the Supreme Court held at 
paragraph 18 in Tesco Stores Ltd. v Dundee Council (Asda Stores Ltd. 
and another intervening) [2012] UKSC 13 in relation to development 
plans: "….. policy statements should be interpreted objectively in 
accordance with the language used, read as always in its proper context". 
In the present case, there is a need to interpret paragraph 47 of the 
Framework correctly. That will involve determining, the correct approach 
to identifying a record of persistent under delivery of housing. That will 
involve, for example, consideration of the meaning of "persistent".  
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6  Corbett, R 
(On the 
Application Of) 
v Cornwall 
Council [2013] 
EWHC 3958  
 
In my judgment, information is "any other information" within the meaning 
of Regulations 2(1) and 19 of the EIA Regulations if it is substantive 
information provided by the applicant to ensure that the Council is 
provided with the information required for inclusion in an environmental 
statement as required by Schedule 4 to the EIA Regulations… 
Conversely, the phrase "any other information" in Regulations 2 and 19 
does not include comments or responses made by the applicant in 
response to the concerns of, or points raised by, third parties or Council 
officers.  
… the phrase "any another information" must be read in context and in the 
light of the EIA Regulations as a whole….In context, therefore, "further 
information" and "any other information" is intended to be the information 
needed to ensure that the requirements for an environmental statement 
are met.  
…. The definition of any other information in regulation 2 is to be read 
accordingly and means any other substantive information provided by the 
applicant for planning permission to ensure that the information required 
for an environmental statement by Schedule 4 to the EIA Regulations is 
provided.  
…the Claimant's interpretation could lead to such odd or absurd 
consequences … In my judgment, the regulations were not intended to 
produce such results.   
7 North Norfolk 
District Council 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWHC 279  
The construction of the development plan policy is a matter of law for the 
court. In my judgment it is clear that the policy should be construed as 
providing for support and consideration in the context of sustainable 
development and climate change, taking account of the wide 
environmental, social and economic benefits of renewable energy gain 
and their contribution to overcoming energy supply problems as a general 
policy to be applied when renewable energy proposals are put forward.  
 
8 Trafford 
Borough 
Council v 
(Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWHC 424  
 
…A planning authority must proceed upon a proper understanding of the 
Development Plan…Policy statements should be interpreted objectively in 
accordance with the language read in its proper context and according to 
what is actually written… 
Policy statements should not be construed as if they were statutory or 
contractual provisions…Many of the provisions of development plans are 
framed in language whose application to a given set of facts requires the 
exercise of judgment…. 
Matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local 
planning authority or the Secretary of State. …  
interpretation of policy is a matter for the court, but the application of 
policy to a given set of facts is a matter for the decision maker, unless 
irrational or perverse.  
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9 Langton 
Homes Limited 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWHC 487  
Mr Jones seeks to characterise that as a "thoroughly bad point" because 
the Inspector only identified the revocation of the EMRP as the matter that 
generated the need for further comments by the parties …I do not 
consider that Mr Jones' argument on that issue is a good one – it is 
derived from too narrow a textual analysis of the relevant paragraph in the 
Inspector's decision letter.. I am, therefore, entirely satisfied that the 
Inspector was aware of the Scoping Consultation document and the 
arguments concerning its implications advanced by the Claimant which, in 
her view, she felt she had dealt with adequately in that sentence.  
10 Bloor Homes 
East Midlands 
Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWHC 754  
…seven familiar principles:  
 Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals 
against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in 
a reasonably flexible way. … Seddon Properties v Secretary of 
State for the Environment (1981) 42 P. & C.R. 26, at p.28).  
 reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, 
… inspector's reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt 
as to whether he went wrong in law, South Bucks District Council 
and another v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1953, at p.1964B-
G). 
 weight to be attached to any material consideration and all 
matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the decision-maker.  
 (Planning policies are not statutory or contractual provisions and 
should not be construed as if they were. The proper interpretation 
of planning policy is ultimately a matter of law for the court. The 
application of relevant policy is for the decision-maker. But 
statements of policy are to be interpreted objectively by the court 
in accordance with the language used and in its proper context. 
Tesco Stores v Dundee City Council [2012] P.T.S.R. 983, at 
paragraphs 17 to 22). 
 When it is suggested that an inspector has failed to grasp a 
relevant policy one must look at what he thought the important 
planning issues were and decide whether it appears from the way 
he dealt with them that he must have misunderstood the policy in 
question (South Somerset District Council v The Secretary of 
State for the Environment (1993) 66 P. & C.R. 80, at p.83E-H). 
 the fact that a particular policy is not mentioned in the decision 
letter does not necessarily mean that it has been ignored (Sea 
Land Power & Energy Limited v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 1419).  
  Consistency in decision-making is important …But it is not a 
principle of law that like cases must always be decided alike.  
11 Earl Shilton 
Action Group, 
R (on the 
application of) 
v Hinckley and 
Bosworth 
Borough 
Council [2014] 
EWHC 1764  
Here, in what I accept is a grammatically clumsy passage, the officer's 
report is simply saying that this strand of national policy should not be a 
reason for refusing the application…As I have indicated, an officer's report 
is not to be construed like a statute. There is a tenet of statutory 
construction that all words must have been intended to have conveyed 
something; but there no such tenet with regard to an officer's report. For 
the reasons that I have given, I consider that the words at the end of the 
quoted passage simply to have been there in error; and it would have 
been obvious to the Committee members that that was the case. 
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12 Cherkley 
Campaign Ltd, 
R (on the 
application of) 
v Mole Valley 
District Council 
& Anor [2014] 
EWCA Civ 567  
At paras 89-106 of his judgment the judge engaged in an elaborate 
examination of the meaning of "need" in paragraph 12.71 of the Local 
Plan, looking at dictionary definitions and at the general and specific 
context, and identifying both a geographical and a qualitative component. 
…He concluded:  "103. In my judgment, the word 'need' in paragraph 
12.71 means 'required' in the interests of the public and the community as 
a whole, i.e. 'necessary' in the public interest sense. 'Need' does not 
simply mean 'demand' or 'desire' by private interests. Nor is mere proof of 
'viability' of such demand enough. The fact that Longshot could sell 
membership debentures to 400 millionaires in UK and abroad who might 
want to play golf at their own exclusive, 'world class', luxury golf club in 
Surrey does not equate to a 'need' for such facilities in the proper public 
interest sense." 
It is common ground that in relation to the construction and application of 
planning policy statements the court should be guided by the principles 
summarised by Lord Reed in Tesco Stores v Dundee City Council [2012] 
UKSC 13, at paras 18-21.  
The text…is not itself a policy or part of a policy, it does not have the force 
of policy and it cannot trump the policy 
the exercise engaged in by the judge in the present case was one of 
interpretation, not application, … It seems to me, however, that in holding 
that it required applicants to demonstrate that further golf facilities were 
"'necessary' in this part of Surrey in the interests of the public and the 
community as a whole" he adopted an unduly exacting and narrow 
interpretation of that statement.  
The word "need" has a protean or chameleon-like character, as Mr 
Findlay and Mr Katkowski respectively submitted, and is capable of 
encompassing necessity at one end of the spectrum and demand or 
desire at the other. The particular meaning to be attached to it in 
paragraph 12.71 depends on context. … Overall I take the view that if any 
need requirement is to be read into the policy by reference to paragraph 
12.71, "need" is to be understood in a broad sense  
In making his finding as to meaning the judge placed emphasis on the 
general context...his reasoning appears to have been that because 
planning control is exercised in the public interest, "need" must relate to 
the interests of the public and/or the community as a whole. I respectfully 
disagree with that reasoning.  
13 Lark Energy 
Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWHC 2006  
Mr Newcombe pointed to the final sentence of paragraph 30, which begins 
with the words "Given this". Those two words, he submitted, can only 
sensibly be read as referring to the Secretary of State's comparison 
between the two schemes, rather than to the merits of the appeal scheme 
itself. I disagree. The words must be read sensibly in their context, ".  
"Given this" could mean "Because of this" or "As a result of this"….There 
is, however, another way to read the expression "Given this". It could 
simply mean "In the light of this", or "Having regard to this", or "Taking this 
into account".  
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14   Redhill 
Aerodrome Ltd 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors [2014] 
EWHC 2476 
 
In this case the starting point is what the relevant extant NPPF policies 
mean…the policies must be construed in context and, in relation to the 
NPPF, that is a consideration of the document as a whole.  
It is for the decision maker to determine whether the individual impact 
attains the threshold that warrants refusal as set out in the NPPF. That is 
a matter of planning judgement and will clearly vary on a case by case 
basis.  
Where an individual material consideration is harmful but the degree of 
harm has not reached the level prescribed in the NPPF as to warrant 
refusal, in my judgment, it would be wrong to include that consideration as 
"any other harm".  
the NPPF… has no words that permit of a residual cumulative approach in 
the Green Belt …does contemplate findings of residual cumulative harm in 
certain circumstances…. Such phraseology does not appear in the Green 
Belt part of the NPPF.  
Once a development has been found to be inappropriate in the Green Belt 
it is by definition harmful. To that harm has to be added additional harm to 
the Green Belt. In the context of the NPPF that is what "any other harm" 
means.  
15 Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors v Redhill 
Aerodrome Ltd 
[2014] EWCA 
Civ 1386 
 
Do the words "any other harm" in the second sentence of paragraph 88 of 
the Framework mean "any other harm to the Green Belt" as submitted by 
the Respondent, and found by the Judge, or do they include any other 
harm that is relevant for planning purposes, such as harm to landscape 
character, adverse visual impact, noise disturbance or adverse traffic 
impact, as submitted by the Appellants?  
…If it had been the Government's intention to make such a significant 
change to Green Belt policy in the Framework one would have expected 
that there would have been a clear statement to that effect.  
It is true that the "policy matrix" (see paragraph 54 of the judgment) has 
changed ..I do not accept…that the other policies "wrapping around" the 
Green Belt policy in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the Framework are "very 
different" from previous national policy (see paragraph 24 of the 
judgment), or that, as the Judge put it, there has been "a considerable 
policy shift"…The Inspector's approach to "any other harm" was correct.  
16  Ashburton 
Trading Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2014] 
EWCA Civ 378  
 
 
The starting point is the correct interpretation of CS9(E). That is a 
question of law for the court: see Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City 
Council [2012] PTSR 983 at paras 17 to 21 per Lord Reed.  
 
In some cases, the words in a policy may "speak for themselves"... But in 
my view, this is not such a case. I do not consider that there is room for 
the exercise of planning judgment in determining the meaning of CS9(E).  
 
The meaning of "generally" in CS9(E) is a hard-edged question of 
construction for the court to determine... even if "generally" is surplusage, 
that is insufficient of itself to point to one interpretation rather than another.  
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17 Cheshire East 
Borough 
Council v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2015] 
EWHC 410  
It is not suggested, nor could it be, that the Secretary of State neglected or 
misunderstood the imperative in paragraph 47 of the NPPF "to boost 
significantly the supply of housing"  
In this case the Secretary of State did what paragraph 14 of the NPPF 
required him to do.   This does not, in my view, show any 
misunderstanding of policy in the NPPF, nor a misapplication of it. On the 
contrary, the Secretary of State carried out the balance between "any 
adverse impacts" and "benefits", as paragraph 14 of the NPPF requires. 
The reasons he gave for his conclusions are, again, both intelligible and 
adequate. They are not in themselves legally deficient. And they betray no 
error of law…one comes back to the most elementary principle of planning 
law…that the weight to be given to material considerations, including 
statements of government policy, is a matter for the decision-maker to 
judge,  
18  Phides 
Estates 
(Overseas) Ltd 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors [2015] 
EWHC 827  
 
The approach the court must take to the interpretation of planning policy 
was explained by Lord Reed in his judgment in Tesco Stores Ltd. v 
Dundee City Council [2012]  
In my view the meaning of the policy is absolutely clear. There are two 
distinct concepts in it: the "requirement" and the "target". The policy is 
entirely consistent in differentiating between those two concepts. The 
distinction is not hard to understand. It is the difference between a need 
and an aspiration. A "requirement" in this context is something which is 
needed, which must be provided. A "target" is more ambitious; it is a goal 
that is set, which may or may not be attained. The "requirement" is the 
requisite minimum, which must be met whether or not the "target" is 
achieved. This is a normal use of those words, which gives them a natural 
meaning.  
In my view, to enlarge the task of construing a policy by requiring a 
multitude of other documents to be explored in the pursuit of its meaning 
would be inimical to the interests of clarity, certainty and consistency in 
the "plan-led system” 
19 Woodcock 
Holdings Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2015] 
EWHC 1173 
The NPPF should not be construed as if it were a statute or a contract, 
any more than a development plan, and regard should be had to both the 
context and object of the policy being interpreted (Tesco Stores v Dundee 
City Council [2012] PTSR 983 paragraphs 19, 21 and 25 - 27)...Thus, it 
may be relevant, and sometimes necessary, to adopt a purposive 
construction of the policy in question.  
"relevant policies for the supply of housing", is not limited to relevant 
policies in the statutory development plan…the second key phrase, 
"should not be considered up-to-date", operates as a deeming provision 
which treats the relevant policies as being out of date so as to engage "the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development".  
 
 
20  Suffolk 
Coastal 
the meaning of the policy in paragraph 49 of the NPPF has already been 
considered several times at first instance, with various results. ...  
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District Council 
v Hopkins 
Homes Ltd & 
Anor [2016] 
EWCA Civ 168   
 
 
…two or three distinctly different possible interpretations of the policy.... 
the "narrow" interpretation…the "wider" or "comprehensive" 
interpretation…the so-called "intermediate" or "compromise" 
interpretation. 
 
 The approach the court will take when interpreting planning policy is well 
settled. As Lord Reed said in Tesco v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 
13 …  
 
policy statements should be interpreted objectively in accordance with the 
language used, read as always in its proper context". 
 
… The adjectives "up-to-date" and "out-of-date" do not always have an 
exactly opposite meaning in ordinary English usage. But in the way they 
are used in the NPPF we think they do. 
 
The contentious words are "[relevant] policies for the supply of housing". 
In our view the meaning of those words, construed objectively in their 
proper context, is "relevant policies affecting the supply of housing". 
 
 The meaning of the phrase "for the supply" is also, we think, quite clear. 
The word "for" is one of the more versatile prepositions in the English 
language. It has a large number of common meanings. These include, 
according to the Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd edition (revised), 
"affecting, with regard to, or in respect of".  
 
A "supply" is simply a "stock or amount of something supplied or available 
for use" ….  
 
Interpreting the policy in this way does not strain the natural and ordinary 
meaning of the words its draftsman has used. It does no violence at all to 
the language. On the contrary, it is to construe the policy exactly as it is 
written.  
21  Horada & Ors 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors [2016] 
EWCA Civ 169  
… the citizen affected by a decision is entitled to an explanation of the 
reasons in plain English which the citizen can understand. 
 
Experts must therefore guard against speaking in terms which can only be 
understood through the intermediary of a lawyer or other professional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Lee Valley 
Regional Park 
Authority, R 
(on the 
The interpretation of planning policy is ultimately the task of the court, not 
the decision-maker. …(see the judgment of Lord Reed in Tesco Stores 
Ltd. v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13,  
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application of) 
v Epping 
Forest District 
Council & Anor 
(Rev 1) [2016] 
EWCA Civ 404  
 
The first sentence of paragraph 88 of the NPPF must not be read in 
isolation from the policies that sit alongside it. "  
 
 This understanding of the policy in the first sentence of paragraph 88 
does not require one to read into it any additional words. It simply requires 
the policy to be construed objectively in its full context  
 
Implicit in the policy in paragraph 89 of the NPPF is a recognition that 
agriculture and forestry can only be carried on, and buildings for those 
activities will have to be constructed, in the countryside, including 
countryside in the Green Belt…This is not a matter of planning judgment. 
It is simply a matter of policy.  
 
 If the Government had meant to abandon that distinction between 
"inappropriate" and appropriate development, one would have expected 
so significant a change in national policy for the Green Belt to have been 
announced. But I also think that the argument Mr Jones founded on his 
distinction between "definitional harm" and "actual harm" fails on its own 
logic.  
 
The true position surely is this. Development that is not, in principle, 
"inappropriate" in the Green Belt is, as Dove J. said in paragraph 62 of his 
judgment, development "appropriate to the Green Belt". On a sensible 
contextual reading of the policies in paragraphs 79 to 92 of the NPPF, 
development appropriate in – and to – the Green Belt is regarded by the 
Government as not inimical to the "fundamental aim" of Green Belt policy  
23  West 
Berkshire 
District Council 
Reading 
Borough 
Council v 
Department for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government 
[2015] EWHC 
2222  
In Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] PTSR 983 the Supreme 
Court held (paragraphs 19-20) that it is the function of the courts to 
interpret planning policy, but the exercise of judgment in the application of 
a policy is a matter for the decision-maker, the planning authority.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24  Turner v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
The question of the true interpretation of the NPPF is a matter for the 
court. In my judgment, the approach the Inspector adopted was correct 
and the judge was right so to hold.  
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Anor [2016] 
EWCA Civ 466  
The word "openness" is open-textured and a number of factors are 
capable of being relevant when it comes to applying it to the particular 
facts of a specific case.  
 
The question of visual impact is implicitly part of the concept of "openness 
of the Green Belt" as a matter of the natural meaning of the language 
used in para. 89 of the NPPF. 
25 Loader, R (on 
the application 
of) v Rother 
District Council 
& Ors [2015] 
EWHC 1877  
Within the glossary, 'open space' is defined as including "All open space 
of public value… the assessment is not to be limited just to areas of land 
which are for active recreational use. That is not what a true reading of the 
paragraph says nor, indeed, is it consistent with healthy communities as 
contained within section 8 of the NPPF.  
 
The claimant contends that the policy and guidance give a broad 
interpretation of open space. I agree. A proper reading of the policy 
documents makes that clear.  
26 Milwood Land 
(Stafford) Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2015] 
EWHC 1836   
"intention" might refer to the subjective intention of the author of a 
policy…the Inspector spoke of the intention of the words used...he used 
the term to mean the objective, or overall broad approach, or thrust, of the 
words used as derived from the words themselves seen in the context of 
the PSB as a whole.  
 
Development plans are full of broad statements of policy which have to be 
read flexibly and in their proper context (see Tesco v Dundee, especially 
at [18]-[21] and [34]-[35]).  
27 Menston 
Action Group, 
R (on the 
application of) 
v City of 
Bradford 
Metropolitan 
District Council 
& Anor [2015] 
EWHC 2292   
As a matter of the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used within 
the condition I reject the claimant's submission.  
28 Old 
Hunstanton 
Parish Council 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors [2015] 
EWHC 1958 
I agree with Counsel for the Claimant that this evidence, as presented, 
does not demonstrate housing need; these are merely expressions of 
interest, which on closer investigation may, or may not, amount to "need", 
and which may, or may not, qualify as "local". 
 
“I consider that the natural meaning of the term, in this context, is not 
necessarily limited to the needs of the settlement in which the 
development is situated. It could also extend to the needs of other small 
rural settlements and communities nearby, if in the judgment of the 
decision-maker, they are "local".    
 
 
29 Pertemps 
Investments 
Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
The proper interpretation of planning policy, whether in the development 
plan or in the NPPF or in some other policy document published by the 
Government, is ultimately a matter of law for the court (see the judgment 
of Lord Reed in Tesco v Dundee City Council, at paragraphs 19 to 22).  
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Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2015] 
EWHC 2308   
The application of planning policy is a matter for the decision-maker, 
within the constraints of the statutory scheme, and subject to review by 
the court.  
 
I turn to Policy P17. … its meaning is not hard to discern when its 
provisions are considered in their proper context…Policy P17 is 
deliberately aligned with national policy in the NPPF. Policy P17 could not 
be consistent with the NPPF if it expanded the "closed lists" in paragraphs 
89 and 90... Policy P17 does no such thing. 
 
The error the inspector made is apparent in the penultimate sentence of 
paragraph 6 of his letter. In that sentence he said he saw "some tension" 
between Policy P17 and the NPPF. There is, I believe, no such tension. 
…By reading that distinction into the disputed provision the inspector gave 
it a false meaning: … the inspector misconstrued Policy P17. That was an 
error of law 
30 Nicholson, R 
(on the 
application of) 
v Allerdale 
Borough 
Council & Ors 
[2015] EWHC 
2510  
 
In Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] PTSR 983 the Supreme 
Court held that the correct interpretation of planning policy is a question of 
law to be determined by the Courts (paragraph 18). . The exercise of 
judgment by a planning authority when applying a policy is legally distinct 
from the construction of that policy. 
 
For a number of reasons I do not accept that the purpose of REM10, 
properly construed, is simply to determine whether land uses are 
acceptable on the site by reference to criteria (i) to (iv), such that if a 
proposal conflicts with one or more of those criteria it must be treated as 
being in breach of REM10.  
31 Thornhill 
Estates Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Ors [2015] 
EWHC 3169  
I do not accept the criticism that by referring to paragraph 49 NPPF, or by 
using the word "now" the Inspector was limiting his consideration to five 
year housing land supply issues. The context of the sentences and the 
reference to the application of N34 through the Interim Policy and to 
paragraph 14 militates against that.  
 
 
32 Daventry 
District Council 
v Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
And Local 
Government & 
Anor [2015] 
EWHC 3459  
In Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13, Lord 
Reed (with whose judgment Lord Brown, Lord Hope, Lord Kerr and Lord 
Dyson agreed) said, at [17]: "It has long been established that a planning 
authority must proceed upon a proper understanding of the development 
plan… 
 
33 Meyrick, R (On 
the Application 
Of) v 
Bournemouth 
Borough 
Council [2015] 
EWHC 4045  
the definition of 'deliberate neglect' adopted in the officer's report cannot 
be faulted…it can be taken to imply a conscious decision to fail to take 
proper care of a heritage asset.  
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34 Edward Ware 
Homes Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2016] 
EWHC 103   
"Housing supply policies" in a development plan may include policies 
which deal with or direct the distribution of the housing to be provided 
during the plan period.  
35 The London 
Borough of 
Bromley v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2016] 
EWHC 595  
In my judgment, it is unnecessary to gloss the paragraph 89 exceptions 
and they should be read naturally and in the context that it is part of the 
statutory planning code that permission for new buildings always carries 
with it permission for the use of the buildings.  
 
36  JJ Gallagher 
Ltd & Ors v 
Cherwell 
District Council 
& Anor [2016] 
EWHC 290  
 
where a policy is neither obscure nor ambiguous it is not necessary or 
appropriate to resort to other documents outside the local plan to help with 
the interpretation of policy… The starting point to be taken when 
interpreting planning policy seems to me to be the wording of the policy 
itself,  
 
I reject the submission that the words used in Bicester 13, in themselves, 
and in their context, admit some built development within the CTA. The 
words used are perfectly clear; they do not permit any development within 
the CTA… the wording makes sense in context…the supporting 
paragraphs are entirely consistent 
37  Cheshire East 
Borough 
Council v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2016] 
EWHC 571   
In my judgment, DL20 is clearly correct, neatly and appositely 
characterising the approach mandated by paragraph 14 of the NPPF.  
 
I entirely reject Mr Hunter's submission that the use of the verb "must" in 
DL40 betrays an erroneous approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38  Williams, R 
(on the 
application of) 
v Powys 
County 
Council & Anor 
[2016] EWHC 
480  
Turning now to the meaning of 'affect', … primary legislation in the case 
both of the Norfolk Broads and other Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
require the relevant authorities to have regard to the purpose of 
conserving and enhancing the natural beauty of the area in question…. 
'beauty' is a concept based for present purposes on visual appreciation; 
'site' is not.  
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39 St Modwen 
Developments 
Ltd v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government & 
Anor [2016] 
EWHC 968  
 
Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13 held that the 
interpretation of planning policy was a matter for the Courts and not for the 
reasonable interpretation of the decision-maker, returning planning policy 
to the status of all other policies when it came to their interpretation. But 
beyond saying that it required an objective interpretation and in context, it 
said very little about what tools, materials or approach should be used in 
the interpretation exercise by the Court 
"Now" means "now", and I accept that "available now" looks to the present 
availability of the land in question.  
 Mr Young is also making the words "available now" cover both the 
absence of ownership constraints, and possibly the removal of any need 
for the owner to find alternative land for, for example, any statutory 
function carried out on the land in question, as well as the grant of 
permission. This is working the phrase too hard.  
A bespoke approach is required for the interpretation by the Court of 
statements made by the policy-maker, for the benefit of those who are 
affected, as to how he intends in general to use his discretionary powers. 
The policy-maker of the NPPF cannot say that he meant one thing when 
he used words which mean something else. But when the policy-maker 
produces a subordinate document to expand upon what he has previously 
said, which does not and is not expressly intended to contradict it, that 
document may assist the Court in understanding what was intended in the 
first place and why, thus assisting it in its task of interpretation. This is not 
substituting his views for the interpretation of the Court.  
Mr Young contended that the Inspector had misinterpreted what 
"deliverable" meant in NPPF [47]…The Inspector had focused on "supply" 
and not on "deliverable supply"…In my judgment, the Inspector made no 
error of interpretation of the NPPF at all….   
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